Dynamics and collective phenomena of social systems by Gracia Lázaro, Carlos et al.
2012 73
Carlos Gracia Lázaro
Dynamics and collective
phenomena of social
systems
Departamento
Director/es
Física de la Materia Condensada
Moreno Vega, Yamir
Floría Peralta, Luis Mario
Director/es
Tesis Doctoral
Autor
Repositorio de la Universidad de Zaragoza – Zaguan   http://zaguan.unizar.es
UNIVERSIDAD DE ZARAGOZA 
Departamento
Director/es
Carlos Gracia Lázaro
DYNAMICS AND COLLECTIVE
PHENOMENA OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS
Director/es
Física de la Materia Condensada
Moreno Vega, Yamir
Floría Peralta, Luis Mario
Tesis Doctoral
Autor
2012
Repositorio de la Universidad de Zaragoza – Zaguan   http://zaguan.unizar.es
UNIVERSIDAD DE ZARAGOZA
Departamento
Director/es
Director/es
Tesis Doctoral
Autor
Repositorio de la Universidad de Zaragoza – Zaguan   http://zaguan.unizar.es
UNIVERSIDAD DE ZARAGOZA
Dynamics and Collective Phenomena
of Social Systems.
(Dina´mica y Feno´menos Colectivos de Sistemas Sociales)
Carlos Gracia La´zaro
Departamento de Fı´sica de la Materia Condensada
Universidad de Zaragoza
Memoria presentada para acceder al grado de doctor,
bajo la direccio´n del Doctor Mario Florı´a Peralta y el Doctor Yamir Moreno Vega.
September 13, 2012
1. MARIO FLOR´IA PERALTA, Profesor catedra´tico del Departamento de Fı´sica de la
Materia Condensada de la Universidad de Zaragoza ,
CERTIFICA
que la presente memoria, “Dynamics and Collective Phenomena of Social Systems”, ha sido
realizada en el Departamento de Fı´sica de la Materia Condensada de la Universidad de
Zaragoza bajo su direccio´n, y autoriza su presentacio´n para que sea calificada como tesis
doctoral.
Zaragoza, a 13 de septiembre de 2012
Fdo: Mario Florı´a Peralta
2. YAMIR MORENO VEGA, Profesor titular del Departamento de Fı´sica teo´rica de la
Universidad de Zaragoza ,
CERTIFICA
que la presente memoria, “Dynamics and Collective Phenomena of Social Systems”, ha
sido realizada en el Departamento de Fı´sica de la Materia Condensada de la Universidad de
Zaragoza bajo su direccio´n, y autoriza su presentacio´n para que sea calificada como tesis
doctoral.
Zaragoza, a 13 de septiembre de 2012
Fdo: Yamir Moreno Vega
ii
Agradecimientos
En primer lugar quiero dar las gracias a mis directores de Tesis, Luis Mario Florı´a y Yamir
Moreno, profesores, compan˜eros y amigos, por su apoyo y dedicacio´n, por introducirme en
el mundo de la investigacio´n y proporcionarme tantas oportunidades. Tanto sus ensen˜anzas
cientı´ficas como su amistad tienen y tendra´n un valor incalculable.
Tambie´n agracezco a los coautores de los trabajos aquı´ presentados, Jesu´s Go´mez, Anxo
Sa´nchez, Jose Cuesta, Laura Herna´ndez, Fernando Quijandrı´a, Alfredo Ferrer, Gonzalo Ruiz
y Alfonso Taranco´n todo lo que he aprendido de ellos y el excelente ambiente de trabajo.
De la misma manera, y por los mismos motivos, quiero expresar mi agradecimiento a los
colaboradores de estos trabajos, entre ellos a Juanjo Molinero, Cristina Vin˜as, Jelena Grujic´,
Elisa Cahue´, Maria Pilar Pe´rez, Fermı´n Serrano y Sandro Meloni, compan˜ero de trabajo, de
despacho y de experiencias.
Gracias a mi compan˜ero de despacho, Javier Borge, por su ayuda, por sus a´nimos y,
como no, por las charlas. Deseo mostrar mi agradecimiento tambie´n a los compan˜eros
del Laboratorio de Redes y Sistemas Complejos COSNET Lab: Emanuele Cozzo, Joaquı´n
Sanz, Alessio Cardillo y Pablo Piedrahita y a los visitantes Chengyi Xia, Arezky Herna´ndez,
Christian Sanabria y Zhen Wang por su camaraderı´a y los buenos momentos compartidos.
Igualmente gracias a todos los miembros del grupo de Fı´sica Estadı´stica y No Lineal
de la Universidad de Zaragoza, por el magnı´fico entorno de trabajo que habe´is compartido
conmigo, ası´ como a todos los compan˜eros del Instituto de Biocomputacio´n y Fı´sica de
Sistemas Complejos, gracias por todo.
A los compan˜eros del Centro Cı´vico Universidad: Carmen, Susana, Teresa, Pilar, Mari
Carmen, Gerardo, Miguel ´Angel, Manolo, Ricardo, Ezequiel, Fernando y Jose Luis, gracias
por facilitarme todo durante el desarrollo de este trabajo y soportar mis turnos.
Y, como no, quiero dedicar esta tesis a Marı´a, por haberme acompan˜ado todos estos an˜os,
apoya´ndome en todas las circustancias y siempre que lo he necesitado.
iii
iv
Contents
Resumen ix
1 Introduction. 1
1.1 Game theory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1.1 Definitions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1.2 Normal form. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.3 Pure and mixed strategies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1.4 Minimax rule. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1.5 Dominant strategy. Nash equilibrium. Stability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1.6 Evolutionary game theory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.1.6.1 Replicator equations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.1.6.2 Replicator dynamics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.1.6.3 Other update rules. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2 Complex networks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2.1 Definitions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2.2 Properties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.2.3 Weighted networks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.2.4 Real networks: distributions and topologies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.2.4.1 Regular graphs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.2.4.2 Random graphs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.2.4.3 Small-world networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.2.4.4 Scale-free networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.2.4.5 Configuration model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.3 Sociophysics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.3.1 Agent based models. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
v
CONTENTS
1.3.2 Topology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
I The emergence of cooperation. 27
2 The dipole model: Thermodynamic study of a social system. 33
2.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.2 Natural strategic selection on graphs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.3 The Dipole Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.4 The role of social structure in Big Brothers competition. . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.4.1 F is a disconnected graph (ideal-gas). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.4.2 F is a random regular graph. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.4.2.1 Mean-field approximation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.4.2.2 Numerical results, and the mean-field failure. . . . . . . . . . 49
2.4.3 What if BB1 and BB2 are directly connected? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.4.4 Low c approximation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.4.5 General case: F is a general random graph. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.4.5.1 Fluctuations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.5 Heat transfer: Two dipoles in contact. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.5.1 The double dipole model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.5.2 Dynamics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.5.3 Effective temperature. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.5.4 Mean-field approximation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.5.5 Numerical results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.6 Prospective remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3 Cooperation in changing environments: Irreversibility in the transition to cooper-
ation in complex networks. 67
3.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.2 The model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.3 Results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.3.1 Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.3.2 Scale-free networks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.4 Microscopic roots. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
vi
CONTENTS
4 Evolutionary dynamics on interdependent populations. 77
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.2 The model: Evolutionary dynamics on two interacting populations. . . . . . . . 79
4.3 Well-mixed populations: Analytical formulation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.4 Phase portrait analysis of the two-variable replicator equation . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.4.1 Symmetric case: N1 = N2(= N). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.4.2 General case: N1 6= N2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.5 Random networks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5 Human behavior in Prisoner’s Dilemma experiments suppresses network reci-
procity. 93
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
6 Heterogeneous networks do not promote cooperation when humans play a Pris-
oner’s Dilemma. 103
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
6.2 The experiments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
6.3 Results and Discussions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
6.4 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
6.5 Appendix 1: Additional material about the experimental results . . . . . . . . . 114
6.6 Appendix 2: Experimental setup. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
6.6.1 Volunteer recruitment and treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
6.6.2 Experimental platform and interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
6.6.3 Synchronous play and automatic actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
6.6.4 Questionnaires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
II An evolutionary dynamics approach to tolerance. 123
7 Residential segregation and cultural dissemination: An Axelrod-Schelling model. 131
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
7.2 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
7.3 Results and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
vii
CONTENTS
7.4 Theorical analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
7.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
8 Selective advantage of tolerant cultural traits in the Axelrod-Schelling model. 147
8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
8.2 The transition from fragmented multiculturalism to globalization revisited . . . 148
8.3 Heterogeneous intolerance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
8.4 Summary and concluding remarks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
9 Co-evolutionnary network approach to cultural dynamics controlled by intoler-
ance. 163
9.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
9.2 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
9.3 Results and discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
9.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
10 Conclusions. 173
Bibliography 179
viii
Resumen
Introduccio´n
Esta tesis aborda el estudio de sistemas sociales utilizando los procedimientos teo´ricos de la
fı´sica. Para abordar estos problemas existen evidentemente me´todos de ana´lisis y predictivos
en la sociologı´a, pero la aportacio´n de la fı´sica proporciona tanto nuevas perspectivas
complementarias como potentes herramientas. Este enfoque resulta especialmente u´til en los
problemas que involucran aspectos estoca´sticos y de dina´mica no lineal. Los procedimientos
utilizados pertenecen a la fı´sica de sistemas complejos e incluyen, adema´s de los me´todos
matema´ticos tradicionales de la fı´sica, los tomados de distintas disciplinas matema´ticas como
las redes complejas, la teorı´a de juegos o la percolacio´n. La aportacio´n no consiste u´nicamente
en los procedimientos de ca´lculo y predictivos, sino sobre todo en el estudio de las propiedades
emergentes que surgen de los planteamientos holı´sticos.
Contenidos
Se estudian sistemas particulares (no exclusivamente sociales) mediante la introduccio´n de
diferentes modelos basados en el agente (ABM), a trave´s de redes de auto´matas. Cuando
es posible, los modelos son analizados siguiendo me´todos matema´ticos de la fı´sica, con el
fin de alcanzar soluciones analı´ticas. Complementariamente al desarrollo teo´rico, se realiza el
tratamiento experimental mediante simulaciones nume´ricas, tanto con me´todos de Monte Carlo
como determinı´sticos o mixtos. Este me´todo de trabajo se ha revelado muy fructı´fero para el
estudio de diferentes problemas abiertos, a los que se pretende contribuir en su comprensio´n.
ix
0. RESUMEN
Primera parte: Cooperacio´n.
La emergencia de la cooperacio´n en escenarios hostiles, donde la accio´n egoı´sta es ma´s
beneficiosa en primera instancia, constituye un objeto de estudio en diferentes campos de la
ciencia. Por ejemplo, la aparicio´n de organismos multicelulares, el comportamiento gregario
en animales o la formacio´n de sociedades humanas son estudiados mediante este enfoque. En
primera aproximacio´n la cooperacio´n no se ve favorecida: Un organismo, animal o persona
al cooperar gasta unos recursos que puede necesitar para subsistir, mientras que el agente
egoı´sta sale beneficiado arriesgando menos su superviviencia. De acuerdo con este argumento,
la evolucio´n conllevarı´a una progresiva disminucio´n de los individuos cooperadores, para
terminar con poblaciones formadas exclusivamente por agentes egoı´stas.
Como respuesta a este interrogante evolutivo (ya planteado por Charles Darwin) se han
ido introduciendo diferentes mecanismos. La seleccio´n de parentesco, introducida por William
Hamilton, consiste en una estrategia que permite conservar el genoma mediante el sacrificio de
un individuo en favor de la supervivencia de seres con los que comparte una alta proporcio´n
de genes. No obstante, este mecanismo no explica la cooperacio´n entre individuos sin relacio´n
de parentesco, para la que se han ido postulando diferentes mecanismos en los ultimos treinta
an˜os.
Por un lado, la reciprocidad directa, propuesta por Robert Trivers, se basa en el beneficio
que obtienen al cooperar dos agentes cuando interaccionan entre ellos repetidas veces, pese a
que en una u´nica interaccio´n un agente egoı´sta se viera favorecido frente a un cooperador.
Por otro lado, segu´n el mecanismo de reciprocidad de red propuesta por Robert Alxerod
en 1983 y formalizada posteriormente por Martin A. Nowak y Lord Robert May, cuando la
poblacio´n esta´ dotada de una estructura subyacente, de manera que un individuo interacciona
so´lo con ciertos agentes, la cooperacio´n puede verse favorecida en agrupaciones (clusters) de
elementos cooperadores que se ayuden mutuamente, consiguiendo una ventaja evolutiva frente
a los egoı´stas.
La metodologı´a seguida en los trabajos presentados consiste en implementar en diferentes
topologı´as de red los procesos de toma de decisiones de la teorı´a evolutiva de juegos.
Este me´todo ha resultado ser muy fructı´fero en las u´ltimas de´cadas para abordar diferentes
problemas. Los resultados muestran co´mo, para algunas dina´micas evolutivas, la estructura
subyacente favorece la cooperacio´n a trave´s de la reciprocidad de red. En particular, en el
modelo dipolo introducido en el capı´tulo 2, la formulacio´n termodina´mica permite interpretar
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los indicadores sociales macrosco´picos como observables fı´sicos, para posteriormente poder
inferir resultados analı´ticos. Este modelo permite, a trave´s de la distribucio´n de Boltzmann,
un ana´lisis riguroso de un sistema consistente en una poblacio´n influenciada por dos conjuntos
opuestos. La interpretacio´n del modelo en te´rminos sociales dota de significado matema´tico
al concepto de temperatura social. Llevando ma´s lejos este paralelismo, se estudia como se
comportan dos poblaciones en contacto desde la perspectiva de la transmisio´n de calor entre
dos sistemas termodina´micos bajo la influencia de respectivos ban˜os te´rmicos. A pesar de que,
al igual que la mayorı´a de los modelos sociales, el modelo no es conservativo, se muestra como
la entropı´a en te´rminos de informacio´n es un punto de inicio so´lido para el estudio de dichos
modelos.
En en el capı´tulo 3 se profundiza en el estudio de la teorı´a evolutiva de juegos en redes
complejas: Partiendo de investigaciones previas sobre la robustez a las condiciones iniciales,
se toma un modelo caracterı´stico (dilema del prisionero en diferentes redes aleatorias) con
el fin de estudiar la reversibilidad del proceso. Una vez que el sistema alcanza el equilibrio,
se varı´a adiaba´ticamente un para´metro de la matriz de pagos. Los resultados muestran un
comportamiento reversible del modelo dentro de un amplio rango de valores del para´metro.
No obstante, se demuestra le existencia de un punto de no retorno a partir del cual el sistema
exhibe un comportamiento no reversible, dando lugar a un ciclo de histe´resis. Esto es,
existe un estado lı´mite tal que, una vez sobrepasado, la poblacio´n no recupera los valores
anteriores de cooperacio´n al reestablecer el estı´mulo. Este resultado puede ser de utilidad en
diferentes a´mbitos como el ecolo´gico (punto lı´mite de degradacio´n de un habitat, por ejemplo),
econo´mico (situaciones desesperadas), etce´tera.
A pesar de los diferentes mecanismos para explicar la persistencia de la cooperacio´n en
entornos hostiles, un problema de difı´cil solucio´n es aquel en el que la poblacio´n esta´ bien
mezclada, esto es, cuando todos los agentes esta´n relacionados entre sı´. En el capı´tulo 4
se estudia una dina´mica evolutiva de la teorı´a de juegos, la dina´mica replicador aplicada al
dilema del prisionero, implementada en dos redes totalmente conectadas acopladas entre sı´.
El modelo consiste en dos poblaciones que interaccionan internamente mediante el dilema del
prisionero evolutivo, acopladas -no evolutivamente- a trave´s de un incentivo menos gravoso
para la cooperacio´n (halco´n-paloma). En el caso de poblaciones bien mezcladas, en el lı´mite
termodina´mico, los resultados analı´ticos obtenidos muestran que, para determinados valores de
los para´metros, la cooperacio´n no decae a cero; de hecho, evoluciona a estados polarizados y
casi-polarizados. Adema´s del caso anterior con solucio´n analı´tica, se estudia nume´ricamente el
xi
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comportamiento del modelo en redes finitas aleatorias, donde se reproducen cualitativamente
los resultados anteriores. En el caso de las redes aleatorias, la cooperacio´n esta´ influı´da por dos
mecanismos superpuestos: la polarizacio´n y la reciprocidad de red. Por un lado, para valores
pequen˜os del para´metro que penaliza la cooperacio´n, la polarizacio´n se opone a la reciprocidad
de red. Por otro lado, para valores mayores del para´metro los dos mecanismos promocionan la
cooperacio´n, vie´ndose e´sta doblemente potenciada. Los resultados del estudio aportan nuevos
mecanismos de control aplicables a diferentes campos.
En cualquier caso, las soluciones al problema general de la emergencia de la cooperacio´n
dependen del a´mbito especı´fico considerado. En lo concerniente a las interacciones humanas,
durante los u´ltimos veinte an˜os ha habido una gran controversia sobre la dependencia del nivel
de cooperacio´n respecto a la estructura de la red de contactos. Pese a los mu´ltiples estudios
teo´ricos realizados, los resultados no son concluyentes, puesto que una de las hipo´tesis de
partida es la manera en la que las personas actualizan su accio´n, esto es, sus estrategias.
Estas estrategias habitualmente dependen del beneficio obtenido por los agentes del entorno
y sus respectivas acciones. No obstante, recientes experimentos indican que las estrategias en
las interacciones entre personas no tienen en cuenta el beneficio de los agentes con los que
interaccionan, sino el nivel de cooperacio´n en la vecindad. Estos trabajos experimentales esta´n
realizados sobre conjuntos de pequen˜o o mediano taman˜o. En el estudio presentado en el
capı´tulo 5, se introducen las estrategias propuestas en estos trabajos y se estudia teo´ricamente
el comportamiento bajo diferentes redes subyacentes de creciente complejidad: totalmente
conectadas, regulares y heteroge´neas, siendo estas u´ltimas las que se encuentran en los
sistemas sociales. Aunque el primer supuesto se puede resolver analı´ticamente, los restantes
se resuelven mediante simulaciones nume´ricas. Los resultados muestran que, cuando las
estrategias son independientes de la matriz de pagos, el nivel de cooperacio´n es independiente
de la topologı´a de la red.
Las consecuencias del resultado suponen que, en el a´mbito de las interacciones humanas
y ante un problema que pueda ser descrito mediante el dilema del prisionero, el mecanismo
de reciprocidad de red no juega un papel determinante en la emergencia de la cooperacio´n.
Verificar esta prediccio´n implica la realizacio´n de experimentos a gran escala, requisito
necesario para reproducir las redes de conectividad heteroge´neas presentes en las sociedades.
En el capı´tulo 6 se muestra el ensayo realizado para confirmar la anterior hipo´tesis: En primer
lugar, se realiza un experimento con una red regular de 625 individuos. Por otro lado, se
realiza simulta´neamente otro experimento en una red heteroge´nea, en la que la conectividad
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varı´a para cada individuo. Cada uno de estos experimentos consta a su vez de dos fases: el
experimento propiamente dicho y una fase de control en la que se elimina el efecto de la red
mediante una reconexio´n aleatoria de los contactos en cada ronda. La interaccio´n se realiza
a trave´s del dilema del prisionero, donde el mayor beneficio colectivo se obtiene mediante la
mutua colaboracio´n, pero la accio´n egoı´sta frente a un cooperador proporciona mayor ganancia
individual. Los resultados del experimento confirman las predicciones teo´ricas del capı´tulo 5,
no apareciendo diferencia en los niveles de cooperacio´n para las dos redes estudiadas dentro
del margen de error del experimento.
Segunda parte: La tolerancia como variable en la dina´mica cultural.
Mientras la dina´mica de opinio´n estudia las probabilidades que tiene un grupo social de
alcanzar consenso respecto a una materia, la dina´mica cultural surge como una generalizacio´n
en la que la cultura se modela a trave´s de un vector de opiniones. El modelo ma´s representativo
de dina´mica cultural es el propuesto por Robert Axelrod en 1997, donde se explora la idea de
homofilia, esto es, la tendencia de las personas a relacionarse con similares. Esta similitud
puede referirse a diferentes atributos (como idioma, clase social, religio´n, polı´tica, etce´tera)
que constituyen las componentes del vector cultural. El nu´mero de posibles valores que pueden
tomar estos atributos es una variable independiente que representa la diversidad cultural inicial.
El sistema proporciona dos fases diferenciadas: una multicultural caracterizada por la falta
de consenso y otra de globablizacio´n en la que los individuos comparten opinio´n sobre los
diferentes atributos. Desde entonces, se han estudiado mu´ltiples modificaciones al modelo
original, ası´ como otros nuevos, siendo un campo multidisciplinar muy activo actualmente.
En esta segunda parte de la tesis se aborda el concepto de tolerancia, esto es, el grado de
aceptacio´n frente a un elemento de diferente opinio´n, introducie´ndolo como una variable de
la dina´mica cultural. En el capı´tulo 7, partiendo de los modelos de segregacio´n urbana de
Schelling y cultural de Axelrod, disen˜amos un nuevo modelo (Axelrod-Schelling) en el que los
agentes se mueven en funcio´n de la desavenencia con los nodos de su entorno, caracterizada por
un umbral de intolerancia. Al dotar de movilidad al modelo de Axelrod, por un lado se favorece
la fase de globalizacio´n cultural, hasta el punto de que, incluso para pequen˜as densidades de
huecos, el para´metro de orden escala con el nu´mero total de agentes. Por otro lado, cuando los
huecos superan el umbral de percolacio´n, adema´s de las dos fases caracterı´sticas del modelo
de Axelrod aparece una nueva fase fragmentada multicultural para valores pequen˜os de la
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diversidad cultural inicial. Junto con el estudio de los estados de equilibrio, la movilidad
introducida proporciona interesantes procesos de clusterizacio´n, erosio´n y adhesio´n.
¿Puede la intolerancia considerarse una caracterı´stica cultural susceptible de imitacio´n y
difusio´n? De ser ası´: ¿En que´ circustancias tiene una cultura tolerante ma´s posibilidades de
difundirse respecto a una intolerante? A diferencia del modelo anterior, donde la tolerancia
es una constante del sistema, en la modificacio´n introducida en el capı´tulo 8 se considera
la intolerancia como un cara´cter cultural del individuo y, al igual que a los otros caracteres
propios del modelo Axelrod original, se le permite variar por imitacio´n cultural. El desarrollo
de este refinamiento permite estudiar los casos en los que hay, o no, ventaja selectiva de las
culturas respecto a la tolerancia.
Mientras en los capı´tulos [7,8] se introduce la tolerancia en el modelo original de Axelrod
a trave´s de la movilidad, en el capı´tulo 9 introducimos una probabilidad de reconexio´n,
permitiendo a los agentes eliminar los enlaces con sus vecinos dispares si su similaridad
cultural es inferior a un para´metro de tolerancia. La principal diferencia de este modelo con
el Axelrod-Schelling anterior es que, ademas de estar dispuestos los agentes en una red no
regular, e´sta es dina´mica, con una evolucio´n dada por la propia dina´mica cultural, lo que le
confiere mayor representatividad. Tal y como muestran los resultados, en sociedades tolerantes
el mecanismo de reconexio´n promueve el consenso cultural respecto a las redes esta´ticas. No
obstante, valores intermedios de la tolerancia evitan la reconexio´n una vez que la red esta´
fragmentada, lo que determina una sociedad multicultural para valores de la diversidad inicial
que en el modelo original de Axelrod implican globalizacio´n. Por u´ltimo, en sociedades
intolerantes, aunque transitoriamente se forman grupos culturales aislados, la reconexio´n
inducida por la baja tolerancia facilita la transmisio´n cultural entre los diferentes grupos,
resultando sociedades globalizadas incluso para valores muy altos de la diversidad cultural
inicial. En definitiva, valores intermedios de la tolerancia favorecen el multiculturalismo,
mientras que valores extremos favorecen la globalizacio´n.
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Chapter 1
Introduction.
1.1 Game theory.
In 1944, mathematician John von Neumann and economist Oskar Morgenstern established a
definition of game and its components (1):
“First, one must distinguish between the abstract concept of a game, and the individual plays of that
game. The game is simply the totality of the rules which describe it. Every particular instance at which
the game is played in a particular way from beginning to end, is a play. Second, the corresponding
distinction should be made for the moves, which are the component elements of the game. A move is the
occasion of a choice between various alternatives, to be made either by one of the players, or by some
device subject to chance, under conditions precisely prescribed by the rules of the game. The move is
nothing but this abstract occasion, with the attendant details of description, i.e. a component of the
game. The specific alternative chosen in a concrete instance i.e. in a concrete play is the choice. Thus
the moves are related to the choices in the same way as the game is to the play. The game consists
of a sequence of moves, and the play of a sequence of choices. Finally, the rules of the game should
not be confused with the strategies of the players.[...] Each player selects his strategy i.e. the general
principles governing his choices freely. [...] The rules of the game, however, are absolute commands.
If they are ever infringed, then the whole transaction by definition ceases to be the game described by
those rules.” (von Neumann and Morgenstern. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944)).
Game theory (GT) is an area of applied mathematics that uses models to study interactions
with formalized incentive structures (i.e. games), and is therefore a field closely related to
decision theory. The origins of game theory go far back in time: In 1713, James Waldegrave
proposed a solution for a two player game (2). Nevertheless, GT as a specific field did not
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appear until 1928 through a series of papers published by John von Neumann (3). Modern game
theory was comprehensively formalized in 1962 by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern
(1), and experienced a very important step forward with John Nash’s contribution of strategic
equilibrium: the Nash equilibrium (4). GT was firstly developed as a tool for understanding
economic behavior, but now is applied in many fields such as biology, physics, sociology, traffic
control, etcetera; in fact, it applies to a wide variety of agents including humans, microorganism
and nonhuman animals. Further refinements to game theory include evolving populations and
underlying topologies, among others.
1.1.1 Definitions.
In this section is a brief introduction to game theory related to the focus of this thesis, a deeper
study can be found in (5; 6; 7).
A game is a mathematical representation of a conflict situation. The outcome (pay-off) results
from mutual interaction between different agents or players. A player is defined as a decision
maker: a person, a people group, an animal or whatever kind of element. Based on the number
of players N ≥ 2, games are classified as two-person games, three-person games, and in gen-
eral as N-person games. The interactions between the players are governed by rules that state
the actions each player can take, the information each player has available and the outcomes of
the actions. A strategy defines the actions that a player will follow in every scenario.
There is a distinction between games with perfect, complete and incomplete information.
Perfect information describes the situation when each player has available the information to
determine all of the possible scenarios, strategies, actions and outcomes all game long: so,
players have full information about the actions that have already taken place. In games with
complete information, each player knows the rules of the game and the payoff functions of all
the players, but players may not see all of the actions chosen by other players. In incomplete
information games, players may not know some information about the other players (actions,
strategies, payoffs) or about the rules (e.g. game’s length).
According to the updating, games can be classified as simultaneous and sequential games.
In simultaneous games, players choose their actions simultaneously, therefore, players may
predict other players’ action but don’t know it. By extension, a game can be classified as
simultaneous if decisions are not taken simultaneously but players’ actions are in ignorance
of others players’ actions. On the contrary, in sequential games players make decisions in
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sequential order and later players have some knowledge on actions already taken by earlier
players.
Based on the total outcome, there are zero-sum games and non-zero-sum games. In a zero-
sum game, a player’s gain (or loss) is balanced by the losses (or gains) of the other players(s),
i.e. the total pay-offs for the players, for every combination of the available actions, sum
to zero. Otherwise, in non-zero-sum games, total payoff is different from zero. Attending the
indiscernibility of players, games can be classified between symmetric or asymmetric games. In
symmetric games, payoffs depend only on the actions, not on who is chosen them. Otherwise,
the game is asymmetric.
1.1.2 Normal form.
A game can be can be represented through different forms, such as extensive and normal form.
Normal form is a description of a game by way of a matrix that relates players’ actions to payoff
functions. In order to have a normal form description of a game, we take in consideration the
following data:
i) A set N of players, N = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
ii) Each player u has a finite number of actions, represented by the actions setAu = {1, 2, . . . ,mu}.
iii) Each player u has a payoff function associated (Pu : A1 × A2 × . . . × An → R) that
provides the payoff of player u.
Definition: A game in normal form is a structure G = 〈N,A,F〉, where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is
a set of players, A = {A1, A2, . . . , An} is an n-tuple of actions sets, one for each player, and
F = {F1, F2, . . . , Fn} is an n-tuple of payoff functions.
The normal form of a two-person symmetric game is given by a pair (A,P ), where A is
a nonempty set, the set of actions, and P is a real-valued function defined on A × A, (i.e.,
P (ij) ∈ R, ∀ i, j ∈ A.). The payoff matrix P, defined as Pij = P (i, j), represents the payoff
of player I, given the actions chosen by players I and II are i and j respectively. Note that P is a
m×m matrix, where m is the number of possible actions. Inasmuch as the game is symmetric,
player II’s payoff is given by P (j, i). In particular, a two-player m-action symmetric game is
defined by the matrix:
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P =


P11 P12 . . . P1m
P21 P22 . . . P2m
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Pm1 Pm2 . . . Pmm

 =


P (1, 1) P (1, 2) . . . P (1,m)
P (2, 1) P (2, 2) . . . P (2,m)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
P (m, 1) P (m, 1) . . . P (m,m)

 (1.1)
1.1.3 Pure and mixed strategies.
A player’s strategy determine the action the player will take at any stage of the game. A strategy
profile or strategy combination is a set of strategies for each player which fully specifies all
actions in a game. A strategy profile consists of one and only one strategy for every player.
Then, strategy and move are different concepts: A move is an action taken by a player at
some point of the game. On the other hand, a strategy is a player’s algorithm that relates
every scenario to the player’s actions (8; 9). Although the terms action and strategy represent
different concepts, sometimes have been used interchangeably, especially for the last twenty
years. This is due to the use of repeated one-round games in evolutionary dynamics, where the
players action change is sometimes studied according to updating rules. In this thesis we try
to recover the original meaning of such terms; nevertheless, in chapter 2 we use the notation
strategy, updating rule. Note that original notation provides more levels: move, action, strategy,
updating rule.
A pure strategy R determines the move a player will make for any scenario. A player’s
strategy set {R1, R2, . . . , Rm} is the set of pure strategies available to that player. The convex
linear combination set S of pure strategies
S = {p = (p1, . . . , pm) ∈ Rm : pi ≥ 0,
m∑
i=1
pi = 1} (1.2)
is the set of mixed strategies. Therefore, a mixed strategy p is an assignment of a probability
pi to each pure strategy Ri.
1.1.4 Minimax rule.
Minimax is a decision algorithm for minimize losses under the maximum loss scenario; sim-
ilarly, maximin rule consists in maximizing the minimum payoff. John von Neumann proved
the minimax theorem in 1928 (3): He stated that in every two-person zero-sum game with
finitely many pure strategies, there exists a value V and a mixed strategy pj for each player j,
such that:
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i) Given player 2’s strategy p2, the best payoff possible for player 1 is V , and
ii) Given player 1’s strategy p1, the best payoff possible for player 2 is V .
Subsequently, it has been extended to other types of games. A generalization of Neumann’s
minimax theorem is the Sion’s minimax theorem that states (10):
Let X be a compact convex subset of a linear topological space and Y a convex subset
of a linear topological space. Let f be a real-valued function on X × Y such that f(x, ·) is
upper semicontinuous and quasiconcave on Y , ∀x ∈ X , and f(·, y) is lower semicontinuous
and quasi-convex on X , ∀y ∈ Y . Then:
min
x∈X
sup
y∈Y
f(x, y) = sup
y∈Y
min
x∈X
f(x, y). (1.3)
In two-person zero-sum games, the minimax algorithm can be summarized as choosing
the best move for yourself (higher payoff) assuming that your opponent will choose the worse
for you (lower payoff). In an iterated game, minimax method implies considering all possible
moves for all players and rounds.
1.1.5 Dominant strategy. Nash equilibrium. Stability.
A strategy is a strict (resp. weak) dominant strategy if it provides greater (resp. greater or
equal) payoff to a given player than any other strategy, no matter other players’ strategies. Let
B be the set of strategies for which the function v → vPw gets its maximum value; then B is
called set of best responses to w.
A set of strategies is a Nash equilibrium if no player can get greater payoff by unilaterally
changing its strategy. Let Si be the strategy set for player i, S = S1 × S2 × ...× Sn be the set
of strategy profiles and fi(x) be the player-i’s payoff function for x ∈ S. Let xi be a strategy
profile of player i and x−i be a strategy profile of all players except for player i. A strategy
profile x∗ ∈ S is a weak Nash equilibrium if:
fi(x
∗
i , x
∗
−i) ≥ fi(xi, x∗−i), ∀i, xi ∈ Si, xi 6= x∗i . (1.4)
In the same way, a strategy profile x∗ ∈ S is a strict Nash equilibrium if:
fi(x
∗
i , x
∗
−i) > fi(xi, x
∗
−i), ∀i, xi ∈ Si, xi 6= x∗i . (1.5)
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A game is finite if the number of players and the number of pure strategies each player
has are both finite. Nash proved that, taking into account mixed strategies, at least one Nash
equilibrium exists for all finite games (4).
There is a intermediate equilibrium between strict and weak Nash equilibria. A Nash equi-
librium is stable if an infinitesimal change in probabilities for any player u implies: i) Any
other player v 6= u do not gets a higher payoff, ii) Player u gets a lower payoff.
1.1.6 Evolutionary game theory.
Evolutionary game theory (EGT) is defined as the application of game theory to evolving pop-
ulations, providing a useful framework to model Darwinian competition. The origins of EGT
can be found in John Maynard Smith and George R. Price’s study about the way in which ani-
mal conflict can be modeled through survival strategies in hostile scenarios (11). Evolutionary
game theory has been successfully used not only in many aspects of biology (e.g. the basis
of altruistic behaviors, the emergence of multicellular organisms, group selection, sexual se-
lection, parental care, coevolution or ecological dynamics), but also in other sciences such as
economics or sociology (12; 13; 14; 15; 16).
1.1.6.1 Replicator equations.
The usual method for studying evolutionary dynamics in GT is through replicator equations.
These replicator equations establish a relation between the growth rate of the proportion of
players using a certain strategy (that can be interpreted, for example, as a specie’s population
growth or a behavior evolution) and the difference between the average payoff of that strategy
and the average payoff of the whole population (respectively the specie’s fitness or the behavior
reward) (12; 13). Replicator equation assume infinite and well-mixed populations and continu-
ous time. Usually, the interest is not in the transient but in the steady-state solutions: the stable
states.
The replicator equation can be obtained from Darwinian arguments. Once postulated that
expected offspring of a kind (mutation, race, specie, ...) is proportional to the fitness (that
provides food, welfare, safety, ...), the growth ratio x˙i/xi of that kind i can be assumed as the
difference between kind’s fitness and mean population fitness, that is, x˙i/xi = fi(x) − f¯(x).
Assuming continuous time, the evolution of a population distributed in n (finite) kinds is given
by:
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x˙i = xi[fi(x)− µ(x)], µ(x) =
n∑
i=1
xifi(x) , (1.6)
where xi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) is the ratio of kind i in the population, fi(x) is the fitness of type
i, and µ(x) is the average population fitness. Since
∑
i xi = 1, the population vector x =
(x1, . . . , xn) evolves in the (n-1)-simplex defined by the n vertices xi = δij , j = 1, . . . , n.
Eq. 1.6 is the most general form of replicator equation.
Under the assumption that kind’s fitness is a linear function of population ratio, the repli-
cator equation can be written as:
x˙i = xi
(
(Px)i − xTPx
)
, (1.7)
where P is the payoff matrix and contain the fitness information, (Px)i represents the expected
payoff of i-kind and xTPx stands for the whole population’s mean payoff.
1.1.6.2 Replicator dynamics.
An alternative way to get the replicator equation, often used in social sciences, is based on the
concept of imitation, rather than offspring, most related to biology (15; 17; 18). Consider a
iterated two-player n-action symmetric game and a population of N players. Let be t the round
number, i = 1, 2, . . . , n the actions, xti the proportion of population choosing action i and
P ti = Pi(x
t) is the expected payoff of a player choosing i at time (round) t. The evolutionary
dynamics can be model in the following way (replicator dynamics): assume that each time
lapse dt, a randomly and equiprobably player u (the past action of u was i) chooses a random
player v (the past action of v was j) and u changes its action to j, if the payoff P tj of v is
greater than his payoff P ti , with a probability proportional to the payoff difference P tj − P ti .
That is, once two players with past actions i and j have been chosen, the first player’s change
probability is given by:
Πti→j = β(P
t
j − P ti )Θ(P tj − P ti ) , (1.8)
where Θ(y) is the Heaviside function (Θ(y) = 1 if y > 0 and 0 otherwise).
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If the actions are ordered (without loss of generality), such that P t1 ≤ P t2 ≤ . . . ≤ P tn, the
expected ratio of players choosing action i at time t+ dt will be given by:
x¯t+dti = x
t
i −
1
N
xti(dt)
n∑
j=i+1
xtjβ(P
t
j − P ti ) +
i∑
j=1
1
N
xtix
t
j(dt)β(P
t
i − P tj )
= xti +
xtiβ(dt)
N
(P ti − P¯ t) , (1.9)
where P¯ t =
∑
j P
t
jx
t
j is the whole population mean payoff. Under the assumption of large
population size, we can replace x¯t+dti by x
t+dt
i , getting:
x˙ti =
β
N
xti(P
t
i − P¯ t) . (1.10)
and making β = N (time rescaling), we get the replicator equation:
x˙i = xi(Pi − P¯ ) . (1.11)
The strategy above described, replicator dynamics, has been used extensively to describe
a large variety of problems. The main advantage is that it can be applied in finite and non-
well-mixed populations but, unfortunately, the mean-field description is not valid anymore and
those problems must be numerically solved, usually through extensive numerical simulations.
In fact, the first part of this thesis is focused in such kind of problems.
1.1.6.3 Other update rules.
A necessary ingredient of evolutionary game models is the way in which agents choose their
actions. In order to frame the thesis’ subject of study, this description is focused on repeated
two-player symmetric games. In simultaneous games (i.e., players choose their actions simul-
taneously), at a given time step, every player plays the game with all her neighbors, usually
using the same strategy in all pairings. If there is an underlying topology, the neighbors of
each player are given by the network(s) of the model (16). Once all the games are played each
agent collects the total payoff. Subsequently, players decide the action they will take in the
next round: This decision constitutes the strategy (update rule). Besides the aforementioned
replicator dynamics, some of the most used strategies are:
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Unconditional imitation: A randomly chosen player i compares its payoff Pi with its neighbor
with the largest payoff, say player j. If Pj > Pj player i will imitate in the next round the last
action taken by j. Otherwise, player i will repeat action (19).
Moran rule: A randomly chosen player i chooses one of its neighbors j proportionally to its
payoff Pj . In the next round agent i will chose the last action taken by j (20).
Fermi rule: A randomly chosen player i compares its payoff Pi with a random neighbor j. If
Pj > Pi player i will imitate in the next round the last action taken by j with a probability
proportional to:
Πi→j =
1
1 + e−β(Pj − Pi) . (1.12)
Otherwise, player i will repeat action (21).
Best-response: The best response is the strategy consisting on choosing, for the next round,
the action which would have produced the higher payoff in the past round, once each player
knows the chosen action by its neighbors. (22).
In some kind of problems, instead of considering that the strategies depend directly on
the payoff, it is more realistic to consider the fitness as a function of payoff. For instance,
weak selection describes situations in which the effects of payoff differences are small. Weak
selection has been extensively studied in evolutionary biology, and recently in evolutionary
game dynamics (24). Nevertheless, not all the usual strategies take into consideration the
payoffs: Majority rule consists on the imitation of most common action in the neighborhood,
and analysis players’ strategies, described in chapters 5 and 6, consists on the imitation of
neighborhood actions with a probability proportional to their frequency (23).
1.2 Complex networks.
The study of the relations among elements of different systems unveil underlying networks:
Regardless of its origins, many networks of different areas can be characterized through com-
mon schemes, showing similar properties (25; 26; 27; 28). Examples of this can be found in
biology (e.g., regulatory, metabolic, signaling or neuronal networks), sociology (e.g., scientific
colaborations, coworking relations or information exchange networks) and technology (e.g.,
internet). The topology of the interaction network may provide the key to understanding many
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A) B) C)
Figure 1.1: Examples of graphs. Although the three graphs have a similar number of nodes, only
the one on the right can be considered a complex network. A) Regular lattice of 25x25 (625 nodes).
B) Regular lattice of 25x25 (625 nodes) with periodical boundary conditions. C) Complex network
consisting of 700 nodes and a heterogeneous connectivity according to a binomial distribution.
Different colors and diameters represent different connectivities.
complex systems and, in fact, complex networks have become a new paradigm for complexity
(29).
1.2.1 Definitions.
A graph G = {N,L} consists of two sets N and L, such that N is not empty and L is a set of
couples of elements of N . If L is ordered (unordered), then the graph is directed (undirected).
The elements ni of N are called vertices or nodes and the elements li of L are the links or
edges. Let N and K be the number of elements in N and L, respectively. We can refer to a
node by its order number i, then a link l consisting of couple (i, j) can be referred by lij or by
lk, where k is the order number of the link l in set L. The link lij is said to be incident in nodes
i and j, or to join i and j. Two nodes (i,j) are adjacent, connected or neighbors if there exists
a link lij incident in nodes i and j. G′ = {N ′, L′} is a subgraph of G = {N,L} if N ′ ⊂ N
and L′ ⊂ L. In order to get a matricial representation of graph G, we consider the adjacency
matrix A: a NxN square matrix with components aij such that aij = 1 if and only if the link lij
exists, otherwise aij = 0. The components aii of the diagonal of the adjacency matrix satisfy
aii = 0 and it is a symmetric matrix aij = aji for undirected graphs. An alternative matricial
representation is given by the incidence matrix B: a NxK matrix with components bik such that
bik = 1 if and only if lk = lij for a node j, otherwise bik = 0.
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1.2.2 Properties.
Let G = {N,L} be an undirected graph. The connectivity ki or degree of a node i ∈ G is
defined as:
ki =
∑
j∈L
aij , (1.13)
and represents the number of incident links in i. In the same way, if G′ = {N ′, L′} is a directed
graph, the out-degree and in-degree of a node i ∈ G′ are defined as:
kouti =
∑
j∈L′
aij ,
kini =
∑
j∈L′
aji ,
(1.14)
and represent the number of outgoing and ingoing links respectively, and the total degree of the
node i in a directed graph is ki = kouti + kini . In order to characterize the topology of an undi-
rected graph, the degree distribution P (k) = Pk is defined for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . as the fraction
of nodes with connectivity k in the graph. Likewise, for directed graphs P out(k), P in(k) are
defined in the same way. As well, the n-moments of P (k), defined as 〈kn〉 =∑k knP (k), give
us information about networks’ topology and therefore about their behavior under the dynam-
ical processes that we study in this work. To deal the degree correlations, P (k′|k) is defined
as the likelihood that a given link connecting a degree k node i is connected to a node j of
degree k′, and satisfies the normalization equation
∑
k′ P (k
′|k) = 1 and the detailed balance
condition kP (k′|k)P (k) = k′P (k|k′)P (k′). Nevertheless, in finite size real networks we can
obtain clearer results computing knn(k), that is, the average degree of the neighbors of degree
k nodes:
knn(k) ≡
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
aij
kj
ki
=
∑
k′
k′P (k′|k) . (1.15)
Depending on knn(k), the networks can be uncorrelated, assortatives (knn(k) increases with
k) or dissortatives (knn(k) decreases with k).
The shortest path dij or geodesic between two nodes (i,j) is the minimum number of links
required to connect i and j. In order to characterize the size of a network G, beside the values
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of N (number of nodes) and L (number of links), the diameter Diam(G) of G is defined as the
maximum value of the shortest paths in G. For fully connected graphs, the characteristic path
length L is defined as:
L =
1
N(N − i)
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1, j 6=i
dij , (1.16)
as it diverges for disconnected graphs, can be useful the efficiency:
E =
1
N(N − i)
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1, j 6=i
1
dij
. (1.17)
With the purpose of characterizing the connectedness of a node i, together with the degree,
the closeness ci of i is defined as the inverse of the average distance from i to all nodes ci =
N(
∑N
j=1,j 6=i dij)
−1
. Besides, the betweenness of i is defined as the average fraction of shortest
paths passing through i (njk(i)) over total the shortest paths (njk) for every pair of nodes:
bi =
N∑
j=1
N∑
k=1, k 6=j
njk(i)
njk
. (1.18)
Another typical property of complex networks is clustering, it characterizes the likelihood
that two nodes with a common neighbor are connected. One of the many measures of clustering
is transitivity T, which is defined as the normalized ratio of the number of transitive (fully-
connected) triples divided by the amount of connected (fully or simply-connected) triples.
T = 3(transitive triples in G)connected triples in G . (1.19)
When a subgraph G′ = {N ′, L′} of G = {N,L} has higher connectivity than G, i.e. the
nodes of G′ are tightly connected, G′ is called a cluster. More precise definitions of cluster are
the n-clique and the k-plex. A clique or 1-clique is a fully-connected subgraph G′ of G. More
generally, a n-clique is a subgraph G′ such that the largest geodesic dij between two nodes (i,j)
of G′ is n. On the other hand, a subgraph G′ = {N ′, L′} is a k-plex if it is a maximal subgraph
such that k′i ≥ N ′ − k, ∀i ∈ N ′, that is, each node of G′ has at least N ′ − k neighbors in G′
and there is not another graph in G containing G′ that satisfy this property.
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1.2.3 Weighted networks.
So far, we have considered unweighted networks, which means that the links between nodes
are either present or not, without an assigned value. However, many real networks exhibit
heterogeneity in the links. This feature has been studied in many fields such as social networks
(33; 34; 35; 36; 37), metabolic networks (38; 39), predator-prey interactions (40; 41), neural
networks (35; 44), traffic of the passengers in airline networks (42; 43), internet traffic (60),
etcetera. Weighted networks (i.e. networks in which each link is characterized by a value)
provide a very useful tool to describe these systems.
A weighted network GW = {N,L,W} consists of three sets N , L and W , such that
N = {n1, n2, ..., nN} is a not empty set of N nodes, L = {l1, l2, ..., lK} is a set of K couples
of elements of N (the links) and W = {w1, w2, ..., wK} is a set of real numbers (weights)
associated to the links. A Weighted network GW can be described by a N × N matrix W ,
the weights matrix , such that its component wij is the weight of the link from node i to node
j, assumed that wij = 0 if such connection does not exist. The network is symmetric if
wij = wji, ∀i, j .
In a weighted network GW , the weight distribution Q(w) is defined as the probability for
a given edge to have weight w. The node weight (or strength, or weighted connectivity) is
defined as si =
∑
j∈N wij . If there are not correlations between weights and connectivity, one
obtains s|k ∼ 〈w〉k. In the same way, measure coefficients of unweighted networks (such as
shortest paths, clustering coefficient, etcetera) can be generalized to weighted networks (28).
1.2.4 Real networks: distributions and topologies.
Complex networks can represent a huge range of real systems consisting on many highly con-
nected elements that can be found in different fields, such as sociology, biology or technology.
Although the use of complex network theory makes up an approximation that implies loss of
information, it provides a holistic approach and details about emergent phenomena. Different
sorts of systems are characterized by different kinds of networks, with dissimilar properties as
degree distributions, path lengths, clustering, degree correlations, etc.
1.2.4.1 Regular graphs.
In graph theory, a regular graph (RG) is a graph where each vertex has the same degree con-
nectivity. In addition, in a regular directed graph the indegree and outdegree of each vertex are
13
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Example of real network. Partial map of the Internet: Each node represents an IP address
while each line symbolizes a link between two nodes, the length of the lines indicate the delay.
This graph represents less than 30% of the Class C networks reachable by the data collection
program. Different colors represent different allocations. The Opte Project (2005).
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equal to each other. A RG with vertices of degree k is called a k-regular graph. A network is a
regular graph if and only if the vector u = (1, . . . , 1) is an eigenvector of its adjacency matrix
Aij . In addition, the eigenvalue of u is the constant degree k of the graph. Eigenvectors v cor-
responding to other eigenvalues are orthogonal to u, for such eigenvectors v = (v1, . . . , vn),
we have
∑n
i=1 vi = 0 (see, e.g. (78)).
RG of degrees k = 0, 1, 2 are trivial, but higher degree RG can be complex networks. In
some parts of this work (e.g. chapter 2) we use a kind of RG, called random regular graph
(RRG), characterized by a random distribution of links. Starting from a regular lattice, a RRG
can be generated by randomization of links through a rewiring process.
1.2.4.2 Random graphs.
Erdo¨s and Re´nyi initiated in 1959 the study of graphs that grow through random procedures
(76). The original Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graph GERN,K consists of a set of N nodes, firstly disconnected,
and later linked by connecting K pairs of nodes at random. In the same way, GERN,p represents
a graph generated though a set of N nodes, firstly disconnected, and later linked by connecting
each pair of nodes with probability p (figure 1.2). Although both processes generate different
(but similar) kinds of network, for large values of N they provide the same distribution. The
graph GERN,p has on average
(
n
2
)
p edges. The degree distribution of a node i is binomial:
P (ki = k) =
(
n− 1
k
)
pk(1− p)n−1−k . (1.20)
In (77), Erdo¨s and Re´nyi showed that the topology of GERN,p depends mainly on p, in fact:
ze
If p < 1/N , then the size Smax of the greatest connected component of graph GERN,p will be
Smax . lnN , with a probability increasing with N.
If p = 1/N , then almost surely Smax ≃ N2/3.
If p > 1/N , then GERN,p will almost surely have a giant component and no other component will
contain more than O(lnN) nodes.
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Figure 1.2: Random network according to a Poisson distribution of the connectivity. Red (blue)
colored circles represent the high (low) connectivity nodes. Network size N = 800, averaged
degree 〈k〉 = 4
1.2.4.3 Small-world networks
Many real networks, such as social networks (62; 63; 64), show the property that, although
the mean connectivity is much low that the system size, most nodes can be reached from
every other by a small number of steps. A small-world (SW) network is a network where
the characteristic path length grows proportionally to the logarithm of the network size:
L ∝ logN . (1.21)
The Watts and Strogatz model consists of an algorithm to make graphs that provides small-
world networks with a high clustering coefficient (25). Starting from a ring of N nodes (that is,
a circle of nodes in which each node is connected to its 2m nearest nodes), a rewiring process
is performed, so that with probability p each node is disconnected from its clockwise neighbor
and connected to a random node. On one extreme, for p = 0 the ring remains unchanged and
we have a regular lattice; at the other extreme, for p = 1 the procedure provides a random
graph with minimum connectivity kmin = m.
16
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Figure 1.3: Random network generated through Erdo¨s-Re´nyi mechanism (left) and its connectivity
histogram (right). Different colors represent different connectivities. In the same way, the diameter
of each node is proportional to its number of neighbors. Network size N = 1000, averaged degree
〈k〉 = 2
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According to the SW definition, most pairs of nodes will be connected by at least one short
path. Furthermore, from the high clustering coefficient property follows that SW networks
contain a high number of cliques and many highly connected subgraphs. Real SW networks
usually have high degree nodes that serve as hubs of short paths, and the degree distribution
are fat-tailed. Anyway, very different graphs (both real and artificial networks) can be defined
as small-world networks as long as they satisfy the property 1.21.
1.2.4.4 Scale-free networks
The degree distribution of many real networks follows a power-law, at least asymptotically.
That is, P(k) goes for large values of k as
P (k) ∼ k−γ , (1.22)
where the value of the constant γ is usually 2 < γ < 3. Power-laws are the only functions
f(x) that presents scale invariance: do not change if independent variable x is multiplied by
a common factor, apart from a dilatation. In reference to this property, such networks are
called scale-free networks. Many networks belonging to a wide range of subjects appear to
be scale-free: Social networks (by example the collaboration networks, as the collaboration
of movie actors in films or the coauthors relationships), biological networks as the protein-
protein interaction networks, sexual relations in humans (related with the diffusion of sexually
transmitted diseases), semantic networks, many technological networks as the World Wide
Web, etcetera. Although the average degree 〈k〉 is bounded, the variance
σ2 = < k2 > − < k >2 , (1.23)
diverges as the second moment < k2 >:
< k2 > =
∫ kmax
kmin
k2P (k) ∼ k3−γmax = kamax , (1.24)
where the exponent a > 0.
The Baraba´si-Albert (BA) model:
In 1999, A. L. Baraba´si and R. Albert mapped of a portion of the Web, and show that some
nodes (hubs), had a connectivity degree very higher than the rest ones, and that the degree
distribution of the whole network follows a power-law distribution (45). They found that other
social and biological networks also had similar properties. Baraba´si and Albert proposed a
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mechanism, the preferential attachment, to explain the emergence of the power-law distribu-
tion. However, this mechanism only produces a specific kind of scale-free networks, and many
other mechanisms have been discovered since (and earlier). The preferential attachment mech-
anism generate a graph GBAN,K according to the next rules: starting from m0 isolated nodes, a
new node j with m < m0 links is added. The likelihood that j will connect to a given node i is
proportional to the i-degree:
P (j → i) = ki∑
l kl
. (1.25)
The operation of addition a node is repeated N −m0 times. At the end, the graph obtained,
known as Baraba´si-Albert (BA) network, will haveN nodes andK ≃ mN links, with< k >=
2m (figure 1.4).
The BA model has been solved in the mean-field approximation (45): In the thermody-
namic limit t → ∞, the degree distribution obtained is P (k) ∼ k−γ , with γ = 3. For the
same value of N and K, BA graphs have smaller average distance than ER graphs, resulting
L ∼ logN/log(logN) (46). Furthermore, the clustering coefficient decreases with respect to
the size of the system asC ∼ N0.75, that is, slower than that observed for ER graphsC ∼ 1/N .
Several variations of the model have been studied, such as directed graphs (47) or alternative
mechanisms for preferential attachment (48), among many others.
1.2.4.5 Configuration model
Starting from a set of N nodes and a given connectivity vector V (that is, V is the connectivi-
ties sequence k1, k2, . . . , kN , and ki the connectivity of link i), the configuration model (CM)
provides an algorithm to build up a network (49; 50). The CM takes the set GconfN,D of all graphs
with N nodes and connectivity vector V , and consider all the elements of GconfN,D with equal
probability. The algorithm consists of the following steps: firstly assigns ki half-edges to each
node i, after this connects by pairs the half-edges in an equiprobable way. A giant component
emerges almost surely when Q =
∑
k k(k − 2)P (k) > 0 and the maximum degree kmax is
not too large (49) (figure 1.5).
The configuration model proposed by Molloy and Reed provides networks with degree
correlations, in the sense that the expected degree of the neighbors of a given node i is not
independent of ki. Starting from the CM, Catanzaro, Bogun˜a, and Pastor-Satorras proposed
19
1. INTRODUCTION.
Figure 1.4: SF network generated through Baraba´si-Albert mechanism. Red (blue) colored circles
represent the high (low) connectivity nodes. Network size N = 2000, averaged degree 〈k〉 = 2.
The subgraph (detail) highlights the scale invariance property of power-law distributions.
the uncorrelated configuration model (UCM), capable to generate random uncorrelated scale-
free networks (51). The model adds a restriction on the maximum possible degree of the
vertices, governed by the structural cutoff kmax ≃
√
kN .
1.3 Sociophysics.
The use of methods of probability theory and statistics for dealing with large populations in
solving physical problems constitutes Statistical Physics as a branch of physics, and its proce-
dures are successfully used in a wide variety of fields of physics involving many interacting
entities. In the light of its usefulness, this successful framework has recently been extended to
other sciences including chemistry, biology, neurology, and even some social sciences, such as
economics and sociology.
Sociophysics is a multidisciplinary research field that applies theories and methods origi-
nally developed by physicists in order to study social topics, usually those including uncertainty
or stochastic processes and nonlinear dynamics (142). In Statistical Physics, the elementary
components of studied systems usually are simple objects whose behavior is conditioned by
some well-know laws: the statistical study focuses on collective effects due to the interactions
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A) B)
Figure 1.5: Examples of configuration model graphs: The C.M. algorithm allows to make a
network according to a given connectivity vector. Both graphs above consist of N nodes and
a heterogeneous connectivity conforming to a truncated power-law distribution P (k) = k−2.7.
A)N = 600, kmin = 2, kmax = 15. B)N = 2000, kmin = 2, kmax = 44. Different colors
and diameters represent different connectivities..
of a large number of elements. In contrast, the basic constituents of social phenomena are
humans, and each individual interacts with a variable number of individuals that, for most indi-
viduals and problems, is negligible compared to the system size. People are not single objects
following simple behavior rules, and modeling of social topics involves a great simplification
of reality. Clearly, this approach does not try to model the complexity of individuals, but focus
on the nature of interactions, seeking an holistic approach and drawing conclusions about the
overall system. These conclusions include transitions from order to disorder phase, transient
and stationary states, scaling properties, and so on. Obviously, the limitations in the modeling
of agents (people) condition the validity of the results, and should be taken with caution. How-
ever, in most collective systems, global properties do not depend on microscopic configuration
but on global features as symmetries, conservation laws, temperature, external fields, noise, etc.
Following this holistic view, the modeling of social systems includes only the most important
characteristics of individuals, nevertheless criterion common to all scientific modeling process.
A high number of scientists and multidisciplinary work teams are involved in this branch
of knowledge and the topics have been dealt in recent years with this approach are so varied as
opinion dynamics, ethnic segregation, cultural dynamics, crowd behavior, social hierarchies,
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language dynamics and spreading phenomena among others.
1.3.1 Agent based models.
An agent-based model (ABM) is a class of numerical models for simulating the interactions
of autonomous agents with the purpose of studying their effects on the system as a whole.
Usually ABMs rely Monte Carlo methods to introduce randomness and the high numbers of
interactions is performed trough specific computer programs. The origin of agent based (AB)
modeling dates back to the late 1940s when the mathematician John von Neumann (starting
from the Alan Turing idea) designed the von Neumann machine, a theoretical system based
on self replication. The concept was then improved by Stanislaw Ulam: Ulam suggested to
build the machine as a set of cells on a grid (30). The concept was taken up by von Neumann,
who created the first of the devices later termed cellular automata (31). The development of
computers led to AB modeling widespread since the 1990s. ABMs have been used to deal with
a wide range of problems in several fields as biology (as e.g., spread of epidemics, population
dynamics), biomedical applications, economics, dynamics of ancient civilizations, logistics,
traffic control, workforce management, distributed computing, people’s migrations, language
dynamics and social network effects.
One of the firsts ABM designed to explore a social issue was developed by Thomas Schelling
in 1971 (52; 53). The Schelling’s residential segregation model studies the effects of a prefer-
ence for people to be in a similar neighborhood and consists of a regular lattice, with a density
of empty sites, whose nodes mimic agents of different ethnicities. After an initial distribution
of the agents, at each elementary dynamical step an agent is randomly chosen and it moves to
a empty site chosen at random if its ratio of other ethnic neighbors is higher than a tolerance
threshold T. After a long enough transition time, he found that the agents remain in a mixed
distribution only for very high values of the tolerance threshold, but agents form segregated
neighborhoods for other values of tolerance (Figure 1.6).
Opinion Dynamics is a social topic very dealt with AB modeling, it studies the chance for
a social group to reach agreement or disagreement about a question. Outside this framework,
in the early 70’s Clifford an Sudbury defined a model for population dynamics (54), the latter
named Voter Model has been used in fields so varied such as social dynamics, population ge-
netics, chemistry and probability theory. The description of Voter Model is not at all complex:
each agent is provided of a variable that take two possible values, and at each time step a ran-
domly chosen agent selects at random a neighbor and imitates its variable’s value. Although
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Figure 1.6: Dynamics of the Schelling model. The Schelling’s model of residential segregation
studies the effects of intolerance in the population distribution. People move if their neighborhood
is unfriendly according to a tolerance parameter. The model shows segregation in neighborhoods
for intermediate and high values of intolerance (52; 53). Colors represent ethnicities and opposite
sides are connected.
its extremely simple design and the fact that can be solved exactly in any finite dimension (55),
the model has been and is still studied in many sciences and according to different variants
(as e.g., different topologies, noise and external fields). Other opinion dynamics model, the
majority rule model (56), explores a similar topic through a different procedure: Starting from
a complete graph whose nodes (agents) are provided of a variable (opinion) that can take two
possible values (-1, +1), at each time step a random group of r agents is selected and they share
the majority opinion inside the group. The group size r is taken at each interaction from a given
distribution. The model includes an asymmetry: when r is even, a value of opinion (e.g. +1)
can be promoted in case of a tie. Under the mean field assumption, Krapivsky and Redner (57)
solved the model for a fixed value of r. They found three fixed points: one unstable fixed point
that corresponds to a situation in which the population is evenly distributed in both values of
opinion variable, and two stable fixed points that correspond to one-opinion frozen states. The
majority rule model has been studied under different network topologies, multi-state opinion
and plurality rule (58), as well as modifications that include mobility, external fields, variable
connectivity, etcetera ...
Other context of social research corresponds to the cases in which opinion is modeled as
a vector of variables. These models are usually grouped under the name of cultural dynamics.
The most representative and studied model in cultural dynamics was introduced by Robert Ax-
elrod in 1997 (59). The well-known Axelrod’s model for culture dissemination explores the
principle of homophily, developing the idea that a social agent will convince similar people
easily than dissimilar ones, and therefore similar people tend to become even more alike. It
consists of a regular lattice, whose nodes mimic cultural agents. Each one of these nodes is
23
1. INTRODUCTION.
Figure 1.7: Dynamics of the Axelrod model. Top panels: For low values of the initial cultural
diversity (q), the system converges to a frozen monocultural state, characterized by a cultural group
shared by all the agents. Bottom panels: Otherwise, for high values of q the system remains in a
multicultural state in which agents do not share many traits with their neighborhood (59). Colors
represent different cultures and periodic boundary conditions are applied.
provided with a set of F cultural features that can assume q possible integer values. The pa-
rameter q represents the possible traits that each feature can assume. Thus a culture is modeled
as a vector of F integer variables. After assigning the traits at random, the system evolves as
follow: at each elementary dynamical step, an individual i randomly chosen imitates a feature’s
trait of a random neighbor j with a probability equal to the cultural overlap ωi,j between both
agents, defined as ωij = (
∑F
f=1 δσf (i),σf (j))/F , where δx,y is the Kronecker’s delta which
is 1 if x = y and 0 otherwise. After a long enough transient, for a low value of the initial
cultural diversity q, the system reaches a frozen monocultural state, in which all agents share
every trait. On the other hand, for high values of the initial cultural diversity, the system can’t
arrive to cultural convergence but remains at a multicultural state, characterized by agents who
hardly share features with their neighbors (Figure 1.7). The usual order parameter is the rel-
ative size of main culture 〈Smax〉/N , i.e. the maximum number of agents sharing every trait
divided by the total population. Several others order parameters can be used as the number g
of different cultural domains in the asymptotic state over the total population g = 〈Ng〉/N .
Then, the final states above mentioned are characterized by 〈Smax〉/N ∼ 1, 0 and g ∼ 0, 1
respectively. Both states are bounded by a phase transition at a critical value qc depending on
F : this transition is continuous for F = 2, but discontinuous for F > 2. Axelrod model has
been studied with many variants as random noise (147), mass media effects (150) and different
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network topologies (141; 145) among others.
1.3.2 Topology.
The description of interacting relations (who interacts with whom, how often, in which way
do agents relate), is a key of the modeling process in social dynamics. The usual tool to
describe the relationship between agents is a network in which agents are represented by the
nodes and links represent the interaction chances. ABMs rely on different network structures,
and outcomes usually strongly depend on the topology chosen. In a society, people are not
usually connected everyone to everyone but in several ways. This fact can be modeled through
different network kinds (directed or indirected, weighted or unweighted, etc) and topologies,
including regular and complex networks (e.g. lattice, small-world, RRN, ER or SF). Although
real networks, and particularly social networks, often differ from artificial networks in many
features, the dependence of model behavior with topology provides a tool to understand in what
way individual relationship influence on society.
A social network is a graph in which the nodes represent individuals or social groups and
the links symbolize the relationships among them (60; 61). In fact, many of the concepts
used in the analysis of complex networks are based in social features, such as small-world
property (62; 63; 64), as well as theoretical tools such as node centrality or clustering index
(65). Graph”ratio of theory has provided a very useful tool for measurement of different social
topics as collaboration networks, friendship or social interdependence. Additionally, new tech-
nologies provide new kinds of social interactions characterized by lower dependence on the
physical location and higher connectivity of individuals (66). Complex network theory offers a
tool to study the properties of the contacts structure and the dynamics involved in the forming
process. Examples of social networks are scientific colaborations (such as coauthorship net-
works), actors coworking relations, information exchange, online social networks friendship,
etcetera.
The influence of network topology on the behavior of social ABMs mentioned in section
1.3.1 has been studied in the last decades, including several areas such as language dynamics,
social behavior, rumors spreading, opinion models, cultural dynamics, etcetera (see, e.g. (67)).
For example, in opinion models, consensus critical values show a strong dependence on the
underlying topology (57). Similarly, Axelrod model for cultural dissemination displays depen-
dence of the phase transition on the network structure (145; 146); beyond this dependence, the
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dynamics of the model can be used to build a network through a rewiring process, which in
turn provides new system behaviors (166; 167).
In strategic games (12; 17), the role of network topology is usually introduced through the
condition that, at every time step, one or more individuals interact with one or more agents
chosen among their network neighbors. The specific model definition depends, among other
parameters, on the kind of synchronization (e.g. synchronous, serial) and on the strategies and
updating rules considered. In particular, the dependence of social observables on the underlying
topology has been widely analyzed through EGT models. For example, prisoner dilemma in
complex networks has been object of several studies for the last twenty years, focusing in the
influence of the structure of interactions among people on the level of cooperation (16; 18; 94;
95; 109). The studies showed a strong dependence of the cooperation level on the topology,
that is, heterogeneity enhances cooperation. Nevertheless, this dependence is very sensitive to
the type of strategies and updating rules considered (79).
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The emergence of cooperation.
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Presentation of Part I.
“First, let it be remembered that we have innumerable instances, both in our domestic productions
and in those in a state of nature, of all sorts of differences of inherited structure which are correlated
with certain ages and with either sex. We have differences correlated not only with one sex, but with
that short period when the reproductive system is active, as in the nuptial plumage of many birds, and in
the hooked jaws of the male salmon. We have even slight differences in the horns of different breeds of
cattle in relation to an artificially imperfect state of the male sex; for oxen of certain breeds have longer
horns than the oxen of other breeds, relatively to the length of the horns in both the bulls and cows of
these same breeds. Hence, I can see no great difficulty in any character becoming correlated with the
sterile condition of certain members of insect communities; the difficulty lies in understanding how such
correlated modifications of structure could have been slowly accumulated by natural selection. This
difficulty, though appearing insuperable, is lessened, or, as I believe, disappears, when it is remembered
that selection may be applied to the family, as well as to the individual, and may thus gain the desired
end. Breeders of cattle wish the flesh and fat to be well marbled together. An animal thus characterized
has been slaughtered, but the breeder has gone with confidence to the same stock and has succeeded.
Such faith may be placed in the power of selection that a breed of cattle, always yielding oxen with
extraordinarily long horns, could, it is probable, be formed by carefully watching which individual bulls
and cows, when matched, produced oxen with the longest horns; and yet no one ox would ever have
propagated its kind. Here is a better and real illustration: According to M. Verlot, some varieties of the
double annual stock, from having been long and carefully selected to the right degree, always produce a
large proportion of seedlings bearing double and quite sterile flowers, but they likewise yield some single
and fertile plants. These latter, by which alone the variety can be propagated, may be compared with
the fertile male and female ants, and the double sterile plants with the neuters of the same community.
As with the varieties of the stock, so with social insects, selection has been applied to the family, and
not to the individual, for the sake of gaining a serviceable end. Hence, we may conclude that slight
modifications of structure or of instinct, correlated with the sterile condition of certain members of the
community, have proved advantageous; consequently the fertile males and females have flourished, and
transmitted to their fertile offspring a tendency to produce sterile members with the same modifications.
This process must have been repeated many times, until that prodigious amount of difference between the
fertile and sterile females of the same species has been produced which we see in many social insects.”
(Charles Darwin. The Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection. (1859)).
Understanding how cooperative behavior emerges in different contexts is one of the major
questions of modern science. The presence of cooperation in hostile environments, that is,
when selfish behavior provides higher individual fitness as does cooperation, has been studied
in many areas including microbiology, species evolution, population dynamics, economy and
sociology.
Theory of evolution is based on natural selection, which in turn is based on the survival-
of-the-fittest rule. The limited resources available in a habitat promotes competition between
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organisms of the same or different species that have to struggle to survive; the final purpose
of this competition is to provide offspring. In such competition, cooperation is, at least in the
first instance, faced to individual interest of survival and reproductive success. Nevertheless,
cooperation and even altruism have evolved and persist, and evolutionists have studied this
question extensively for the last 150 years.
Cooperation between biological entities pursuing their own ends is key to understanding
biological issues such as the emergence of multicellular organisms or gregarious behavior,
but also to analyze human societies: people form families, tribes, cities, nations, coworker
networks, companies, research teams, associations, etcetera.
Altruism is defined as a form of cooperation in which there is no direct benefit to the or-
ganism carrying out the behavior, while mutually beneficial relationship refers to cooperative
behavior in which there is a direct benefit to the actor as well as the recipient (68). There are
several proposed mechanisms which help to explain cooperative behavior; they are not neces-
sarily mutually exclusive, so that a combination of some of them may be applied to explaining
a particular case of cooperative behavior. The most widely accepted and studied ones are:
Kin selection refers to evolutionary strategies that favor the persistence and reproductive suc-
cess of an agent’s relatives, even at a cost to the survival or reproduction of the agent. Kin
selection implies cross-generational genetic changes driven by interactions between relatives
and may be applied when relatives influence one another on survival and offspring. William D.
Hamilton established, in 1964, a mathematic condition to explain altruistic behavior through
kin selection (69). According to Hamilton’s rule, an altruistic action from agent i to j may be
justified when:
rB > C , (1.26)
where r is the genetic relatedness of i to j, defined as the probability that two genes taken at
random from the same locus in both individuals are identical by descent, B is the reproductive
benefit obtained by j and C is the reproductive cost paid by i.
Group selection mechanism in biology takes the assumption that genes can spread into a pop-
ulation because of the benefits they provide to the community (70). Although group selection
is not widely accepted by evolutionists in biology for several reasons (e.g., the different time
scales between groups dynamics and reproduction), it is often applied to other areas such as
human behavioral sciences (71).
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Reciprocity refers to situations where cooperation and/or altruism is enhanced by the proba-
bility of future mutual interactions. There are three types of reciprocity that have been deeply
studied:
i) Direct reciprocity mechanism was proposed by Robert Trivers in 1971 (72). If there is
a probability of repeated interactions between the same two players with a cooperate action
available, then a strategy of mutual cooperation may be favored even when non-cooperate
actions brings larger short-term benefits. Direct reciprocity can enhance cooperation only if
the probability w of another encounter between the same two individuals is higher than the
cost-to-benefit ratio c/b of the cooperative action w > c/b.
ii) Indirect reciprocity mechanism do not requires that the same two individuals interact again.
In a mutual interaction, actions are observed by third party individuals who might inform oth-
ers. Thus, social approval promotes cooperation by indirect reciprocity (73). Indirect reci-
procity can enhance cooperation only if the probability p, of knowing a random agent’s repu-
tation is higher than the cost-to-benefit ratio c/b of the cooperative action p > c/b.
iii) Network reciprocity. Real populations have spatial structures or underlying networks
which imply that some individuals interact more often than others. According to the so-called
lattice reciprocity mechanism, the cooperative action can take advantage of the topology of the
network, so that cooperators clusters are often resilient to invasion by the defective action (19).
In this part of the thesis, we focus on the emergence of cooperation in complex networks.
In the framework of evolutionary game theory, among other games that provides a satisfactory
description of a wide range of situations (e.g., the Public Goods Game), the Prisoner’s Dilemma
(PD) has become a standard for studying the cooperation. First, in chapters 2-3-4 we investigate
in detail the dynamics of PD in different artificial networks under the assumption of a widely
accepted strategy: the replicator dynamics. Later, in chapter 5 we take into consideration
observed strategies in human behavior and study the consequences of such rules. Finally, in
chapter 6 we test the predictions by a large-scale experiment.
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Chapter 2
The dipole model: Thermodynamic
study of a social system.
In Evolutionary Dynamics the understanding of cooperative phenomena in natural and social
systems has been the subject of intense research during decades. We focus attention here on the
so-called ”Lattice Reciprocity” mechanisms that enhance evolutionary survival of the cooper-
ative phenotype in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game when the population of darwinian replicators
interact through a fixed network of social contacts. Exact results on a ”Dipole Model” are
presented, along with a mean-field analysis as well as results from extensive numerical Monte
Carlo simulations. The theoretical framework used is that of standard Statistical Mechanics
of macroscopic systems, but with no energy considerations. We illustrate the power of this
perspective on social modelling, by consistently interpreting the onset of lattice reciprocity as
a thermodynamical phase transition that, moreover, cannot be captured by a purely mean-field
approach.
2.1 Introduction.
Is the term ”social temperature” just a rhetoric figure (suggestive metaphor), or on the contrary,
could it be given a precise meaning? By working out in detail the evolutionary dynamics of
the most studied social dilemma (the Prisoner’s Dilemma) on a simple kind of artificial social
networks we will show here that the formal framework of equilibrium statistical mechanics is,
to a large extent, applicable to the rigorous description of the asymptotic behavior of strategic
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evolution, thus providing the key for a formal quantitative meaning of the term social ”temper-
ature” in these contexts.
Evolutionary game theory, in contrast with classical game theory that focusses on the de-
cision making process of (rational) agents, is concerned with entire populations of agents pro-
grammed to use some strategy in their interactions with other agents. The agents are replicators,
i.e. entities which have the means of making copies of themselves (by inheritance, learning,
infection, imitation, etc...), whose reproductive success depends on the payoff obtained during
interaction. As the payoff depends on the current composition of strategies among the inter-
acting agents, this yields a feedback loop that drives the evolution of the strategic state of the
population(12)(17)(79)(80).
This darwinian feedback (frequency-dependent fitness) dynamics depends strongly not
only on the particular game, and on the specifics of the way strategies spread, but also on
the (social) structure of connections describing the interactions. Under the assumption of a
well-mixed population (social panmixia assumption), the temporal evolution of the proportion
of strategies among the population is governed by a differential equation named replicator
equation (see below). Well-known celebrated folk’s theorems (see, e.g. (79)) establish a con-
nection between the asymptotic behavior of this equation and the powerful concepts of classical
game theory based on the notion of best reply (Nash). However, if the social panmixia assump-
tion is abandoned, and individuals only interact with their neighbors in a social network, the
asymptotic of evolutionary dynamics generically differ in a substantial way from this ”well-
mixed population” description. The social structure of strategic interactions turns out to be of
importance regarding the evolutionary outcome of the strategic competition.
We will consider here the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), a two-players-two-strategies game,
where each player chooses one of the two available strategies, cooperation or defection: A
cooperator receives R when playing with a cooperator, and S when playing with a defector,
while a defector earns P when playing with a defector, and T (temptation) against a cooperator.
When T > R > P > S, the game is a PD (while if T > R > S > P it is called Snowdrift
game, also ”Chicken” or ”Hawks and Doves”). Given the payoff’s ordering, whatever the value
of the prior assign of probability to the co-player’s strategy is, the expected payoff is higher for
defection, and that is what a rational agent should choose. In the PD game only the defective
strategy is a strict best response to itself and to cooperation, thus it is an easy example of
game with an unbeatable (80) strategy. Still, though there is no difficulty in the making of the
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strategic decision from Nash analysis, two cooperators are better off than two defectors, hence
the social dilemma.
In graph-structured populations, a large body of research (16; 19; 81; 82; 83; 84; 85; 86; 87;
90; 101; 102; 103; 104) (and references therein) on evolutionary dynamics of the PD game has
convincingly show the so-called lattice reciprocity effects: The cooperative phenotype can take
advantage of the topology of the social net, so that clusters of cooperators are often resilient to
invasion by the (continuum-unbeatable) defective phenotype. This enhancement of asymptotic
macroscopic levels of cooperation due to the structure and topology of strategic interactions in-
cludes, but it is far more general than, the so-called space reciprocity mechanisms, where social
nets are discretizations (solid state lattices) of the euclidian space, and diffusion approximations
are often useful (105). In this regard, one should stress the accumulated evidence that (i) many
interesting social nets (27; 28; 45) are far away from being regular lattices, and (ii) freedom of
connectivity scales (scale-free complex networks) enhances (18; 106; 107; 109; 111; 112; 113)
the lattice reciprocity mechanisms up to unexpectedly high values of the temptation parame-
ter T of the dilemma, where cooperation is very expensive (but affordable in an evolutionary
sense).
In this chapter we investigate in detail the lattice reciprocity mechanisms in an artificial
network (Dipole Model) that models the competition for influence on a population of social
PD-imitators of two antagonist Big Brothers (nodes connected to the whole population, but
with no direct connection between them).
2.2 Natural strategic selection on graphs.
We specify here the evolutionary game dynamics scenario, meaning the game parametrization,
the microscopic strategic dynamics (replication mechanism or strategic updating rule), and the
social structure of contacts that we will consider along the chapter.
We normalize the PD payoffs to the reward for cooperating, R = 1, and fix the null payoff
at punishment P = 0. Note that provided the (differential or relative) selective advantage
among two individuals depends on their payoff’s difference (see below), one can arbitrarily fix
the zero payoff level. Then only two parameters T = b > 1 and S = ǫ ≤ 0 are tuned. Note
that the range ǫ > 0 defines a game named Hawks and Doves (also Chicken and Snowdrift)
where punishment and sucker’s payoff have the reverse order. We will occasionally comment
on this range of parameters.
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Moreover, we do not restrict our computations to 2R > T + S. This restriction means that
the total payoff for the two players is higher if both cooperate (2R) than if one cooperates and
the other defects (T + S), and is usually incorporated in iterated games studies of the PD to
prevent agents taking turns at defection and then sharing the payoffs. For the specifics of the
replicator dynamics (memory-less, markovian) in the next paragraph, one should not expect
that this restriction qualitatively matters.
Regarding the replication mechanism, we implement the finite population (size N ≫ 1)
analogue of replicator dynamics (15; 18). At each time step t, which represents one genera-
tion of the discrete evolutionary time, each agent i plays once with each one of the agents in
its neighborhood and accumulates the obtained payoffs, Pi. Then, the individuals, i, update
synchronously their strategies by picking up at random a neighbor, j, and comparing their re-
spective payoffs Pi and Pj . If Pi > Pj , nothing happens and i keeps the same strategy for the
next generation. On the contrary, if Pj > Pi, with probability Πi→j = η(Pj −Pi), i adopts the
strategy of its neighbor j for the next round robin with its neighbors, before which all payoffs
are reset to zero. Here η is a number small enough to make Πi→j an acceptable probability;
its physical meaning is related to the characteristic inverse time scale: the larger it is, the faster
evolution takes place.
From a theoretical point of view, this specific choice of the dynamics has the virtue of
leading directly (see, e.g. (17)), under the hypothesis of a well-mixed population and very
large population size, to the celebrated replicator equation for the frequencies pα of strategies
α(= C or D) in the population:
p˙α = pα(fα − f¯) (2.1)
where fα is the payoff of an α-strategist and f¯ is the average payoff for the whole population.
Note that time unit in equation (2.1) is scaled to η−1.
For the payoffs of the Prisoner’s Dilemma the asymptotic frequency of cooperators, from
the replicator equation, is driven to extinction, pc = 0, while for the Hawks and Doves game,
its asymptotic value is ǫ/(b−1+ǫ) . As stated in the introductory section, we will be concerned
here mainly with populations that are not well-mixed, where predictions based on this nonlinear
differential equation are often of little use.
Regarding the structure of connections between interacting agents, we will consider here
that it is given by a fixed graph (i.e. connections between players do not change by rewiring)
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where agents are represented by nodes, and a link between nodes indicates that they inter-
act (play). If ki is the number of neighbors of agent i (connectivity or degree), and ∆ is
the maximal possible one-shot-payoff difference (∆ = max{b, b − ǫ}), we will assume η =
(max{ki, kj}∆)−1 for the specification of the probability Πi→j of invasion of node i by the
strategy of neighbor j. This simple choice, introduced in (18), assures that Πi→j < 1; in
heterogeneous networks it has also the effect of slowing down the invasion processes from
or to highly connected nodes, with respect to the rate of invasion processes between poorly
connected nodes, a feature not without consequences (114).
We now introduce some notation, which is familiar to statistical physicists: The configura-
tion (strategic microstate l) of a population of N agents at time t is specified by the sequence
l = {si(t)} (i = 1, ..., N ), where si(t) = 1 (or 0) denotes that node i is at this time a co-
operator (resp. defector). The set of all possible 2N configurations is called the phase space.
Stationary probability densities of microstates P(l) (l = 1, ...2N ) are then representatives of
strategic macro-states. The average cooperation cl of microstate l is defined as
cl =
1
N
N∑
i
si (2.2)
We denote by Πl′l the probability that the strategic microstate of the population at time
t + 1 is l′, provided that it is l at time t. Note that
∑
l′ Πl′l = 1. A microstate lˆ is a frozen
equilibrium configuration if the probability that it changes in one time step is null, and then
Πlˆlˆ = 1 and Πl′ lˆ = 0 if l
′ 6= lˆ. We will assume generic real values (irrational) of the payoff
parameters, so that if a configuration contains a C-D link it cannot be a frozen configuration.
The only possible frozen equilibrium configurations are all-C and all-D. However, for a very
wide class of graphs, and a wide range of model parameters they are not the only possible
stationary probability measures.
We now illustrate by means of easy examples the evolution of PD on graphs. Our first
and simplest example is a star-shaped graph consisting of a central node connected to N − 1
peripheral nodes. It is straightforward to check that any initial condition with cooperators at
the central node and (at least) at [(b− ǫ(N − 1))/(1− ǫ)] + 1 peripheral nodes has a positive
probability of evolving in one time step to a configuration with a higher number of cooperators,
and a null probability of evolving towards less cooperators. Thus, all those configurations
evolve asymptotically to the all-C equilibrium. The rest of configurations evolve towards the
all-D equilibrium. Therefore, ifN > (b−ǫ+2) both equilibria are attractors (absorbing states),
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in the sense that some configurations different from themselves evolve to them; the phase space
is partitioned into two basins of attraction. If N < b− ǫ+2, only the all-D frozen equilibrium
is attractor. The stationary probability densities P∗(l) of the star are pure point measures (two-
or one- Dirac delta peaks) in the thermodynamic limit N →∞.
Now take a star and add some arbitrary number of links between its peripheral nodes. We
call this network a crown, whose head is the central node. If the head is occupied at t0 by
a defector, it will remain so forever, because the payoff of a peripheral cooperator is strictly
lower than head’s payoff. Sooner or later the head (center) of the crown will be imitated by
the whole crown, and the evolution will stop when everybody be defecting. But, what happens
to a cooperator on the head? The answer is dependent on both, the net topology of the crown
periphery and the cooperators disposition there: To ensure fixation of cooperation at the head
node, it suffices that a subset C of peripheral nodes occupied by cooperators, and with no direct
links to the rest of the periphery, have a size nC > bkmax− ǫ(N −nC − 1), where kmax is the
maximal degree in the rest of the periphery. Under this proviso all-C is the unique absorbing
microstate of all corresponding initial conditions.
Finally consider the graph schematized in Fig. 2.1, composed of the following:
(a) A component F of nF nodes with arbitrary connections among them.
(b) A node, say node 1, that is connected to all the nodes in F and has no other links.
(c) A component C of nC nodes with arbitrary connections among them.
(d) A node, say node 2, that is connected to all the nodes in F and C, but not to node 1.
This is what we will call a Dipole Model network. It is a two-headed (nodes 1 and 2) crown
(with periphery F) plus a tail C hanging on head 2. To strength the special status of the head
nodes, let us nickname them as ”Big Brothers”. They certainly enjoy a sort of omnipresence
that fits well with the character of Orwell’s famous social sci-fiction novel 1984. In the follow-
ing section we prove that for this simple network there exists a non-trivial stationary probability
density of microstates P∗(l) for the strategic evolution of the PD game.
2.3 The Dipole Model.
The analysis of evolutionary dynamics of the PD on the Dipole network shows that there is
a non-trivial invariant measure in phase space. Let us consider the set I of initial conditions
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C
F
2 1
Figure 2.1: Structure of the Dipole Network. Two nodes (1 and 2) are connected to all nodes in
F, whose elements can be arbitrarily linked to each other. Moreover, node 2 is also linked to a set
C (with arbitrary internal connections as well). Initial conditions are indicated by colors: red for
cooperators (node 2 and set C), blue for defectors (node 1), and green means arbitrary (set F). See
the text for further details.
defined by: (i) Big Brother 1 is a defector, (ii) Big Brother 2 is a cooperator, and (iii) all nodes
in component C are cooperators. Note that this set contains 2nF different configurations. We
now prove that, provided some sufficient conditions, this is a minimally invariant set of the
evolutionary dynamics.
First, one realizes that Big Brother 1 cannot be invaded by the cooperative strategy: The
payoff of a cooperator node i in F is P ci = kci + 1 + ǫ(ki − kci + 1), where ki is the number
of its neighbors in F and kci ≤ ki is the number of those that are cooperators. The payoff of
Big Brother 1 (BB1) is then P1 ≥ (kci + 1)b. For the PD game, where ǫ ≤ 0, the inequality
P1 > P
c
i always holds, so that BB1 will always be a defector. (Note also that for the Hawks
and Doves game, a sufficient condition for P1 > P ci is b > 1+ ǫ(kF +1), where kF (< nF ) is
the maximal degree in component F, i.e. the maximal number of links that a node in F shares
within F.) We thus conclude that defection is fixed at BB1.
Second, thanks to its interaction with set C, Big Brother 2 resists invasion, provided its
size nC is above a threshold: The payoff of a defector node i in F is P di = (kci + 1)b, where
kci is the number of its cooperator neighbors in F, while the payoff of Big Brother 2 (BB2) is
P2 = nC + nF ǫ + n
c
F (1 − ǫ), where ncF ≤ nF is the number of cooperators in F. Thus, a
sufficient condition for P2 > P di is nC > b(kF +1)−nF ǫ. With this proviso, BB2 will always
be a cooperator, which in turn implies that all the nodes in the component C will remain always
cooperators. Note that for ǫ ≤ 0 and b > 1, the absence of the component C could imply
invasion of node 2, that would lead to fixation of the defective strategy on the whole network.
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The previous argument proves that provided the sufficient conditions nC > b(kF+1)−ǫnF
and b > 1+ǫ(kF+1) hold, the subset I of phase space defined by (i), (ii), and (iii) is an invariant
set. As this set does not contain equilibria, no stochastic trajectory evolves from it to a frozen
equilibrium configuration.
Finally, one realizes that I is indeed minimal, because at any time, a defector in F has a pos-
itive probability to be invaded by the cooperation strategy (at least from BB2), and a cooperator
in F has a positive probability of being invaded by the defection strategy (at least from BB1).
Therefore, any strategic configuration of the set I is reachable in one time step from any other,
i.e. for all pairs (l, l′) of microstates in I, the transition probability Πl′l > 0. Consequently,
I does not contain proper invariant subsets: it is minimally invariant. Moreover, following
Perron-Frobenius theorem, there exists a unique stationary macro-state P∗(l). This provides
a rigorous framework for the interpretation of results from numerical Monte Carlo simulation
studies in evolutionary dynamics on dipole models, provided the sufficient conditions above.
While nodes in C and Big Brother 2 are permanent cooperators, and Big Brother 1 is a
permanent defector, nodes in F are forced to fluctuate. This partition of the network into sets
of nodes where each particular strategy is fixed forever, and a set of fluctuating nodes, turns
out to be a generic feature of the discrete replicator dynamics (neighbor imitation proportional
to payoffs difference) on many network settings (109; 112). The simplicity of the Dipole Net-
work model allows on it an easy formal proof of existence of this partition, so providing an
illustration of both, its origins and generic character. It also shows the formal applicability of
equilibrium statistical physics formalism to characterize the asymptotic behavior of evolution-
ary dynamics on these graphs. This will be made in the next section for specific choices of
structural traits for the subgraph F.
Let us note that if a direct link between BB1 and BB2 is added, then (see appendix 2.4.3)
asymptotic fixation in the whole network of either cooperation or defection will occur, depend-
ing on the relative size nC/nF of components C and F.
The name dipole for this structure of connections is suggested by the strategic polar (C −
F−D) aspect of the whole graph. Note also that the number of C−F and F−D connections
scales linearly with the size nF of the fluctuating interior, that is to say that the poles (C and
D) act as an externally imposed (AC) field on F, whose strength is proportional to the internal
levels of cooperation. As the cooperation (and then the fitness) levels are self-sustained (as
proved by the previous theorem), this is a closed macroscopic system with a non-trivial self-
sustained social activity of cooperation at evolutionary equilibrium.
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The interest of the Dipole Model is by no means restricted to a mere academic illustra-
tion: First of all, we can make a technical use of it in macroscopic stability analysis studies
of PD-evolution on highly heterogeneous complex networks. Indeed, the fluctuations inside
the subset F are the effect of the competition for invasion among two non-neighboring hubs
(hugely connected nodes), where opposite pure strategies have reached fixation, in their com-
mon neighborhood. This is a local strategic configuration that mimics those that are often
observed in stochastic simulations of evolutionary dynamics in highly heterogeneous (scale-
free) networks (109; 112). Simple multipolar network models can easily be constructed (e.g.
by establishing direct links from C to F in a way that simple sufficient conditions guarantee that
the theorem still holds), that are indeed indistinguishable from typical strategic patterns found
in the numerical simulations on scale-free networks. This makes the Dipole net a very useful
technical device to analyze the stability mechanisms of the cooperator clusters (109; 112) in
scale-free structured populations, as well as the kind of temporal fluctuations of cooperation
that one should expect in the fluctuating set of nodes.
Regarding potentialities for econo-socio-physics applications of the Dipole model, it could
be viewed as a sort of schematic (then simplistic, cartoon-like) model for the competition for
influence of two powerful superstructural institutions (e.g. like ”mass media”, political par-
ties, or lobbies) on a target population, in strongly polarized strategic contexts. The analysis
rigorously provides sufficient conditions for the parameter values where fixation of strategic
traits is proved impossible, so that temporal fluctuations dominate forever the target population
of social imitators F. The influence on each individual of the two competing institutions is
simulated here through the omnipresent (”Big Brother” nodes 1 and 2) neighbors, whose own
high appeal for imitation (the strength of Big Brother’s influence) is in turn conditioned by the
strategic composition of the target population. Here the interest could well be the study of the
influence that metric and topological network characteristics of the social structure have on the
strategic macro-state, and thus on the quantitative values of social indicators. We address some
aspects of this issue in the next section.
At a more general level, the design of experiments in social sciences as well as theoretical
studies of artificial societies could greatly benefit from having at hand simple but non-trivial
”exactly soluble statistical-mechanical models” that may provide safe guides to develop further
intuitions on social phenomena that demands more comprehension.
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2.4 The role of social structure in Big Brothers competition.
In this section we present some analytical and numerical results on the evolutionary dynamics
of games in the Dipole Model for different choices of topologies of the fluctuating set F. The
sufficient conditions stated in the previous section are assumed hereafter. We are interested in
the situation where nF ≫ 1, i.e. large size of the fluctuating population.
First we will briefly comment on the straightforward limiting case when the macroscopic
set F is a fully connected set, so that kF = nF −1. This is the well-mixed population limit, for
which it is easy to show that the replicator equation (2.1) is an exact description. The payoffs
of polar nodes BB1 and BB2 are given by P1 = bcnF and P2 = nC+ cnF + ǫ(1− c)nF , while
the payoffs of a cooperator node and a defector node in F are Pc = cnF + ǫ(nF − cnF + 1)
and Pd = (cnF + 1)b. One easily realizes that Pc < Pd, provided the sufficient condition
(b > 1 + ǫnF ) for fixation of defection at node 1. Thus the (one time step) probabilities QDC
(invasion of a cooperator node in F) and QCD (invasion of a defector node in F) are
QDC =
1
(nF + 1)
P1 − Pc
∆(nF + 1)
+
(1− c)nF
(nF + 1)
Pd − Pc
∆(nF + 1)
QCD =
1
(nF + 1)
P2 − Pd
∆(nF + nC)
. (2.3)
Assuming that the size of F is macroscopic, nF ≫ 1, the fraction of cooperators c in F
evolves according to
c˙ = (1− c)QCD − cQDC . (2.4)
Now, if nF ≫ 1, and nC/(nF )2 → 0, then both QCD and the first term in the right-hand
side of QDC vanish, and we arrive to the differential equation
c˙ =
c(1− c)
∆
(ǫ(1− c)− (b− 1)c) . (2.5)
This is, with a simple re-scaling of time, the replicator equation (2.1): note that in the limit
nF ≫ 1 that we have considered, the probability that a node in F picks up a Big Brother
when updating its strategy is negligible, and then the evolution inside the complete graph F is
overwhelmingly determined by the internal connections, and thus by the replicator equation.
In other words, in this limit of maximal possible connectivity, BB1 and BB2 are no longer
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bigger than the nodes in F and their influence on the fluctuating set is negligibly small in the
thermodynamic limit.
We now turn attention to situations where kF ≪ nF , far from the social panmixia. In sub-
section 2.4.1 we will explicitly solve the opposite trivial case of disconnected F set (kF = 0),
which turns out to reduce to the standard textbook ideal two-states model of Statistical Physics.
After that, in subsection 2.4.2, the ”random regular” network structure for F is seen to be
amenable to a plausible mean-field approach, but insufficient to explain the phenomenology
shown by Monte Carlo numerical results. These show beyond any doubt a critical behavior, a
transition point separating two qualitatively different types of social macro-states. This transi-
tion is sensibly interpreted as the onset of lattice reciprocity. In other words, lattice reciprocity
is a true critical social phenomenon.
2.4.1 F is a disconnected graph (ideal-gas).
Let us now obtain some explicit results for one of the simplest choices for the topology of
connections inside the fluctuating set, namely kF = 0. In this case each node in F is only
connected to Big Brothers. This is in fact an effective single node problem, where homogeneity
(i.e., mean field assumption) in F is exact; in other words, the absence of internal interactions
in the set F is a sort of ideal-gas condition easy to exactly deal with in the large size limit.
Note that the sufficient conditions for fixation of defection at BB1 and of cooperation at
BB2 are respectively, b > 1 + ǫ, and nC > b − ǫnF . Denoting by c(t) the instantaneous
fraction of cooperators in F, one finds for the (one time step) probability QDC of invasion of a
cooperator node in F
QDC =
cb− (1 + ǫ)/nF
2∆
, (2.6)
and using the notation A = ǫ+ (nC − b)/nF and B = 1 + nC/nF
QCD =
A+ c(1− ǫ)
2∆B
, (2.7)
for the probability of invasion of a defector node in F. Note that A > 0 due to the non-invasion
of BB2 (sufficient) condition.
Provided nF ≫ 1, the fraction of cooperators c in F evolves according to the differential
equation (2.4), which after insertion of expressions (2.6) and (2.7), and re-scaling of time,
becomes
c˙ = f(c) ≡ A0 +A1c+A2c2 , (2.8)
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where the coefficients are
A0 = A , (2.9)
A1 = 1− ǫ−A+B(1 + ǫ)/nF , (2.10)
A2 = −(1− ǫ+ bB) , (2.11)
One can easily check (A0 > 0 and A2 < 0) that there is always one positive root c∗ of
f(c), which is the asymptotic value for any initial condition 0 ≤ c(0) ≤ 1 of equation (2.8).
For ǫ = 0, in the so called weak PD game (i.e. at the border between the PD and the Hawks
and Doves game), if one further assumes that the relative size µ(F ) of the component F is
large enough, i.e. µ(F )→ 1, and µ(C)→ 0, one easily obtains that the stationary solution of
equation (2.8) behaves as c∗ ≃ (b+ 1)−1 near the limit µ(F )→ 1.
From the point of view of the set F, when nF ≫ 1, the model corresponds to a non-
interacting (ideal) set of independent phenotypic strategists that fluctuate due to a polar field
(Big Brothers influence) whose strength is self-consistently determined by the average cooper-
ation c. This problem is equivalent to the equilibrium of an ideal paramagnetic salt in a noisy
(telegraphic) magnetic AC field of intensity proportional to the average magnetization.
A typical and correct statistical-physicists approach ”from scratch” to this two-states model
is the familiar micro-canonical setting: At (dynamical) macroscopic equilibrium, the probabil-
ity of each strategic micro-state l = {si} of fixed value of cl = c is uniform
Pl = Ω
−1 , (2.12)
where Ω = nF !/((cnF )!(nF − cnF )!)) is their number. The lack of information S = lnΩ
of the macro-state as a function of global cooperation nF c, i.e. the relation S(nF c), can be
regarded as the analogue of the micro-canonical fundamental ”thermodynamical” relation, and
its first derivative is the intensive parameter β (thus the analogue of the inverse thermodynam-
ical temperature), that after using Stirling’s approximation is easily obtained as
β = ln
(
1− c
c
)
. (2.13)
This relation is the analogue of a thermodynamical equation of state, which simply ex-
presses the connection of the equilibrium value of the macroscopic cooperation level c to the
”entropic” intensive parameter β. Note that c is determined by the balance condition (c˙ = 0):
1− c
c
=
QDC
QCD
, (2.14)
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from where the equation of state (2.13) determines β as a function of model parameters (i.e. b,
ǫ, and nC/nF ). For example, when ǫ = 0, β = ln b > 0, indicating that the disorder of the
activity increases with increasing cooperation. The maximal value of β → ∞ corresponds to
zero disorder (b→∞), while its minimal zero value corresponds to highest possible value (at
b = 1) of cooperation (c = (1/2)). Note that values of b < 1 correspond to negative β values,
where entropy decreases with increasing values of cooperation, outside the PD domain. 1
An alternative (and equivalent in the thermodynamic limit) setting is to consider the whole
space of 2nF configurations l = {si}nFi=1, of unrestricted cl, but under the condition that the
average value c =
∑
l Plcl is fixed. This is the analogue of the canonical setting. The normal-
ization factor Z =
∑
l exp(−βcl) is the analogue of the familiar canonical partition function
(Boltzmann’s Zustandsumme), that due to the agents independence (k = 0) is easily factorized
as Z = (1 + exp(−β))nF .
In the canonical setting a most informative macroscopic quantity is the ”heat capacity” ana-
logue: The fluctuations of cl along representative (typical) stochastic trajectories at equilibrium
under the evolutionary dynamics of the game are, following the standard thermodynamical for-
malism, given by ∂c/∂(β−1), so that this quantitative social indicator detects very precisely
sudden variations of the macroscopic cooperation with payoff’s parameters. In this ideal-gas
kind of case there are no critical points and fluctuations do not diverge. For example, for ǫ = 0
they are given by the (Bernouillian) binomial variance nF c(1− c) = nF b/(b+ 1)2.
2.4.2 F is a random regular graph.
Random regular networks are random networks of fixed degree k. All nodes being thus equiv-
alent, a sensible approach is to assume (mean-field like, see e.g. (117)) that the fraction of
instantaneous cooperators in the neighborhood of a node is the fraction c of the whole set F. In
other words, one neglects local fluctuations of c. The contribution of the internal interactions to
the variation of c is then of the ”replicator equation” type, as discussed above for the complete
graph case. The difference here is that if kF ≪ nF the contribution of the interactions with
Big Brothers cannot be longer neglected.
1Note: The Stag Hunt game corresponds to b < 1 and ǫ ≤ 0, and it is the archetype of coordination games. A
clear case for the deep importance of this game in Social Studies can be found in (116).
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Figure 2.2: Macroscopic cooperation in a random regular graph structure for the set F, with k = 4,
and nF = 4000, and ǫ = 0. A decreasing sequence of nC/nF , as indicated in figure, has been used.
Symbols represent numerical Monte Carlo results, and the different lines represent the mean-field
predictions as given by the solution (c˙ = 0) of Eq. (2.17).
2.4.2.1 Mean-field approximation.
The payoffs of Big Brothers BB1 and BB2 are given by P1 = bcnF and P2 = nC+cnF+ǫ(1−
c)nF , while the payoffs of a cooperator node and a defector node at F under the mean-field
assumption are:
Pc = ck + 1 + ǫ(k(1− c) + 1) , Pd = (ck + 1)b . (2.15)
The differential equation for c is then
c˙ =
(1− c)(P2 − Pd)
(k + 2)BnF∆
− c(P1 − Pc)
(k + 2)nF∆
+
(1− c)ck(Pc − Pd)
(k + 2)2∆
, (2.16)
which under the assumption kb≪ nF , takes the form
c˙ = f(c) ≡ 1
(k + 2)2B∆
(A′0 +A
′
1c+A
′
2c
2 +A′3c
3) , (2.17)
where the coefficients are
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A′0 = (k + 2)(B − 1 + ǫ) , (2.18)
A′1 = 2(2(1− ǫ)−B) + k(2(1− ǫ)−B(b− ǫ))
+k2Bǫ , (2.19)
A′2 = 2(ǫ− 1−Bb) + k(ǫ− 1−B(1 + ǫ))
+k2B(1− b− 2ǫ) , (2.20)
A′3 = k
2B(b− 1 + ǫ) , (2.21)
Note that the assumption nC > b − nF ǫ (i.e. the condition for Big Brother 2 to be a
permanent cooperator) implies that A′0 > 0, so that c˙(0) > 0 and one positive root, say c∗, of
f(c) is then ensured, in agreement with the theorem of section 2.3. In Fig. 2.2 we show the
asymptotic value of the average cooperation c versus the temptation parameter b, as obtained
from (2.17), for several different values of nC/nF , ǫ = 0, and k = 4.
Within the mean field approximation, it is possible to obtain explicitly the equilibrium
macro-state, i.e. the stationary probability distribution density P∗l , which as expected from
section 2.3 turns out to be of the Boltzmann type. Let us consider two different (arbitrary)
strategic microstates l = {si} (i = 1, ..., nF ), and l′ = {s′i}, of the fluctuating set. For any pair
of microstates (l, l′) we define the following numbers:
n11 =
∑
i
δsi,s′iδs′i,1 , (2.22)
n10 =
∑
i
(1− δsi,s′i)δs′i,0 , (2.23)
n00 =
∑
i
δsi,s′iδs′i,0 , (2.24)
n01 =
∑
i
(1− δsi,s′i)δs′i,1 , (2.25)
i.e., n11 is the number of nodes that are cooperators in both microstates, n10 that of the nodes
that are cooperators in l but defectors in l′, etc... Using equation (2.2) it is straightforward to
obtain
cl − cl′ = 1
nF
(n10 − n01) . (2.26)
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Now, let us assume that the probabilities that a node i changes strategy are independent
of node i (homogeneity assumption, mean-field), and denote them by QCD (transition from
defector to cooperator) and QDC (for the transition from cooperator to defector). Then we can
easily see that the transition probabilities between the microstates l and l′ are given by
Πl,l′ = (1−QDC)n11(1−QCD)n00Qn01DCQn10CD, (2.27)
Πl′,l = (1−QDC)n11(1−QCD)n00Qn10DCQn01CD, (2.28)
Henceforth, denoting exp(−β) = QCD/QDC , one easily obtains the expression:
Πl,l′ exp(−βcl′nF ) = Πl′,l exp(−βclnF ) , (2.29)
from where the unique solution to the fixed point equation
Πl,l′P
∗
l′ = P
∗
l , (2.30)
is easily found to be:
P
∗
l = Z
−1 exp(−βclnF ) , (2.31)
where Z is the analogue of the canonical partition function
Z =
[
QCD +QDC
QDC
]nF
. (2.32)
Note that Eq. (2.29) expresses the ”detailed balance” condition, which is thus proved to
be satisfied. As it is well-known (118), the canonical probability distribution density (2.31)
is the unique density that maximizes the lack of information (entropy), S = −∑l Pl lnPl,
among those (compatible) densities that share a common value for the macroscopic average
of cooperation c =
∑
l Plcl. This provides a ”generalized thermodynamic” meaning to the
parameter β: it is no other than the intensive entropic parameter associated to cooperation,
that is, the Lagrange multiplier (119; 120) associated to the restriction c = ∑l Plcl on the
compatible measures (canonical restricted maximization of entropy), that is:
β =
∂S
nF∂c
. (2.33)
The parameter β simply measures how fast the entropy of the equilibrium macro-state in-
creases versus global cooperation variations. Its formal role is that of an analogue of inverse
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thermodynamical temperature. Let us note that, at variance with many works in evolutionary
game dynamics (see (16) and references therein) where an analogue of temperature is intro-
duced ”ad hoc” as a parameter entering into the definition of the (stochastic) strategic updating
rules, the parameter β (2.33) is a kind of emergent property that characterizes the equilibrium
macro-state, and thus is a function of the model parameters (not a model parameter itself).
The fluctuations of the micro-states cooperation cl, namely (nF )2(
∑
l(Plc
2
l )−(
∑
l Plcl)
2)
are given by nF c(1 − c). This is the analogue of the heat capacity. The dependence on the
game and network parameters b, ǫ, nC/nF , k of the fluctuations of cooperation is obtained by
solving for the cooperation equilibrium value c˙ = 0 in (2.17), and plotted in Fig. 2.3(panel b)
for k = 4, ǫ = 0, and decreasing values of the ratio nC/nF .
2.4.2.2 Numerical results, and the mean-field failure.
In this subsection we compare the mean-field results with those obtained from Monte Carlo
simulations implementing the updating rules on the dipole model with a random regular net-
work structure for the fluctuating set F.
In order to illustrate the Boltzmannian character of the stationary probability density P∗(l),
we plot in Fig. 2.4 the numerical estimates of ln
(
P (c)
g(c)
)
, where P (c) is the probability that
a microstate has an average cooperation c (2.2), as inferred from the simulation results, and
g(c) = nF !/((cnF )!(nF − cnF )!) is the degeneracy of c (i.e., the number of microstates l such
that cl = c). The data correspond to a random regular network structure for the component F
with degree k = 4, and parameter values b = 1.1, nF = 5000, nC = 500, and ǫ = 0. As one
can see from the perfect straight line shape of the plot, the data are fully consistent with the
Boltzmann’s density (2.31).
Though the system evolution is governed by dynamical rules (strategic updating) which ”a
priori” could be thought to lead to non-equilibrium behaviors, one finds that the asymptotic
regime of the PD evolutionary dynamics in the dipole model is a true macroscopic equilibrium
regime, where the formalism of generalized thermodynamics (120) applies.
The results of the asymptotic value of the average cooperation c versus the temptation to
defect b are presented in Fig. 2.2 for (relatively small) values of nC/nF ranging from 0.025
down to 4 × 10−3, but still satisfying the sufficient condition for the fixation of cooperation
at BB2. The comparison with the mean-field predictions show that the mean-field approxima-
tion overestimates the cooperation value. Most notably, for very small values of nC/nF , the
numerical results show, at about b ≃ 1.4, a fast decay of cooperation to values close to zero
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Figure 2.3: Fluctuations of cooperation in a random regular graph structure for the set F. The
upper panel (a) shows, for k = 4, ǫ = 0, nF = 4000, and a decreasing sequence of nC/nF values
as indicated, the fluctuations of cooperation observed in Monte Carlo simulations. The lower panel
(b) shows the mean-field predictions. The mean-field approach is shown in text to be unable to
predict the observed phase transition. This qualifies network reciprocity as a true ”critical” social
phenomenon.
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Figure 2.4: Plot of ln
(
P (c)
g(c)
)
versus cooperation c, showing the Boltzmannian character of the
stationary probability density of microstates, for a random regular network structure for the set F.
The parameter values are b = 1.1, nF = 5000, k = 4, nC = 500, and ǫ = 0. The results shown
here correspond to 5 × 104 Monte Carlo steps (after a long enough transient), for each one of the
1.5× 103 different network realizations and/or initial conditions.
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(thus suggesting the existence of a phase transition), while the corresponding decay for the
mean-field prediction is smooth in the whole range.
To which extent the mean-field approximation fails for low values of the parameter nC/nF ,
can be appreciated by confronting its prediction, nF c(1 − c), for the fluctuations of coopera-
tion with the results from Monte Carlo simulations. In Fig. 2.3 (panel a) we see how a peak
in cooperation fluctuations is revealed, when nC/nF → 0, signaling the occurrence of a phase
transition between two qualitatively different equilibrium macroscopic behaviors, that corre-
spond to low and high temptation regimes. The mean-field assumption is thus qualitatively
wrong if the payoff received from C by Big Brother 2 becomes negligible versus the size nF .
The reasons for this qualitative failure of the mean-field approximation rely on the lattice
reciprocity of internal interactions, which is totally absent in the mean field approximation. Let
us remind here our remark above on the replicator-equation-type of effect of internal interac-
tions in equation (2.8) because of the mean-field assumption. The transition signaled by the
divergence of fluctuations at b∗ reveals the onset of internal lattice reciprocity, a conclusion that
we now substantiate (see also appendix 2.4.4 below).
For b > b∗, say in the low-temperature (high temptation) phase, the macro-state is domi-
nated by fast defection invasions on the relatively few nodes that are instantaneous cooperators
due to sporadic interactions with Big Brother 2. In the appendix 2.4.4 we show that, in the low
c and low nC/nF regime, the BB-imitation events in a given node are typically separated by
intervals of time of about c−1 time units large. In those large intervals when Big Brother 2’s in-
fluence is null, the very few and mostly isolated instantaneous cooperators are quickly invaded
by defector internal neighbors. In this regime lattice reciprocity has no chance to develop, and
cooperation is only weakly sustained by the sporadic influence of BB2.
On the contrary, for b < b∗ (high temperature, or low temptation phase) the local fluc-
tuations of the neighbors strategic field favor the building up of clusters of cooperators that
resist invasions during time intervals that are comparable to the characteristic time intervals
between BB-imitation events. Under these circumstances the ”extra payoff” that BB2 receives
from C does not anymore need to be high in order to sustain high levels of cooperation. In-
ternal lattice reciprocity enhances the probability of highly cooperative micro-states, so that
the macro-states below transition differs substantially from those of the high-temptation phase.
This was not captured by the mean-field approximation, for these effects require a sizable like-
lihood of occurrence for the local fluctuations of the strategic field, and the neglect of them is
all a mean-field approach is based upon.
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To summarize the discussion of the results shown in figure, a random regular structure
of interactions inside F is enough to support lattice reciprocity mechanisms that cannot be
captured by a simple mean-field approach. The onset of lattice reciprocity in the dipole model
is furthermore interpreted as a ”thermodynamical” phase transition, in a rigorous formal sense
(divergence of the fluctuations of an equilibrium extensive parameter, the cooperation c). One is
then lead to a sensible and precise formal framework where such a term as ”social temperature”
is not a vague metaphor, but it denotes a truly quantitative parameter, a legitimate (measurable,
observable) social indicator.
2.4.3 What if BB1 and BB2 are directly connected?
If a direct connection between Big Brothers is added (for the set of initial conditions specified in
section 2.3, and the conditions on parameters given ibidem), one must compare their respective
payoffs to see who can invade the other. One easily finds that the payoff of the defector BB1 is
higher than that of the cooperator BB2 provided the following condition holds:
nC
nF
< c(b+ ǫ− 1)− ǫ+ b− ǫ
nF
, (2.34)
where c is the (instantaneous) average cooperation in F. In this case, BB2 will be invaded
with a non-zero probability. Once this eventuality occurs, no cooperator (in F or in C) can
later invade BB2 because all of them have lower payoffs, and fixation of defection in the whole
network will occur. Note that as the average cooperation in F fluctuates, the condition above
must be satisfied at the precise time when BB2 has chosen (by chance) to compare its payoff
with BB1, and that due to the high connectivity of BB2 (which is now nC + nF + 1) the
later event occurs with a very low probability for macroscopic values of nF . In other words,
the eventual invasion of BB2 from BB1 and the subsequent fixation of defection in the whole
network can take on a very long time.
If the opposite condition holds, say if
nC
nF
> c(b+ ǫ− 1)− ǫ+ b− ǫ
nF
, (2.35)
when BB1 has chosen to compare its payoff with BB2, then invasion of BB1 will occur with a
non-zero probability. After this has occurred, BB1 becomes a fluctuating node (for it could be
eventually invaded by an instantaneous defector in F), but in the long term fixation of cooper-
ation in the whole network will occur.
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The introduction of a direct connection between Big Brothers in the Dipole Model makes
fixation of opposite strategies on them impossible, and then asymptotic fixation on the whole
network of either defection or cooperation will occur, depending on the relative size nC/nF of
components C and F.
2.4.4 Low c approximation.
In order to simplify expressions we assume hereafter ǫ = 0 and k = 4, and denote δ = nC/nF .
For the case of a random regular graph structure of the fluctuating set F, the probability ΠBBC←D
that an instantaneous defector node chooses to imitate Big Brother 2 (invasion event from BB2)
is, to first order in n−1F ,
ΠBBC←D =
1
(k + 2)
c+ δ
(1 + δ)b
(2.36)
while the probability ΠBBD←C of an invasion event from BB1 to an instantaneous cooperator
node in F is, to first order in n−1F ,
ΠBBD←C =
c
(k + 2)
(2.37)
Thus, for δ ≤ c, typical intervals between invasion events from Big Brothers in a node are
(of the order of) c−1 time units large. For large values of the temptation, where the value of c
is expected to be very small, the dynamics is consequently dominated, for typically very large
intervals of time, by internal strategic interactions. Let us analyze them.
The internal neighbors of a cooperator i are overwhelmingly likely instantaneous defectors
in this ”low c” regime, so that i will be quickly invaded by them. The only chance for it to resist
invasion would be that its instantaneous neighborhood microstate had at least two cooperator
neighbors and that b < (3/2) (note that in this strategic configuration, the payoff of i is Pi = 3
and that of its typical defector neighbors is 2b). These neighborhood microstates (cooperative
clusters) are so rare fluctuations that low values of the temptation b are necessary for their
non-negligible occurrence. Provided b is below the transition value, the resilience to invasion
(lattice reciprocity) of cooperative clusters enhances the likelihood of these fluctuations, which
in turn reinforces the clusters resilience, and so on. This positive feedback mechanism of
cooperative fluctuations enhancement is thus what triggers the transition to highly cooperative
macro-states, and qualifies lattice reciprocity as a critical social phenomenon.
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Figure 2.5: Fraction of cooperators as a function of the temptation to defect b in a ER (BA)
topology for the set F, with nF = 4000, nC = 3804 and ǫ = 0, −0.2. Each point is averaged over
1600 realizations (40 networks, 40 initial conditions).
2.4.5 General case: F is a general random graph.
Let us pay attention to the behavior of the model when F is a graph characterized by a given
degree distribution P (k). While the random regular network (RRN) considered in the previous
section corresponds to the distribution P (k) = δ(k − kF ), now we consider two cases: when
F is a Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER) or Baraba´si-Albert (BA) network. While in homogeneous ER graphs,
P (k) follows a Poisson distribution centered at kµ, in BA networks the degree distribution
follows a power-law, and the different connectivity distribution determines the system behavior;
as will be detailed below, the hubs of the set F in the BA case are a deciding factor.
With regard to the roots of cooperation, highly connected nodes are critical elements in the
intensity of lattice reciprocity mechanism. This is mainly due to the effect that the network
topology has on the distribution of strategies: the formation of clusters of cooperators prevents
the invasion of the strategy D in them. If the connectivity distribution is such that there are
very connected vertices, the hubs having an initial strategy C are likely to form cooperative
clusters, and the change of strategy of these hubs is very unlikely. According to this argument,
BA networks will promote cooperation more than ER ones.
We have numerically studied the system by performing Monte Carlo simulations after im-
plementing in the fluctuating set F a network topology generated by a routine taken from (140).
This algorithm provides a random network such that P (k) depends on a continuous parameter
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Figure 2.6: The main panel shows the probability for a fluctuating node to remain as a cooperator
for a period τ , for ǫ = −0.2 (PD), b = 2 and a BA structure for the set F. The permanence
probability follows a power law. The inside panel shows the slopes of the main panel, for all
connectivity classes. Nodes with higher connectivity are more resilient to strategy change, which
provides a microscopic basis for lattice reciprocity. See the text for further details.
α: α = 0 (resp., 1) generates a Scale-Free (resp., Poisson distribution) graph. We have scanned
the parameter space {α, ǫ, b}, with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 (SF to ER). The condition b > 1 + ǫ(kF + 1),
in practice ǫ ≥ 0, involves PD. In the same way, the constraint nC > b(kF + 1)− ǫnF implies
a large number of BB2 stabilizer agents (set C) for a high connectivity, as in the BA case.
Regarding macroscopic cooperation, the numerical results obtained do not show any abrupt
transition when the parameter α varies: the gradual change from α = 0 (SF) to 1 (ER) implies
a gradual change in c. The results of the asymptotic value of the average cooperation c can be
seen in figure 2.5. The figure shows greater cooperation c in BA graphs than in ER ones, as we
argued above. Moreover, the dependence of c on ǫ (always for ǫ < 0, i.e., PD game) turns out
to be approximately linear for all values of b, depending very little on the type of network:
c(ǫ) = c(ǫ = 0)(1 + κǫ), (ǫ < 0), κ ≈ 1.
This relation is valid for all values of b, as verified by low variance of
φǫ(b) =
c(b)|ǫ′
c(b)|ǫ=0
, (e.g. σ2(φǫ) = 0.004 for ǫ′ = −0.2).
2.4.5.1 Fluctuations.
Given that the elements of the set F always have a non-zero probability of strategy change, we
have studied the distribution of the characteristic cooperation time τc, which is defined as the
average period that a node remains as cooperator. The simulations showed that τc is indepen-
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Figure 2.7: Fluctuations of cooperation in a ER (BA) topology for the set F, with nF = 4000,
nC = 3804 and ǫ = −0.2, 0.2.
dent of α, that is, the characteristic cooperation time for a given connectivity is independent
of the network topology. Figure 2.6 shows the probability P (τ)that a node of the set F keeps
strategy C during a period τ , in a BA graph, for ǫ = 0, b = 2 and different connectivity classes.
The probability of permanence decreases exponentially over time and, as expected, nodes with
higher connectivity have higher characteristic cooperation time, which constitutes a manifes-
tation of the microscopics roots of lattice reciprocity, and explains why BA networks show
higher cooperation rates than ER ones. The inset of figure 2.6 shows the slopes of main figure,
and represents the coefficient λ of the relation:
P (τ) ∝ e−λτ (2.38)
As shown, λ(k) is monotonically decreasing, which highlights the relationship between
connectivity and network reciprocity.
As in the previous sections, we study the fluctuations of cooperation along stochastic tra-
jectories. Nevertheless, for a ER or BA structure for the set F, the analogy between the coop-
eration rate variance and the heat capacity is not as justified as in the random regular structure
and, therefore, the study is restricted to Monte Carlo simulations. As shown in figure 2.7, BA
structures presents more fluctuations than ER ones.
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2.5 Heat transfer: Two dipoles in contact.
The system shown so far constitutes a Markov process. We have seen in section (2.4.2) that, in
the scope of applicability of mean field approximation (as when F is a RRN), the model satisfies
detailed balance condition (2.29). Therefore, in the stationary state we deal with a reversible
Markov process described by the Boltzmann distribution (2.30). However, the analogy of the
model with a real particle system has a drawback: the equivalent of energy is the total number
of cooperators cnF , which means that the model is not conservative. Despite that, it’s hard
not to wonder how two dipoles behave when they come into contact. The interest of this
extension of the original model is wide: On one hand, we can study the validity of the social
temperature concept and evaluate its relation to the physical temperature. Furthermore, the
expanded model allows to study the interaction between two evolutionary dynamics, both with
two pure strategies.
2.5.1 The double dipole model.
In order to simulate the heat transfer, we consider two dipolesD1 andD2, composed by respec-
tive fluctuating sets Fi, the hubs BB1i and BB2i and the cooperating sets Ci. The subscript
i indicates the dipole subsystem to which it belongs, i = 1, 2. Both dipole subsystems have
the same size: nC1 = nC2 = nC , nF1 = nF2 = nF . Therefore, from now on, these sizes
will be denoted by nC and nF . The parameter ǫ is common for both dipoles, and the differ-
ence in payoffs is determined by the respective parameters bi. The definition of temperature,
β−1 = −(lnQCDQCD )−1 = f(b), leading to the Boltzmann distribution (2.30), takes us to use b as
an independent variable. This procedure allows to control the temperature of each of the two
dipoles when they reach their respective stationary states.
Let I’ be the set of initial conditions: the Big Brothers BB1i are defectors, Big Brothers
BB2i are cooperators, and all nodes in sets Ci are also cooperators. There is not constraint to
initial strategies for elements in sets Fi. To ensure that I’ is a invariant set of the evolutionary
dynamics, we maintain the restrictions of section 2.3, now take the form: nC > bmax(kF +
1)− ǫnF and bi > 1 + ǫ(kF + 1), where bmax = sup{bi}.
2.5.2 Dynamics.
The subsystems D1 and D2, after setting their parameters, are left to evolve according to the
usual dynamic to reach equilibrium. Once reached their respective stationary states (t = 0), we
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Figure 2.8: Structure of the Double Dipole Network. On the left side is represented the model
before thermal contact: Without any link between the sets F1 and F2. On the right, after the
thermal contact: With links connecting nodes of F1 to nodes of F2. Nodes 1i and 2i (Big Brothers)
are linked to all nodes in Fi. Furthermore, nodes 2i are also connected to all nodes in Ci. Nodes in
sets Fi, Ci are internally connected, forming a defined network. Initial conditions (on left side) are
indicated by colors: red for cooperators (nodes 2i and set Ci), blue for defectors (nodes 1i), and
green means arbitrary (sets Fi). See the text for further details.
connect both fluctuating sets as follow: We choose at random a node i1 of F1 and a neighbor
j1, in the same way, we choose another node i2 of F2 and his neighbor j2. Subsequently,
we remove links connecting those nodes, and connect i1 to i2, and j1 to j2. We repeat this
process kκnF /2 times, where κ is a coupling parameter. After that, the system will evolve
again according to the habitual dynamics. When a node i of dipole n choose a neighbor j of
dipole m to play, both agents take n’s pay-off matrix, i.e. the temptation to defect is bn. We
have studied the evolution of the system, the observables and stationary states.
2.5.3 Effective temperature.
The intrinsic observables of the extended model are ci. However, it is possible to study the
final temperature of each subsystem by introducing the concept of effective temperature.
By exp(−β) = QCD/QDC , we know that stationary state temperature in an isolated
dipole, when F is a RRN, is a function f(b, ǫ, nC , nF ). Besides, if all other parameters keep
fixed, the cooperation is given by a monotonically decreasing function c(b). Therefore, if we
keep constant all other parameters, each value of c corresponds to a value of b.
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We define the effective temperature of a subsystem Di(bi, ǫ, nC , nF ) as the value of β−1
that would fall to his level ci of cooperation in an isolated dipole D(bi, ǫ, nC , nF ) in stationary
state. The effective temperature is applicable to each subsystem, once put in thermal contact
and reached a new stationary state.
We can study now the temperatures of the subsystems before and after putting them in
contact. The problem is that, knowing the asymptotic value of ci, we can not infer β for any
topology in set F, unless we use an approximation as MF. Therefore, we use the observed
value of c as relatives of the temperature. The Big Brothers’ influence on fluctuating sets Fi is
determined by its payoffs, which in turn are a function of ci, bi, nC , nF and ǫ. An interpretation
of the influence of BBs on Fi is that the sets Fi are thermodynamic systems in contact with
respective heat baths. The influence of the heat baths remains after putting the dipoles in
contact, therefore the effective temperature of both subsystems need not be equal once it has
reached the new stationary state, unless the coupling parameter is κ ≥ 0.5.
In the model, there are only two strategies or accessible levels by element, and there exists
a extern source of cooperation: The sets Ci. It is therefore possible to have configurations in
which there are more elements adopting cooperating strategy than defect one and the system
can be characterized by a negative effective temperature. This is only possible if the external
field (heat bath) has enough influence, that is, for high values of nC . Negative temperatures are
possible in both dipole, before and after heat contact, for high enough values of nC .
2.5.4 Mean-field approximation.
For an isolated dipole, in subsection 2.4.2 we assumed that the fraction of instantaneous co-
operators c[i] in the neighborhood of a node i, is the fraction c of the whole set F. In or-
der to generalize MF approximation, now we make c[i] to correspond to the weighted aver-
age of the cooperation: We assume that for a fluctuant node i1 in the dipole D1, in thermal
contact κ with another dipole D2, the fraction of cooperators in the neighborhood of i1 is
c[i1] = (1 − κ)c1 + κc2. In the same way, we take c[i2] = κc1 + (1 − κ)c2. In the model,
according to 2.5.2, when a node of dipole n chooses a neighbor to play, they take bn, in this
approximation we assume the average temptation to defect b¯ = (b1+b2)/2 for heat interactions
(between two fluctuating sets).
Under these assumption, the payoffs of Big Brothers BB1i and BB2i are given by P1i =
bicinF and P2i = nC + cinF + ǫ(1 − ci)nF , while the payoffs of a cooperator node and a
defector node at Fi are:
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Pc1 = k(λc1 + κc2) + 1 + ǫ(k(λ(1− c1) + κ(1− c2)) + 1) ,
Pc2 = k(κc1 + λc2) + 1 + ǫ(k(κ(1− c1) + λ(1− c2)) + 1) ,
Pd1 = (kλc1 + 1)b1 + kκc2b¯ ,
Pd2 = kκc1b¯+ (kλc2 + 1)b2 ,
(2.39)
where λ = 1− κ.
bi > 1 implies Pdi > Pci. Without loss of generality, we assume that b2 > b1. If there is
not constraint to κ, can not ensure that Pci > Pcj nor Pdi > Pdj for any i 6= j. For nodes in
Fi, each time step, the probabilities QDCi (a cooperator changes its strategy to defector) and
QCDi (a defector changes its strategy to cooperator) are:
QDC1 =
P11 − Pc1
(k + 2)nF∆
+k
λ(1− c1)(Pd1 − Pc1) + κ(1− c2)(Pd2 − Pc1)H(Pd2 − Pc1)
(k + 2)2∆
,
QCD1 =
P21 − Pd1
(k + 2)BnF∆
+ k
κc2(Pc2 − Pd1)H(Pc2 − Pd1)
(k + 2)2∆
,
QDC2 =
P12 − Pc2
(k + 2)nF∆
+k
κ(1− c1)(Pd1 − Pc2)H(Pd1 − Pc2) + λ(1− c2)(Pd2 − Pc2)
(k + 2)2∆
,
QCD2 =
P22 − Pd2
(k + 2)BnF∆
+ k
κc1(Pc1 − Pd2)H(Pc1 − Pd2)
(k + 2)2∆
,
(2.40)
where H(x) represents Heaviside’s step function, that takes value 1 if x > 0, 0 otherwise.
After a time step, the fraction of cooperators in set Fi is given by:
ci(t+ 1) = ci(t) + (1− ci(t))QCDi − ci(t)QDCi . (2.41)
Now, we can replace (2.39) and (2.40) in (2.41) to achieve two coupled finite difference
equations for ci. These equations provide the evolution of the system and the stationary state,
according to MF approximation.
61
2. THE DIPOLE MODEL: THERMODYNAMIC STUDY OF A SOCIAL SYSTEM.
0 1e+02 2e+020
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
c
0 100 200
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 100 200
t
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
c
0 100 200
t
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
(A)
(C) (D)
(B)
Figure 2.9: Evolution of macroscopic cooperation after putting in contact two dipoles (t = 0),
with k = 4, nF = 4000, ǫ = 0, nC = 100, b1 = 1.1, and for different values of b2 = 1.5 (A,B),
b2 = 1.8 (C,D) and coupling parameter: κ = 0.25 (A,C), κ = 0.5 (B,D). Solid lines represent the
results of the simulations, while dotted lines represent the MF approximation. Black lines represent
to dipole D1 and red lines to dipole D2. Time unit corresponds to a Monte Carlo step. See the text
for further details.
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Figure 2.10: Macroscopic cooperation levels c for both subsystems, versus the size nC of pure
cooperators sets, with k = 4, nF = 4000, ǫ = 0, κ = 0.5 and RRN structures in fluctuating sets Fi.
Upper panels show the results of Monte Carlo simulations, after a long enough transient, averaged
over 5 × 104 steps and 5 × 103 different network realizations. The temptation parameters of both
sybsystems are fixed at b1 = 1.1 (blue, +) and b2 = 1.5 (red, x). The upper-left panel corresponds
to the stationary state before putting in contact the dipoles, and the upper-right panel corresponds
to the stationary state after exchanging 1.5nF links. Lower panels: Mean field estimate for the
same values of parameters.
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Figure 2.11: Upper panels: Cooperation levels in dipoles D1 (blue, +) and D2 (red, x) versus the
difference b2 − b1 of temptation parameters. The rest of parameters have been fixed to b1 = 1.1,
k = 4, nF = 4000, nC = 100, ǫ = 0 and κ = 0.5. Sets Fi are endowed with a random regular
graph structure. Symbols correspond to the value of c once reached stationary state, averaged over
5×104 Monte Carlo steps and for 5×103 different networks, before (left) and after (right) putting
in contact the dipoles. Middle panels: Mean-field estimation of cooperation levels in dipoles D1
(solid blue lines) and D2 (dashed red lines), before (left) and after (right) contact, for the same
values of parameters. Lower panels: Mean-field estimation of effective temperatures Teff of
dipoles D1 (solid blue lines) and D2 (dashed red lines), before (left) and after (right) contact, for
the same values of parameters.
In all panels, the temptation parameter b1 of dipole D1 remains constant (blue), while varying the
respective parameter b2 of dipole D2 (red).
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2.5.5 Numerical results.
We compare the mean-field results, obtained by evaluating the expression (2.41) iteratively,
with experimental ones obtained from Monte Carlo simulations. The values of ci, once station-
ary state is reached, are related to the effective temperatures according to 2.5.3.
In order to study transition phenomena, we measure the cooperation evolution from the sta-
tionary states for the isolated dipoles Di to the stationary state after thermal contact. Fig. 2.9
shows the evolution of cooperation, by comparing simulations results with MF estimate, for
different values of coupling parameter κ and b2 − b1 (in monotone bijection to initial temper-
ature difference). One can observe that the mean-field predictions provide higher cooperation
values. This failure of MF approximation, as in the section 2.4.2.2, highlights the importance
of lattice reciprocity, which is ignored in MF approximation. As expected, this MF estimate,
provided by the finite difference equations (2.41), is coherent at t = 0 with the MF estimate of
the section 2.4.2.2, provided by the fixed point of the differential equation (2.16).
The results for the asymptotic values of the average cooperation, that is, the values of ci at
the stationary states before and after the thermal contact, versus the size of fluctuating sets Ci
are represented in figure (2.10). As shown, for low values of nC the difference in cooperation
between the dipoles is smaller than for high values of nC . This is a consequence of the BB’s
influence, which grows as do the size of the set of cooperating nodes. Put another way, the
influence of heat bath increases with nC/nF . This has a direct explanation because the size of
nC does not affect the payoff of fluctuating nodes, but it does increase the payoff of cooperator
hubs BB2i.
The upper panel of figure 2.11 shows the average cooperation c versus the difference in the
temptation to defect b2 − b1, once fixed nC = 100, nF = 4000, ǫ = 0, κ = 0.5, b1 = 1.1
and taking b2 as independent variable. For high values of b2, the proportion of cooperators of
both subsystems after heat transfer and once reached the new stationary state tend to equate:
The heat bath effect decreases with bmax, and cooperation final ratios tend to be equal when
b2 increases. When we use the MF approximation, the same results can be analyzed from
the perspective of effective temperature, as shown in the lower panel of figure 2.11. Effective
temperature decreases as ci increases, and then it increases when bi increases. The final tem-
perature difference depends on the value of the coupling parameter κ, a higher κ implies lower
difference. However, κ > 0.5 means that in average, nodes have more links to the other fluctu-
ating set than to his. Therefore, for small enough nc size and κ > 0.5, the final temperature of
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initially hotter dipole will be lower than the opposite dipole final temperature.
2.6 Prospective remarks
The plausibility of a thermodynamical perspective on evolutionary game dynamics studies is
not a new issue, for it is somehow implicit (or at least connatural) to a body of research lit-
erature on statistical mechanics of strategic interactions (16; 121). What our simple analysis
here shows is that it can sometimes be strengthened up to a formal interpretation of quantitative
macroscopic social indicators as thermodynamic quantities. In the extent that it helps to under-
stand and to quantitatively characterize the phenomenology of social and economical models,
it should be recognized as a powerful theoretical perspective. What is even more important,
this perspective emphasizes the central role of quantitative (experimental, observational) stud-
ies in social sciences, and could provide, in those contexts, alternate valuable meanings to
quantitative social indicators and even suggestions for new and better ones.
Any ”general-physics” trained scientist recognizes that entropy reasoning is an extraordi-
nary powerful tool for the analysis of macroscopic behavior in (material) traditional-physics
systems. It turns out that some of the models (at least a bunch of interesting ones) of social
phenomena are to a large extent amenable to a macroscopic description where thermodynam-
ical concepts have proved to be essential. Of course, some notions like e.g. ”First Law of
Thermodynamics” could be often absent in these new contexts. However we emphasize that
the absence of energy as a variable in social models is not a shortcoming for the applicability
mutatis mutandi of many aspects of the thermodynamical formalism to these models. A word
of caution is nevertheless worth here regarding typical system sizes in controlled social ex-
periments, where finite size effects could be hugely determinant. Also, one should not expect
always social processes to be amenable to equilibrium descriptions, what makes them even
more interesting from the physicists point of view.
Nowadays, it is somewhat generally accepted that physics in general, and statistical physics
in particular, offers a powerful tool-box for problem solving in social sciences and many other
areas. Recent trends in cognitive science (122) have correctly emphasized the power of the ”di-
versity of perspectives” in problem solving, so it does not come as a surprise that adding phys-
ical perspectives to social models may sometimes pave the way to the needed breakthrough.
Perhaps one should also wonder about the possibility of reverse flow in these interdisciplinary
approaches to social sciences. After all, the proper use of a tool helps to its reshaping, and
65
2. THE DIPOLE MODEL: THERMODYNAMIC STUDY OF A SOCIAL SYSTEM.
one could perhaps expect some kind of feedback. In other words, is there any new physics that
we can learn from the study of social and economic complex systems? Only the recourse to
empirical and quantitative methods in the study of social phenomena may likely give clues for
sensible answers to this question.
—————————————————————————
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Chapter 3
Cooperation in changing
environments: Irreversibility in the
transition to cooperation in complex
networks.
In this chapter, we study the evolutionary dynamics of the prisoner’s dilemma game in differ-
ents complex networks, focusing on its reversibility under adiabatic variations of the payoff
matrix parameter b (temptation to defect). We find that, for the networks considered, the pro-
cess is reversible provided it is kept away from the absorbing states. Nevertheless, irreversibil-
ity appears when the level of cooperation reaches a tipping point, emerging a hysteresis cycle
whose shape depends on the underlying topology.
3.1 Introduction.
Evolutionary dynamics has been widely used to describe the evolution of biological, economic
and social systems (12). The replicator dynamics of evolutionary game theory (EGT) pro-
vides a powerful tool to study the progress of strategies through the lens of evolution (17; 79).
In this respect, one of the hot topics of the evolutionary game dynamics is the understand-
ing of the observed evolutionary survival of cooperative behavior among individuals despite
selfish actions provide higher fitness (reproductive success). Possibly, the most used EGT
model to formalize the emergence of cooperation is iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), a sym-
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metric two-player two-actions game where each player choose one of the two available ac-
tions: cooperation or defection: A cooperator receives R from another cooperator and S
from a defector; a defector receives T from a cooperator and P from another defector; pay-
offs satisfy T > R > P > S. Several studies on the iterated PD on complex networks
(16; 19; 81; 82; 83; 84; 85; 86; 87; 90; 101; 102; 103; 104) show that the cooperation level
depends strongly on the topology of the network. The existence of cooperation enhancing
mechanisms based on the interaction structure now is widely accepted: The clustering of coop-
erators could provide high enough payoff to the cooperator nodes to resist invasion of defectors,
even when defection is favored by the one-round two-players game analysis. For small values
of PS (i.e., PS ≪ TR), cooperation decreases slowly when TR increases from zero, and
becomes zero at a value of T/R > 1 that depends on the network considered.
Recent studies of replicator dynamics (109) on graphs show that fixation of cooperation on
certain nodes occurs after transients, in which the trajectories are characterized by a partition
of the network into three sets: the set C of pure cooperators (nodes where cooperation is fixed),
the set D of pure defectors (nodes where defection is fixed), and the set F of fluctuating nodes
(nodes that never reach an unchanging action). Furthermore, robustness of cooperation in the
evolutionary PD on complex networks has been recently studied (112), showing that the level of
cooperation under different network structures is robust against variation of initial conditions.
The aim of the present study is to investigate evolutionary PD on complex networks in changing
environments, in particular its reversibility under variations of temptation to defect T , and to
determine how topology affects reversibility.
3.2 The model.
We consider a two-players two-actions game, where each player chooses one of the two avail-
able actions, cooperation or defection: A cooperator earns R when playing with a cooperator,
and S when playing with a defector, while a defector earns P when playing with a defector, and
T (temptation to defect) against a cooperator. When T > R > P > S, the game is called Pris-
oner’s Dilemma (PD), while if T > R > S > P it is called Snowdrift Game (SG). In this work
we study a variant of PD called weak Prisoner’s Dilemma, placed in its boundary respect to
SG, that is T > R > P = S. In PD (including weak variant), whatever the opponent’s action,
the payoff is never higher for cooperation, and a rational agent should choose defection. Still,
two cooperator agents receive higher payoff (2R) than two defector ones (2P ), which leads to
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the dilemma. Provided the relative selective advantage among two individuals depends on their
payoff’s difference (see below), we can normalize without loss of generality the pay-off matrix
taking R = 1 and fix the punishment P = 0. Then only a parameter T = b > 1 is a system
variable.
In this study we implement the following replication mechanism: At each time step, each
agent i plays once with each one of its neighbors (i.e. agents connected to i) and accumulates
the obtained payoffs, Pi. After that, the individuals, i, update synchronously their actions
choosing a neighbor j at random, and comparing their respective payoffs Pi and Pj . If Pi ≥ Pj ,
nothing happens and i preserves its action. Otherwise, if Pj > Pi, i adopts the action of its
neighbor j with probability Πji = η(Pj − Pi). Next, all payoffs are reset to zero. Here, η
is a positive real number, related to the characteristic inverse time scale: the larger it is, the
faster evolution takes place. We consider that players and connections between them are given
by a fixed graph where agents are represented by nodes, and a link between nodes indicates
that they interact. We choose here the maximum value of η that preserves the probabilistic
character of Πji, that is, η = (max{ki, kj}b)−1, where ki is the number of neighbors of agent
i (connectivity or degree). This choice, introduced in (18), slows down the invasion processes
from or to highly connected nodes (hubs), with respect to the rate of invasion processes between
poorly connected nodes.
Our aim is the study of the reversible (or irreversible) character of cooperation level c
under the variation of the temptation to defect parameter b, where c is defined as the number
of cooperator nodes divided by the total population c = Nc/N . In order to study the system’s
behavior, we choose an initial value of b = b0 such that the asymptotic cooperation value c is
close to a half: c(b0) ≃ 0.5. Once the system has reached stationary state, we decrease b in a
quasi-static way, that is, in steps ∆b < 0 small enough to ensure that the system remains very
close to equilibrium. Along this process, we compute the stationary value of cooperation c(b)
for each value of b. To avoid getting stuck in the absorbing states we deal with large enough
networks sizes (N > 105), considering that fluctuations decrease according to the square root
of the system size. Once the system has almost reached the absorbing state c = 0, we reverse
the sign of the increase in b, i.e. ∆b > 0, to almost reach the other absorbing state c = 1, and
then again decrease b to complete the cycle.
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3.3 Results.
To study the influence of network topology in the reversibility of the process, we consider
three different network models: Random Regular Graphs (RRG), Erdo¨s-Re´nyi and Scale-free
networks. In the case of RRG (i.e., random networks of fixed degree k, which means that every
node has the same number of neighbors), adiabatic cycles are identical; that is, the behavior
observed in the numerical simulations with RRG corresponds to a reversible process.
3.3.1 Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks.
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER) networks are random graphs characterized by a binomial degree distribution
of any particular node, this distribution is Poisson for large number N of nodes. To study the
processes reversibility, we have performed numerical simulations in 103 independent networks
of size N = 1.2 × 105 generated through Erdo¨s-Re´nyi algorithm. As outcome, for reduced
cycles, that is, when the return points are far from absorbing states (1 − Nc(bmin) ≫ 1,
Nc(bmax)≫ 1) the processes are reversible and the level of cooperation is independent of the
sign of the increase in b. Nevertheless, when return points are close enough to the absorbing
states (c(bmin) ≈ 1, c(bmax) ≈ 0), ER networks show a dramatic irreversibility. In fact, once
the level of cooperation reaches a tipping point, all processes are irreversible. In particular,
there is a strong resilience of cooperation (defection) when increasing (decreasing) the value of
b. However, the backward and forward transition curves are identical for intermediate values
of cooperation. The proximity ǫ of the tipping points c(bmin), c(bmax) to the absorbent states
in both ends of cycle turns out to be similar: 1− c(bmin) = ǫ ≈ c(bmax) and, for the networks
size used, it takes on the value ǫ ≈ 2× 10−3.
As a result, once the population has reached a cooperation level above (below) a tipping
point, the system shows a reticence to retrieve the past level of cooperation when the parameter
b increases (decreases). This phenomenon is independent of the particular ER network, being
observed in all network realizations. Figure 3.1 shows the level of cooperation 〈c〉 versus
the temptation to defect b, averaged over 103 realizations in distinct ER networks. Different
realizations show different b-increasing and b-decreasing curves, whose envelopes are depicted
as dotted lines in Figure 3.1. Remarkably, the dispersion of the different curves is much larger
for the b-decreasing direction.
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Figure 3.1: Cooperation level 〈c〉 versus the temptation to defect b averaged over 103 ER networks
(solid lines) and envelopes (pointed lines). Red lines represent semicycles with increasing b and
blue lines represent semicycles with decreasing b. The network size is N = 1.2× 105. See the text
for further details.
3.3.2 Scale-free networks.
Scale-free (SF) networks are random graphs whose degree distribution P (k) follows a power
law, that is, P (k) ∼ ck−γ . We ran simulations in 5 × 103 independent networks of size
N = 1.2 × 105 generated through the Baraba´si-Albert algorithm. Although most of the SF
networks show nearly reversible behavior, around 5% of networks show a strong hysteresis.
Nevertheless, irreversibility in SF networks should not be considered as a rare event: Increas-
ing the network size increases the proportion of networks that show irreversible behavior. The
explanation for this fact is that the use of larger networks allows to approach closer the absorb-
ing states c = 0, 1 without getting stuck in them. Based on this argument, we have separated
realizations showing a reversible behavior from irreversible ones. In these latter cases, hys-
teresis shows up only for low values of b; in other words, when cooperation is very small,
backward and forward c(b) curves are almost identical. Moreover, the behavior of the system
in b-increasing semicycles is always similar, the cooperation level c(b) taking approximately
the same value in all realizations, regardless they are reversible or irreversible. On the contrary,
c(b) curves are different for different (irreversible) realizations in b-decreasing semicycles, and
show a substantially larger dispersion that those of ER networks.
The results of the average cooperation level 〈c〉 as a function of the temptation to defect b,
for SF networks showing irreversible behavior, are presented in figure 3.2. The return points
bmin, bmax were chosen such that c(bmax) = 1 − c(bmin) = ǫ, for a value of ǫ = 10−3. Note
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Figure 3.2: Cooperation level 〈c〉 versus the temptation to defect b averaged over 100 SF networks
(solid lines) and envelopes (dotted lines). Red lines represent semicycles with increasing b and
blue lines represent semicycles with decreasing b. Only irreversible realizations are shown. The
network size is N = 1.2× 105. See the text for further details.
that, despite the small value of ǫ, the network size N is large enough to asses that we are not
dealing with pathological cases, since a value c = 0.001 involves a number of cooperators
Nc = 120. In the same way, c = 0.999 implies 120 defector nodes. As shown in envelopes
(dotted lines), the degree of irreversibility varies greatly from each realization. Specifically,
irreversibility depends on the particular network, since for a given network repeated cycles
share approximately the same c(b) curves for a given (forward or backward) direction. A
most remarkable feature of the irreversibility in SF networks is that, for irreversible network
realizations, the value of the temptation to defect needed to reach a cooperation level of c =
10−3 is bmin < 1, that is to say, outside the PD game range.
3.4 Microscopic roots.
Previous studies (109; 112; 113) have shown that, in the asymptotic states of the evolutionary
dynamics of the PD game, under the updating of the actions explained above, the network is
generically partitioned into three sets of nodes: Pure cooperators (nodes where cooperation has
reached fixation), pure defectors, and fluctuating strategists (nodes where fixation is impossi-
ble so that defection and cooperation alternate forever). Pure cooperators resist invasion by
grouping together in cooperator clusters, each of these connected subgraphs keeping around it
a cloud of fluctuating strategists. The basis for an understanding of the irreversible behavior
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Figure 3.3: Number ncc of cooperator clusters (blue, thick lines) and relative size of main cooper-
ator cluster Gc/N (red, thin lines) in ER networks. Solid lines represent b-decreasing half-cycles
and dashed lines represent b-increasing half-cycles. The system size is N = 1.2 × 105. We have
averaged over 50 simulations.
in ER networks is found by looking along both (b-increasing and b-decreasing) branches at the
details of this microscopic organization of cooperation. In particular, in what follows we pay
attention to the number and size of pure cooperator clusters as a function of b. Figure 3.3 shows
the averaged relative size 〈Gc/N〉 of the largest cooperator cluster, and the average 〈ncc〉 of
the number of cooperator clusters versus the temptation to defect b, in both semicycles for ER
networks.
Let us first analyze the b-increasing semicycle. In typical configurations near the absorbent
state c = 1, the pure cooperators percolate the network conforming a giant cooperator cluster
whose averaged relative size 〈Gc/N〉 ≃ 1. As the temptation to defect b increases, starting
from such configurations, the existence of a single very large cluster of pure cooperators al-
lows initially for a very efficient resilience to invasion by defectors until a value of b ≃ 1.16
is reached. From there on, invasion processes are dramatically enhanced so inducing the frag-
mentation of the large cluster: 〈Gc/N〉 decreases quickly, the large cluster giving birth to an
increasing number ncc of small clusters of pure cooperators, that at b ≃ 1.23 reaches its maxi-
mum value ncc ≃ 160 when the large cluster size has been reduced to 〈Gc/N〉 ≃ 0.15. Further
increase of b reduces both the number of pure cooperator clusters and the size of the largest
one: At b ≃ 1.8 basically only the largest cluster remains with a very small size which keeps
decreasing further beyond the tipping point (typically found at b ≥ 2).
Now we analyze the b-decreasing semicycle. Back from the typical configuration reached
past the tipping point near the absorbing state c = 0, when decreasing the temptation value
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Figure 3.4: Relative size of the main cooperator cluster Gc/N for reversible processes (dashed
line, red) and irreversible ones (solid line, black) in the b-decreasing semicycle (∆b < 0) on SF
networks. Averaged over the 100 different networks studied that show irreversible behavior. The
system size is N = 1.2× 105.
b the very small size of the remaining pure cooperator cluster cannot benefit (i.e., enlarge its
size) enough from cooperative fluctuations nearby; correspondingly the level of cooperation 〈c〉
remains well below the values observed for the b-increasing branch. It is not until a value of
b ≃ 1.6 is reached, that 〈Gc/N〉 starts a significant increase. Simultaneously, some cooperative
fluctuations in the cloud of fluctuating agents form separated small cooperator clusters, so that
ncc also starts to significantly detach from zero. At around b ≃ 1.5 both 〈Gc/N〉 and ncc (as
well as the average level of cooperation 〈c〉) show already values that are very close to those
exhibited by the b-increasing branch. However, once reached the value b ≃ 1.23, where ncc
has its maximum value (and, as explained in previous paragraph, the fragmentation of the large
cluster of pure cooperators reached an end in the b-increasing branch), though further decrease
in b leads to an increase of 〈Gc/N〉, and a concomitant decrease of ncc due to the connection
of small cooperator clusters to the largest one, these processes take place at a slower pace
than the corresponding fragmentation occurring for the b-increasing branch. The consequence
is that the cooperation level values in this range of b values for the b-decreasing branch are
significantly lower than those for the b-increasing semicycle. Note that though the values of
〈Gc/N〉, ncc, and 〈c〉 in the range of intermediate 1.23 ≤ b ≤ 1.5 values are very similar in
both branches, the system keeps memory of the path followed, demonstrating the importance
of the particular topological details of the organization of cooperator clusters.
A significant difference, regarding the microscopic organization of cooperation, between
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ER and SF networks, is the observation first reported in (109) that for SF networks pure co-
operators group together in a single cluster, while in ER networks they are disaggregated into
several cooperator clusters for generic values of b. In our simulations here we are using net-
work sizes that are larger than those used in (109) by a factor of 30, and for SF networks we
have observed nodes that, though being isolated from the main cooperator cluster, remain co-
operators during observational time scales. Strictly speaking they are not pure cooperators, for
the probability of invasion by the defective strategy is not strictly zero (in all the cases ana-
lyzed), though it turns out to be exceedingly small, due to the large connectivity (degree) of
these nodes. These quasi-pure cooperators appear in both, reversible and irreversible network
realizations. For a network size of N = 1.2 × 105 its number is never larger than 8 for re-
versible realizations and b-increasing branches of irreversible ones, and not larger than 14 for
b-decreasing branches of the latter. Their contribution both direct and indirect (through the
cloud of fluctuating strategists each one keeps nearby) to the level c of cooperation can be con-
sidered as negligible. Still one cannot discard a priori an eventual role they might play in the
reshaping of the main cooperator cluster during the hysteresis cycle of particular irreversible
realizations.
In figure 3.4 we plot the relative size of the cooperator cluster 〈Gc/N〉 averaged over 100
irreversible realizations for both forward and backward branches of the cycle. Contrary to
what happens for ER networks at high values of the temptation to defect, when starting to
decrease it from bmin, the size of the cooperator cluster in SF networks initially follows very
closely the values of the forward branch until b ≃ 2.5. However, significant differences in the
average cooperation value 〈c〉 (see figure 3.2) are already noticeable from b ≃ 3, indicating
that the contribution from the cloud of fluctuating strategies is lower for the backward branch.
When further decreasing b down from b ≃ 2.5, the averaged size of the cooperator cluster
takes on values progressively lower than in the b-increasing branch. This agrees nicely with
the observation just made in the previous sentence on the cloud of fluctuating strategies, for
the growth of the cooperator cluster originates from the cooperative fluctuations in its frontier,
and thus the strength of these fluctuations determines the pace of the cluster size growth. The
difference between forward and backward branches persists down to the tipping point, which
somewhat surprisingly occurs for values of b outside the PD game range.
—————————————————————————
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Chapter 4
Evolutionary dynamics on
interdependent populations.
Although several mechanisms can promote cooperative behavior, there is no general consensus
about why cooperation survives when the most profitable action for an individual is to defect,
specially when the population is well mixed. Here we show that when a replicator like evolu-
tionary game dynamics takes place on interdependent networks, cooperative behavior is fixed
on the system. Remarkably, we analytically and numerically show that this is even the case for
well mixed populations. Our results open the path to new mechanisms able to sustain cooper-
ation and can provide hints for controlling its raise and fall in a variety of biological and social
systems.
4.1 Introduction
The onset of global cooperation in large populations of unrelated agents when defective ac-
tions provide the largest short-term benefits at the individual level constitutes one of the most
amazing puzzles for evolutionary dynamics (14; 124; 171; 172). During the last decade, the
structure of the interactions among individuals seems to have provided a way out for coop-
eration to survive in those scenarios, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game, in which
defective behaviors are evolutionary favored under the well-mixed assumption (16; 88). Al-
though recent results have shown that network reciprocity is not always a viable mechanism to
explain cooperation among humans (see, e.g., chapter 6), larger cooperative levels are achieved
if an evolutionary game dynamics takes place on top of structured populations and networks, in
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which nodes account for players and links represent the existence of game interactions. More-
over, further including real structural patterns of large systems (28) (scale-free distribution for
the number of contacts a player has (108; 109), the small-world properties (81), nonzero density
of triads (173), etc) provides also high cooperative outputs.
On the other hand, in most cases, a real population − be it a biological or a social system
− is not isolated and interactions take place at and between different levels (or layers) follow-
ing different rules (174; 175). Think of for instance in an economical system, where different
levels account for different competitive markets and their interdependencies (developers, man-
ufactures, providers). The rules governing the interactions at one layer are not necessarily the
same that those driving the dynamics at another layer − admittedly, within each layer com-
petition should exist while this is not necessarily the case for inter-layer interactions. Thus, a
natural question arises as to whether the observed degree of interdependency in real systems is
a relevant factor for the emergence and survival of cooperative behavior.
The previous interdependency, which is also referred to as multiplexity, can be easily incor-
porated into the framework of any dynamical process by coupling two or more networked popu-
lations in which links between individuals of the same population involve a different dynamical
relationship to those stablished between members of different populations (176; 177; 178). In
this chapter, we focus on the case in which an evolutionary PD game drives the interactions
between agents of the same population. On its turn, the existence of links between agents of
different populations allow the two networks to interact. We will assume that the latter inter-
actions are ruled by the Snowdrift (SD) game. In this way, defection is punished when facing
other defectors outside the original population, thus balancing the evolutionary advantage that
defectors find by exploiting cooperators in their respective populations.
We henceforth analyze what new emergent behavior results from the multilevel nature of a
system made up by two populations that interact through a number of links connecting nodes
located at each subsystem. Exact analytical calculations can be carried out for the case in
which the population of each layer is well mixed, through the nonlinear analysis of the two-
coupled-variable replicator equation for the strategic densities in both layers. Our results show
the emergence of a new polarized state in which all the individuals in one of the populations
cooperate while all in the other population defect. In addition we find quasi-polarized states,
so that all the agents in one population are defectors, while most of the other one cooperate.
Moreover, we also numerically show that the previous results hold for the case of networked
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Figure 4.1: Phase portrait of replicator equation (4.1) for the symmetric case (β = 1) and weak PD
(r = 0) intra-population game, for different values of the temptation b, with p = 0.3, and ǫ = −0.4.
The direction of velocity field is indicated by the arrows, and its modulus by the colors. We also
plot the interior nullclines. For low values of b (a), the polarized states A and B are attractors.
They lose stability at b = bup (b), in favor of the quasi-polarized states A’ and B’. These in turn
destabilize at b = bc (c) when the nullclines coincide in a line of marginally stable equilibria. From
there on, the interior equilibrium E becomes the global attractor (d).
populations. As we will discuss later on, our findings provide new mechanisms for the rise and
survival of cooperation and for its control.
4.2 The model: Evolutionary dynamics on two interacting popu-
lations.
Let us first describe the evolutionary dynamics of two interacting populations of size N1 and
N2. Two agents belonging to the same population α (= 1, 2) play a PD game so that a coopera-
tor facing a cooperator (defector) in population α obtains a payoff R = 1 (S = 0). On the other
hand, a defector facing a cooperator (defector) obtains a benefit of T = b > 1 (P = r ≥ 0).
The games played between agents of different populations follow the same parameterization
except for the situation in which two defectors meet. In this case, the associated punishment is
negative, P = ǫ < 0 − thus, inter-populations games follow the SD formulation. Importantly,
the strategists’ competition for replication only occurs among own-population players. That is
to say that there is no ”interbreeding” (as it happens for different species, in biological con-
texts) or ”strategic diffusion” (as for functionally heterogeneous layers in social or economical
contexts) among the individuals of different populations. In terms of imperfect (or/and irrel-
evant) knowledge, the strategists from a population are unaware of the replicating success of
strategies in the other population (or/and this information is irrelevant for its replication).
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4.3 Well-mixed populations: Analytical formulation.
To start with, consider the case in which agents of the same population (layer) are well-mixed.
Let us also assume that both N1 and N2 are large enough, i.e., N1, N2 ≫ 1. Under these
simple assumptions, an exact analytical description via the analysis of the phase portrait of
the two-dimensional replicator equation for two-by-two matrix games is possible. In our well-
mixed population approximation an individual in population α has Nα − 1 neighbors inside
this population. Moreover, for interactions between the two layers, we suppose that any pair of
nodes (each one of a different population) is present with probability p. Thus, the number of
inter-population links is equal to p ·N1 ·N2.
Let us call xα the fraction of cooperators in the population α. The replicator equations for
the evolutionary game dynamics are
x˙1 = x1(1− x1)[(N1 − 1)(x1(1− b+ r)− r) +
N2p(x2(1− b+ ǫ)− ǫ)]
x˙2 = x2(1− x2)[(N2 − 1)(x2(1− b+ r)− r) +
N1p(x1(1− b+ ǫ)− ǫ)] . (4.1)
The results of the theoretical analysis (see section 4.4 for details) of these coupled deterministic
equations are illustrated in Fig. 4.1 for the symmetric (thus non-generic) caseN1 = N2, and the
simple weak (r = 0) PD game for those intra-population encounters. Below we will comment
on the main qualitative changes for the generic case, i.e., whenever both the size proportion
β = N1/N2 6= 1 and general PD (r > 0) game for intra-population interactions apply.
The analysis of Fig. 4.1 shows a rather natural non-linear resolution of the conflict intro-
duced by fitness-punishment (ǫ) to inter-populations defective encounters. Briefly said, even-
symmetric (x1 = x2) states D (both populations are fully defective) and C (fully cooperative
populations) are both, for any b > 1+, unstable against perturbations in all directions, and sta-
bility resides instead on odd-symmetric polarized states [A (all-D in population 1 and all-C in
population 2) and its symmetric transformed B (all-C in population 1 and all-D in population
2)] for strictly positive temptation b less than a bound bup(ǫ; p) = 1−pǫ (see Fig. 4.1.a). At this
critical (bifurcation) value of b the interior nullclines x˙1 = 0 and x˙2 = 0 (see Fig. 4.1.b) touch
states A and B respectively. Increasing the value of the temptation b above bup the polarized
states lose their stability in favor of the quasi-polarized states [A’ (all-D in 1 and mostly C in 2)
and its symmetric B’ ], which detach from A and B and become attractors. At b = bc = 1− pǫ1−p
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the interior nullclines coincide (see Fig. 4.1.c) becoming a line (A’B’) of marginally stable
equilibria. Finally, for b > bc (see Fig. 4.1.d) the global attractor is the interior even-symmetric
state E, the intersection of the interior nullclines, which keeps approaching, as b increases, the
neighborhood of the high b limit attractor, say the state D of fully defective populations.
This scenario remains qualitatively unchanged for strictly positive values of the parameter
r, provided 0 < r < −pǫ, the only change being that the bifurcation value bc, where the
quasi-polarized states loose stability, becomes:
bc = 1 +
r − pǫ
1− p . (4.2)
In other words, the weak PD limit (r = 0) for the intra-population game is structurally stable
respect to (small enough) positive parametric variations of the game parameter r. For r > −pǫ,
the scenario changes drastically: D is now a stable equilibrium, but still, for b < bup (which
doesn’t depend on r), the polarized states are also stable equilibria. Only for larger b > bup
values of the temptation, D becomes the unique global attractor. Summarizing the results for
the symmetric case, the attractor states for increasing values of b from b = 1+ follow the
sequence:
A, B b
up→ A’, B’ bc→ E . (4.3)
(a) D, A, B b
up
B→ D, A b
up
A→ D
(b) A, B b
up
B→ A b
up
A→ A’ b
c
A→ E
(c) A, B b
up
B→ A b
up
A→ A’
(d) A, B b
up
B→ A, B’ b
c
B→ A b
up
A→ A’
(e) A, B b
up
B→ A, B’ b
c
B→ A b
up
A→ A’ b
c
A→ E
(f) A, B b
up
B→ A, B’ b
up
A→ A’, B’ b
c
B→ A’
(g) A, B b
up
B→ A, B’ b
up
A→ A’, B’ b
c
B→ A’ b
c
A→ E
Table 4.1: Sequence of attractors in phase space for equation (4.1), as b increases from b = 1+.
The arrow indicates a bifurcation at the b value that appears over the arrow. The scenarios (a)-(g)
correspond to different ranges of values of the parameters r, β, p and ǫ, that are made explicit in
section 4.4. Note that except for the scenario (a), that corresponds to r > −βpǫ, polarized and
quasi-polarized states dominate the asymptotic behavior.
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when 0 ≤ r < −pǫ while, when r > −pǫ, the sequence is:
D, A, B b
up→ D . (4.4)
For the general case N1 6= N2, the lack of the population interchange symmetry modifies
some of the features seen in the symmetric case. Without loss of generality, we assume that
β = N1/N2 > 1. On one hand, the lower bound of r for the stability of the fully defective state
D becomes now r = −βpǫ. On the other hand, the bifurcation values at which the polarized
states lose their stability are now different,
bupB = 1−
pǫ
β
< bupA = 1− βpǫ , (4.5)
as well as the bifurcation values (provided they exist) at which quasi-polarized states destabi-
lize, bcB < bcA, where
bcB = 1 +
r2 − (pǫ)2
(r + βpǫ)− p(βr + pǫ) (4.6)
bcA = 1 +
β(r2 − (pǫ)2)
(βr + pǫ)− p(r + βpǫ) . (4.7)
Let us note that the polarized state A, where the defective population is of larger size, turns
out to have a wider range of stability, as well as a larger basin of attraction, than the state B.
The results of the complete analysis of the replicator equation (4.1) are summarized in Table
4.1, where we show the sequences of attractors coexisting in phase space. The seven scenarios
(a)-(g) correspond to different ranges of values of the parameters r, β, p and ǫ (see section 4.4
for further details).
From the previous analysis of well mixed populations, one sees that polarized and quasi-
polarized states appear as generic attractors of the evolutionary dynamics for wide ranges of
model parameters, which in turn has the effect of enhancing in a remarkable way the asymptotic
levels of cooperation in the two-populations system.
4.4 Phase portrait analysis of the two-variable replicator equation
The replicator equation that describes the continuum time evolution of the cooperator fractions
x1(t), x2(t) in subpopulations 1 and 2 can be written as:
x˙1 = F1(x1, x2) , (4.8)
x˙2 = F2(x1, x2) , (4.9)
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where the velocities F1,2, after time rescaling, are explicitly given as:
F1(x1, x2) = x1(1− x1)[β(x1(1− b+ r)− r) + p(x2(1− b+ ǫ)− ǫ)] , (4.10)
F2(x1, x2) = x2(1− x2)[(x2(1− b+ r)− r) + βp(x1(1− b+ ǫ)− ǫ)] . (4.11)
The unit square 0 ≤ x1, x2 ≤ 1 is the invariant set of interest here. To follow the phase
portrait variation of a two-degrees of freedom nonlinear system like equation (4.9) is pretty
straightforward for one-parameter variations. We are dealing with a model where b, r, ǫ, β,
and p are free model parameters, each one inside their natural range, i.e., b > 1+, 0 ≤ r ≤ 1,
ǫ < 0−, β ≥ 1, and 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. In our systematics below, we will consider continuum
variation of b, from b = 1+ up to infinity, at fixed values of the other parameters and so
we will obtain the ”critical” (bifurcation) points b∗(ǫ, r;β, p), where the phase portrait of the
evolution experiences qualitative changes: Somewhat, the direction of increasing temptation b
is often most considered in recent literature on PD games. But we will pay due attention also to
variations of the parameter r, and find two important critical values that do not depend on the
value of the temptation b, so that different scenarios of phase transitions (inside the well-mixed
population approximation to the thermodynamical limit N1, N2 → ∞) as b varies do appear.
Finally, we choose also β as an interesting (e.g., for control applications) parameter to vary, and
find also two critical values that are temptation independent, that in turns, increase the number
of those scenarios.
The best visualization of the velocity field is a phase portrait where fixed (equilibrium)
points and nullclines are also plotted, as in Fig. 1 in the main text. A nullcline is the locus of
points defined by Fi(x1, x2) = 0 for some i. The nullclines that correspond to F1(x1, x2) = 0
are the straight lines
x1 = 0 , (4.12)
x1 = 1 , (4.13)
x2 =
−x1β(b− 1− r)− (βr + pǫ)
p(b− 1− ǫ) , (4.14)
while those that correspond to F2(x1, x2) = 0 are
x2 = 0 , (4.15)
x2 = 1 , (4.16)
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x2 =
−x1βp(b− 1− ǫ)− (r + βpǫ)
(b− 1− r) . (4.17)
The possible equilibria are the crossing points of any line from the first group with any
other line from the second one, so there are nine candidates. Moreover, only solutions in the
unit square, 0 ≤ x1, x2 ≤ 1, interest us, and this exclude two of the crossing points (see below),
leaving the following seven possibilities, namely the four corners of the unit square:
• A = (0, 1) ,
• B = (1, 0) ,
• C = (1, 1) ,
• D = (0, 0) ,
and those whose location depends on parameter values:
• We call A′ the crossing point of nullclines (4.12) and (4.17), whose coordinates are
x1(A
′) = 0 and
x2(A
′) =
−(r + βpǫ)
(b− 1− r) . (4.18)
• We call B′ the crossing point of nullclines (4.14) and (4.15), so that x2(B′) = 0 and
x1(B
′) =
−(βr + pǫ)
β(b− 1− r) . (4.19)
• Finally, we call E the crossing of (4.14) and (4.17). Its coordinates are obtained as:
x1(E) =
(b− 1− r)(βr + pǫ)− p(b− 1− ǫ)(βr + pǫ)
β[(p(b− 1− ǫ)2 − (b− 1− r)2] , (4.20)
x2(E) =
(b− 1− r)(r + βpǫ)− p(b− 1− ǫ)(r + βpǫ)
(p(b− 1− ǫ)2 − (b− 1− r)2 . (4.21)
The (missing in the list) crossings of (4.13) - (4.17), and of (4.14) - (4.16), are easily seen
to be always outside the unit square for the range of parameters considered. Also inside this
range, the non-generic event of nullclines’ coincidence only could happen provided β = 1 and
r > −pǫ, at a value bc(ǫ, r;β = 1, p) = 1 + r−pǫ1−p . Only then, the exotic (forced by symmetry)
situation in which there is a segment of marginally stable equilibria occurs.
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To determine the bifurcation points, one uses the spectral analysis of tangent space per-
turbations around equilibria. The linearized evolution of small perturbations around the fixed
point x∗ is given by the matrix:


∂F1
∂x1
∂F1
∂x2
∂F2
∂x1
∂F2
∂x2


x=x∗
(4.22)
In what follows, the presentation of the results from the phase portrait analysis of the non-
linear coupled ODE (4.11) tries to rationalize them in terms of evolutionary game theoretic
concepts, within a thermodynamical limit (statistical physics) perspective.
4.4.1 Symmetric case: N1 = N2(= N).
For simplicity, as well as for illustrate neatly the systematics that we follow, we analyze first
the case of equal population sizes. For this case, where populations are identical (though
distinguishable), the population interchange symmetry imposes that phase portrait is invariant
under permutation of coordinates (x1 ↔ x2), a non-generic property that limits severely the
possible scenarios. The stability analysis of the equilibria shows that there are two generic
scenarios for the sequence of bifurcations that appear when b increases from 1+ up to infinity:
(s1) If r > rc = −pǫ there is only one bifurcation at bup(r, ǫ, β = 1, p) = 1 − pǫ. For
b < bup, the phase portrait has three stable equilibria with their own basins of attraction:
D, A, and B. The equilibria C, A’ and B’ are unstable, and E is outside the unit square. At
b = bup, A and B destabilize (through collision with A’ and B’ that exit the unit square)
becoming saddle equilibria, and D becomes the unique global attractor for b > bup. This
translates into the following sequence of attractors when temptation increases from 1+:
D, A, B b
up→ D . (4.23)
(s2) If r < rc(p, ǫ), however, D is always unstable, and there are two bifurcations at bup
and bc (and note that bup < bc). For b < bup the equilibria C, D are sources, E is a
saddle, and A and B are attractors, becoming saddle equilibria at bup where A’ and B’
enter into the unit square. For bup < b < bc A’ and B’ are the only attractors. At
bc the segment A’B’ of marginally stable equilibria is the limit set for all trajectories
(nullcline’s coincidence). For b > bc E becomes the unique (and even-symmetric) global
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attractor. This last bifurcation restores the symmetry of the asymptotic evolution that
was spontaneously broken at lower b values. The sequence of stationary limiting (point)
densities is:
A, B b
up→ A’, B’ bc→ E . (4.24)
Note that the condition r = rc(p, ǫ) that separates the regimes where the equilibrium D
is unstable (r < −pǫ) or attractor (r > −pǫ), corresponds to the exact compensation of the
surplus rN of defective intra-population interactions of a defector and the punishment pǫN it
receives from inter-population interactions. Below this critical value, full defection is unsta-
ble to cooperative fluctuations. But, as we have just seen, even in case the punishment from
coupling is weaker than surplus, polarized states have their own basins of attraction, away
from whole defection, at low values of b > 1+. This can be rationalized from the role that
punishment plays in our -no interbreeding, punishing defective coupling- setting. Populations’
strategic polarization emerges as stable generic asymptotic state of evolution, even when de-
fectors can afford external punishment (D being then fully stable): The duplex (two coupled
populations) has always the option to become polarized or quasi-polarized provided the initial
conditions belong to its basin of attraction.
4.4.2 General case: N1 6= N2.
The parameter p determines the fraction of inter-to-intra-population interactions any agent
plays per unit time in the symmetric (N1 = N2) case. This fraction changes to βp and p/β
(β > 1) for small and large populations respectively, when symmetry of population interchange
is absent. This combination of parameters regulates how important to the replicating power
(fitness) of an individual the inter-population coupling is, and we then see that for the largest
population the effective coupling p/β is smaller. This makes the polarized state A (where pop-
ulation 1 is defective) more robust than the polarized state B, and provided both are attractors,
the basin of attraction of A is correspondingly larger. This is a major qualitative change in the
phase portrait of the velocity field of evolution in the absence of symmetry. The concomitant
change is the shift, and in more extreme cases the disappearance, of the bifurcations associated
to the quasi-polarized equilibria A’ and B’, i.e., bupA,B and bcA,B:
bupB (r, ǫ;β, p) = 1− (p/β)ǫ , (4.25)
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bupA (r, ǫ;β, p) = 1− βpǫ , (4.26)
bcB(r, ǫ;β, p) = 1 +
r2 − (pǫ)2
(r + βpǫ)− p(βr + pǫ) , (4.27)
bcA(r, ǫ;β, p) = 1 +
β(r2 − (pǫ)2)
(βr + pǫ)− p(r + βpǫ) . (4.28)
Note that the minimum of this set of values is bupB , its maximum is bcA, and that the relative order
of the other two values is parameter dependent. Several new generic scenarios of phase portrait
variations naturally follows from these major effects, when the ”population interchange” sym-
metry is absent. Still, let us remark that the evolutionary attractiveness of the odd-symmetric
polarized (A and B) and quasi-polarized (A’ and B’) asymptotic densities still dominates ample
regions of parameter space.
A first scenario, similar to the first one seen above for the symmetric case, is found when
r > rAc (ǫ; β, p) = −βpǫ. In this scenario, the fully defective state D is stable for all b > 1
values. For very low values of b, A and B are also stable. Due to asymmetry, the instabilities of
A and B occur at different bifurcation values, bupB < b
up
A , so that state B destabilizes first when
b increases from b = 1+, as expected, i.e.,
(i) If rAc < r there are only two bifurcations at bupB < bupA . For all b > 1+, C is unstable
and E is outside the unit square. For b < bupB , the states D, A and B are attractors. At
bupB , B collides with the unstable B’ that exits the unit square, then becoming a saddle
with unstable direction corresponding to defective fluctuations in cooperative population
1. The same happens mutatis mutandi (1↔ 2 interchange) to A at bupA , leaving finally D
(for b > bupA ) as the global attractor.
D, A, B
bup
B→ D, A b
up
A→ D (4.29)
At r = rAc , for a defective individual in population 2, and state D, the ”internal surplus -
coupling punishment” balance exactly compensates. This means that changing to cooperator
makes no difference to its replicating power, and thus a zero eigenvalue appears in the spectrum
of the Jacobian (linear stability) matrix of the fully defective state D. Inside the range r < rAc ,
D is always unstable face to cooperative fluctuations in the smaller population. Further down
in surplus (r) values, at r = rBc = −(p/β)ǫ, D becomes also unstable face to cooperative
fluctuations in the large population. In other words, when decreasing r from large (compared
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to rAc ) positive values of intra-population surplus, to 0+ (weak PD limit), there are two critical
values, where qualitative changes of the phase portrait occur, that coincide with the change of
stability of D from stable (r > rAc ) to saddle (rBc < r < rAc ), to source (r < rBc ).
Provided r < rAc , if one consider the high b (→ ∞) limit, one easily finds that it can be
either ”mixed type” (state E, interior to the unit square) or ”quasi-polarized” (state A’, on the
vertical x1 = 0) regarding its convergence to virtually full defection. The transition between
these two qualitatively different ”high temptation limit behaviors”, for given values of ǫ, p, and
r, is controlled by the value of the population ratio β and it occurs at the critical value:
βAc (ǫ, r; p) =
p(r − ǫ)
r − p2ǫ . (4.30)
At this value of the population ratio, the bifurcation value bcA (where A’ collides with state
E, this one entering into the unit square) formally diverges, so that the collision occurs (or
doesn’t), depending on the value of the population ratio β, for fixed value of p, r, and ǫ.
On the other side, the bifurcation value at bcB only occurs provided r < rBc , but its relative
order with respect to bupA depends also on the value of β with a critical value at:
βBc (ǫ, r; p) =
−pǫ(p2ǫ− r)−
√
p2ǫ2(p2ǫ− r)2 − 4p2ǫ(r − ǫ)(p2ǫ2 − r2)
2p2ǫ(r − ǫ) . (4.31)
The different possible combinations of all the previous possibilities give the following sce-
narios:
(ii) If rBc < r < rAc , then the stable linear manifold of the saddle point D (x2 = 0) does not
allow B’ to be a stable equilibrium, while its unstable direction (x1 = 0) pushes evolution
to polarized A or quasi-polarized A’ states; C is a always a source for all b > 1. Two
different scenarios are realized depending on the inter-population ratio value, β:
(ii1) If β > βAc (see Eq. 4.30), bifurcations only occur at bupB < bupA . At bupB , the
collision of B and the unstable exiting B’ occurs, while at bupA , it takes place the
collision of A with the entering state A’. The corresponding sequence of attracting
equilibria is given by:
A, B
bup
B→ A b
up
A→ A’ (4.32)
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(ii2) If βAc > β, besides the bifurcations described in (ii1), there is an additional bifur-
cation at bcA, where A’ collides with state E that enters into the unit square. The
corresponding sequence of attracting equilibria is given by:
A, B
bup
B→ A b
up
A→ A’ b
c
A→ E (4.33)
The presence or absence of the bifurcation bcA determines whether the approach to the
high temptation limit is via ”mixed interior type” E state, or ”edge quasi-polarized type”
A’ state, so that for values of β below critical (βAc ), virtually full defection (1−, 1−) is
approached with non-zero cooperation levels in both populations as b diverges.
(iii) If r < rBc , both quasi-polarized states A’ and B’ enter into the unit square at bupB and bupA ,
respectively. B’ always destabilizes at bcB (> bupB always) to become a saddle through
collision with the exiting unstable interior equilibrium E. This may happens before [as in
(iii1) and (iii2) below] or after [as in (iii3) and (iii4)] the entrance of A’ at bupA depending
on β value (relative to βBc ). And finally note that the bifurcation at bcA only occurs for
β < βAc , as analyzed above, to arrive to the following possible four scenarios:
(iii1) If max(βAc , βBc ) < β, then bcB < bupA , and bcA is absent:
A, B
bup
B→ A, B’ b
c
B→ A b
up
A→ A’ (4.34)
(iii2) If βBc < β < βAc , then bcB < bupA , and bcA occurs:
A, B
bup
B→ A, B’ b
c
B→ A b
up
A→ A’ b
c
A→ E (4.35)
(iii3) If βAc < β < βBc , then bupA < bcB , and bcA is absent:
A, B
bup
B→ A, B’ b
up
A→ A’, B’ b
c
B→ A’ (4.36)
(iii4) If β < min(βAc , βBc ), then bupA < bcB , and bcA occurs:
A, B
bup
B→ A, B’ b
up
A→ A’, B’ b
c
B→ A’ b
c
A→ E (4.37)
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This analysis provides the three-dimensional phase diagram (r, β, b) for fixed, though ar-
bitrary, ǫ and p. It exhibits a wealthy of different macroscopic phases separated by critical
lines and surfaces. It shows that polarized and quasi-polarized phases dominate wide regions
in parameter space. This illustrates the effects of inter-population trade of fitness (even under
the simplest possible structure of inter and intra population contacts) on the evolution of PD
replicators.
A, B b
up→ A’, B’ bc→ E . (4.38)
when 0 ≤ r < −pǫ while, when r > −pǫ, the sequence is:
D, A, B b
up→ D . (4.39)
4.5 Random networks.
On the other hand, for structured populations, where individuals interact with their neighbors as
dictated by a given network of contacts, it is known that under some assumptions cooperation
is enhanced, a phenomenon called network reciprocity.
While for well mixed populations, the stability of polarized states extends down to b = 1+,
one should expect that at small b > 1 values, the enhancement of cooperative fluctuations
due to network reciprocity in the defective population 1 destabilizes the polarized states below
some critical value blow. Moreover, one should also expect blow to decrease with the parameter
p, because higher values of p increase the payoff that a (defector) individual in population
1 obtains from encounters with (cooperator) individuals of population 2, thus decreasing the
resilience of cooperative fluctuations (”network reciprocity”) in population 1. In other words,
for low values of b, the interaction between populations acts against network reciprocity. These
expectations are fully confirmed by the results from simulations of the evolutionary dynamics
in populations with a random network structure of intra-population contacts, using the discrete
version of replicator dynamics.
In Fig. 4.2 we show the average cooperation 〈c〉 level (over a sample of 200 different
realizations) on the two-population system as a function of b for different values of p, and
parameters as indicated. The two populations have a random (Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (28)) network of
contacts with average degree 〈k〉 = 6. In the initial conditions, the individuals of both popu-
lations were chosen cooperators with probability 1/2. The plateau at 〈c〉 = 1/2 points out the
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Figure 4.2: Average level of cooperation in the two-population system as a function of b, for
different values of the fraction p of inter-population contacts. Other parameters are r = 0, ǫ =
−0.4, N1 = N2 = 103. The two populations have a random (Erdo¨s-Re´nyi) network of contacts
with average degree 〈k〉 = 6. See the text for further details.
asymptotic polarized state. Moreover, the states with 〈c〉 < 1/2 correspond to quasi-polarized
regimes where all the individuals in one population are defectors, while those with 〈c〉 > 1/2,
at values of b < blow, results from states where all the individuals in one population are coop-
erators. This represent a new type of quasi-polarized states that were not found to be attractors
of the dynamics for well mixed populations. The comparison with the average cooperation
level for non-interacting populations (p = 0 in Fig. 4.2) confirms that for low values of b the
inter-population interaction acts against network reciprocity.
From a complementary perspective, the networked populations show new attractors, im-
possible to be such for coupled well-mixed populations, because they are the effect of network
reciprocity. On the other hand, for larger values of b, the populations’ coupling favors the
achievement of substantial levels of cooperation, well beyond the typical values of b for which
network reciprocity ceases to be effective, being an effect already present in the well-mixed
case. This clarify farther the confluent effects of these two different mechanisms of coopera-
tion enhancement.
Finally, the robustness of polarized and quasi-polarized states suggests to use the coupling
to a defective population as an engineered (control) procedure to induce high levels of cooper-
ation in a target population. To check for this possibility, we have coupled a large population
1 with random (equiprobable in strategies) initial conditions to a smaller defective population
2. In Fig. 4.3 we show the asymptotic average level of cooperation in a target population of
size N1 = 103 for different values of the average number, N2 · p, of inter-population contacts
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Figure 4.3: Average level of cooperation in the population 1 as a function of b, for different
values of the fraction p of inter-population contacts. The population 1 (of size N1 = 103) has
been coupled to a smaller population 2 (N2 = 102). While initial strategies in population 1 are
equiprobables (random initial conditions), the population 2 starts from the absorbent state of fully
defection. Other parameters are r = 0, ǫ = −0.4. Both populations have a random (Erdo¨s-Re´nyi)
network of contacts with average degree 〈k〉 = 6.
per individual of the target population. The results suggest that such arrangements can provide
new mechanisms to control and/or sustain cooperation in different kind of systems.
Summarizing, two PD populations SD-coupled in conditions of strict inbreeding (no inter-
population strategic diffusion) evolve easily to polarized and quasi-polarized strategic probabil-
ity densities in the well-mixed thermodynamical limit of the evolutionary replicator dynamics.
This happens also when population structure is a complex network of contacts, where other
mechanisms (known as network reciprocity) of enhanced cooperation also operate. The con-
fluence of both mechanisms has been analyzed in depth showing that polarization opposes net-
work reciprocity at small values of the temptation parameter, while both act (synergy) together
enhancing cooperation in one of the layers for higher temptation values. This phenomenon, that
could be rationalized as the effect of incorporating a punishment to defective inter-population
encounters, illustrate the remarkable effects that structural multiplexity introduces in evolution-
ary dynamics.
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Chapter 5
Human behavior in Prisoner’s
Dilemma experiments suppresses
network reciprocity.
During the last few years, much research has been devoted to strategic interactions on complex
networks. In this context, the Prisoner’s Dilemma has become a paradigmatic model, and
it has been established that imitative evolutionary dynamics lead to very different outcomes
depending on the details of the network. We here report that when one takes into account the
real behavior of people observed in the experiments, both at the mean-field level and on utterly
different networks the observed level of cooperation is the same. We thus show that when
human subjects interact in an heterogeneous mix including cooperators, defectors and moody
conditional cooperators, the structure of the population does not promote or inhibit cooperation
with respect to a well mixed population.
5.1 Introduction
In recent years, the physics of complex systems has widened its scope by considering interact-
ing many-particle models where the interaction goes beyond the usual concept of force. One
such line of research that has proven particularly interesting is evolutionary game theory on
graphs (16; 88), in which interaction between agents is given by a game while their own state
is described by a strategy subject to an evolutionary process (12; 91). A game that has attracted
a lot of attention in this respect is the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) (92; 93), a model of a situation
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in which cooperative actions lead to the best outcome in social terms, but where free riders or
non-cooperative individuals can benefit the most individually. In mathematical terms, this is
described by a payoff matrix (entries correspond to the row player’s payoffs and C and D are
respectively the cooperative and non-cooperative actions)
C D
C 1 S
D T 0
(5.1)
with T > 1 (temptation to free-ride) and S < 0 (detriment in cooperating when the other does
not).
In a pioneering work, Nowak and May (19) showed that the behavior observed in a repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemma was dramatically different on a lattice than in a mean-field approach: In-
deed, on a lattice the cooperative strategy was able to prevail by forming clusters of alike agents
who outcompeted defection. Subsequently, the problem was considered in literally hundreds
of papers (16; 18; 94; 95; 109), and very many differences between structured and well-mixed
(mean-field) populations were identified, although by no means they were always in favor of
cooperation (96; 97). In fact, it has been recently realized that this problem is very sensitive
to the details of the system (88; 115), in particular to the type of evolutionary dynamics (79)
considered. For this reason experimental input is needed in order to reach a sound conclusion
about what has been referred to as ‘network reciprocity’.
Here, we show that using the outcome from the experimental evidence to inform theoretical
models, the behavior of agents playing a PD is the same at the mean field level and in very
different networks. To this end, instead of considering some ad hoc imitative dynamics (19;
21; 98), our players will play according to the strategy recently uncovered by Grujic´ et al. (23)
in the largest experiment reported to date about the repeated spatial PD, carried out on a lattice
as in Nowak and May’s paper (19) with parameters T = 1.43 and S = 0.
The results of the experiment were novel in several respects. First, the population of players
exhibited a rather low level of cooperation (fraction of cooperative actions in every round of
the game in the steady state), hereafter denoted by 〈c〉. Most important, however, was the
unraveling of the structure of the strategies. The analysis of the actions taken by the players
showed a heterogeneous population consisting of “mostly defectors” (defected with probability
larger than 0.8), a few “mostly cooperators” (cooperated with probability larger than 0.8), and
a majority of so-called moody conditional cooperators. This last group consisted of players
that switched from cooperation to defection with probability PDCi = 1− d− γci = 1− PCCi
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and from defection to cooperation with probability PCDi = a+ βci = 1− PDDi , ci being the
fraction of cooperative actions in player i’s neighborhood in the previous iteration. Conditional
cooperation, i.e., the dependency of the chosen strategy on the amount of cooperation received,
had been reported earlier in related experiments (99) and observed also for the spatial repeated
PD at a smaller scale (100). The new ingredient revealed in Grujic´ et al.’s experiment (23) was
the dependence of the behavior on the own player’s previous action, hence the reason to call
them “moody”.
5.2 Results
To study how the newly unveiled rules influence the emergence of cooperation in an structured
population of individuals, we first report results from numerical simulations of a system made
up of N = 104 individuals who play a repeated PD game according to the experimental ob-
servations. To this end, we explored the average level of cooperation in four different network
configurations: a well-mixed population in which the probability that a player interacts with
any other one is the same for all players, a square lattice, an Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER) graph and a
Baraba´si-Albert (BA) scale-free (SF) network. It is worth mentioning that the dependence on
the payoff matrix only enters through the parameters describing the players’ behavior (d, γ, a,
β and the fractions of the three types of players). Once these parameters are fixed the payoffs
do not enter anywhere in the evolution, as this is only determined by the variables ci, the local
fractions of cooperative actions within each player’s neighborhood. Thus there is no possibility
to explore the dependence on the payoffs because we lack a connection between them and the
behavioral parameters.
In Figure 5.1 we present our most striking result. The figure represents, in a color-coded
scale, the average level of cooperation as a function of the fraction of mostly cooperators, ρC ,
and mostly defectors, ρD, for a BA network of contacts. The same plots but for the rest of
topologies explored (lattice and ER graphs) produce indistinguishable results with respect to
those shown in the figure. We therefore conclude that the average level of cooperation in the
system does not depend on the underlying structure. This means that, under the assumption
that the players follow the behavior of the experiment in (23), there is no network reciprocity,
i.e., no matter what the network of contacts looks like, the observed level of cooperation is
the same. This latter finding is in stark contrast to most previous results coming out from
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Figure 5.1: Dependency of the average level of cooperation on the density of strategists. Den-
sity plot of 〈c〉, as a function of the fractions of the three strategies -mostly cooperators, C, mostly
defectors, D, and moody conditional cooperators, X-. Pannels A), B) and C) correspond to a reg-
ular lattice (k = 8), Erdo¨s-Re´nyi(〈k〉 = 6) and Baraba´si-Albert (〈k〉 = 6) network of contacts
respectively, but independence of cooperation level on the topology make them indistinguishable.
The system is made up of N = 104 players and the rest of parameters, taken from (23), are:
d = 0.38, a = 0.15, γ = 0.62, β = −0.1. The thin lines represent the mean-field estimations
[c.f. Eq. (5.5)] for 〈c〉 = 0.32, 0.44, 0.56, 0.68. They very accurately match the contour lines of the
density plot corresponding to those values of 〈c〉, thus proving that the same outcome is obtained
in a complete graph (mean-field). Simulation results have been averaged over 200 realizations.
numerical simulations of models in which many different updating rules —all of them based
upon the relative payoffs obtained by the players— have been explored.
Mean-field Approach. The previous numerical findings can be recovered using a simple
mean-field approach to the problem. Let the fractions of the three types of players be ρC ,
ρD and ρX , for mostly cooperators, mostly defectors, and moody conditional cooperators,
respectively, with the obvious constraint ρX = 1−ρD−ρC . Denoting by Pt(A) the cooperation
probability at time t for strategy A(= C,D,X) of the repeated PD we have
〈c〉t = ρCP (C) + ρDP (D) + ρXPt(X), (5.2)
where Pt(C) = P (C) and Pt(D) = P (D) are known constants [in our case P (C) = 0.8,
P (D) = 0.2]. The probability of cooperation for conditional players in the next time step can
be obtained as
Pt+1(X) = (d+ γ〈c〉t)Pt(X) + (a+ β〈c〉t)[1− Pt(X)], (5.3)
where the first term in the right hand side considers the probability that a conditional cooperator
keeps playing as a cooperator, whereas the second terms stands for the situation in which a
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Figure 5.2: Absence of Network Reciprocity. Average cooperation level in the stationary state,
〈c〉, as a function of the density ρC of mostly cooperators and two different values of the density
ρD of mostly defectors, for two different kinds of networks: regular lattice (k = 8), and Baraba´si-
Albert network (〈k〉 = 8). The network size is N = 104 and the rest of parameters are as in Figure
5.1. Lines represent the mean-field estimations. Results are averages over 200 realizations. The
inset is a zoom that highlights how the different curves compare.
moody conditional cooperator switched from defection to cooperation. Asymptotically
lim
t→∞
Pt(X) = P (X), lim
t→∞
〈c〉t = 〈c〉.
From Eq. (5.3),
P (X) =
a+ β〈c〉
1 + a− d+ (β − γ)〈c〉 , (5.4)
thus (5.2) implies (with the replacement ρX = 1− ρC − ρD)
AρC +BρD = 1, (5.5)
where
A ≡ P (C)− P (X)〈c〉 − P (X) , B ≡
P (D)− P (X)
〈c〉 − P (X) , (5.6)
are functions of 〈c〉. From Eq. (5.5) it follows that the curves of constant 〈c〉 are straight lines in
the simplex. Figure 5.1 clearly demonstrates this fact: The straight lines are plots of Eq. (5.5)
for different values of 〈c〉. It can be seen that they are parallel to the color stripes, and that the
values of 〈c〉 they correspond to accurately fit those of the simulations.
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Figure 5.3: Asymptotic level of Cooperation. Time evolution of the cooperation level until the
stationary state is reached. The results have been obtained from numerical simulations on different
networks with different sizes. The Mean-Field curve is the solution of Eq. (5.3). P (C) = 2/3,
P (D) = 1/3, P (X; t = 0) = 1, 〈k〉 = 8, ρD = 0.586, ρC = 0.053, d = 0.345, a = 0.224,
γ = 0.64, β = −0.072. Averages have been taken over 103 realizations.
Figure 5.2 depicts the curve 〈c〉 vs. ρC for two different values of ρD, as obtained from
Eq. (5.5) and compared to simulations. This figure illustrates the excellent quantitative agree-
ment between the mean-field result and the simulation results. The match between the analyt-
ical and numerical results is remarkable, as it is the fact that the result does not depend on the
underlying topology. This is the ultimate consequence of the lack of network reciprocity: the
cooperation level on any network can be accurately modeled as if individuals were playing in
a well-mixed population.
The steady state is reached after a rather short transient, as illustrated in Figure 5.3. This
figure compares the approach of the cooperation level to its stationary state as obtained iterating
Eq. (5.3) and from numerical simulations on different networks with different sizes. The initial
cooperation level has been set to 〈c〉0 = 0.592, close to the value observed in the experiment
of Ref. (23). The transient does exhibit a weak dependence on the underlying topology and
specially on the network size, but for the largest simulated size (N = 104) the curves are all
very close to the mean-field prediction.
Distribution of Payoffs. The only observable on which the topology does have a strong
effect is the payoff distribution among players. Figure 5.4 shows these distributions for the
three studied topologies, and at two different times —short and long. Smooth at short times,
this distribution peaks around certain values at long times. This reflects the fact that payoffs
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depend on the number of neighbors of different types around a given player, which yields
a finite set of values for the payoffs (the centers of the peaks). These numbers occur with
different probabilities (determining the height of the peaks), according to the distribution
Q(k) =
∑
k≥1
(
k
kC kD
)
ρkCC ρ
kD
D ρ
kX
X p(k), (5.7)
where p(k) is the degree distribution of the network and k = (kC , kD, kX), but it is understood
that kX = k − kC − kD. The standard convention is assumed that the multinomial coefficient(
k
kC kD
)
= 0 whenever kC < 0, kD < 0 or kX < 0.
The approach to a stationary distribution of payoffs exhibits a much longer transient. This
is due to the fluctuations in the payoffs arising from the specific actions (cooperate or defect)
taken by the players. These fluctuations damp out as the accumulated payoffs approach their
asymptotic values. Thus, the peak widths shrink proportionally to t−1/2. In fact, one can show
that the probability density for the distribution of payoffs Π for strategy Z can be approximated
as
WZ(Π) =
∑
k≥1
G
(
Π− ak(Z)µ(k),
√
tak(Z)σ(k)
)
Q(k), (5.8)
where G(x, γ) ≡ (2πγ2)−1/2e−x2/2γ2 , the mean payoff per neighbor received by a Z strategist
against a cooperator is
ak(Z) ≡ 1
k
{P (Z) + T [1− P (Z)]},
with k = kC + kD + kX , and the average cooperation level in the neighborhood of the focal
player and its variance are
µ(k) ≡ kCP (C) + kDP (D) + kXP (X),
σ(k)2 ≡ kCP (C)[1− P (C)] + kDP (D)[1− P (D)]
+kXP (X)[1− P (X)].
The approximate total payoff distribution, W (Π) = ρCWC(Π) + ρDWD(Π) + ρXWX(Π), is
compared in Figure 5.4 with the results of the simulations for the longest time.
5.3 Discussion
In this work we have shown both analytically and through numerical simulations that if we
take into account the way in which humans are experimentally found to behave when facing
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Figure 5.4: Payoffs Distribution. Distribution of the pay-off per neighbor in the stationary state
for different network topologies: regular lattice (k = 8), Erdo¨s Re´nyi (〈k〉 = 8) and Baraba´si-
Albert network (〈k〉 = 8). Black and blue lines represent the results of numerical simulations for
two values of time: t = 10 (black shallow curves) and t = 104 (blue, thick line curves) while red
lines represent the theoretical estimations for the density probabilities at t = 104, as obtained from
Eq. (5.8). N = 104, ρD = 0.586, ρC = 0.053, and other parameters are as in Figure 5.1. The
simulation results are averages over 103 realizations.
social dilemmas on lattices, no evidence of network reciprocity is obtained. In particular,
we have argued that if the players of a Prisoners’ Dilemma adopt an update rule that only
depends on what they see from their neighborhood, then cooperation drops to a low level —
albeit nonzero— irrespective of the underlying network. Moreover, we have shown that the
average level of cooperation obtained from simulations is very well predicted by a mean-field
model, and it is found to depend only on the fractions of different strategists. Additionally, we
have also shown that the underlying network of contacts does manifest itself in the distribution
of payoffs obtained by the players, and has a slight influence on the transient behavior.
To conclude, it is worth mentioning that our results only make sense when applied to evo-
lutionary game models aimed at mimicking human behavior in social dilemmas. The indepen-
dence on the topology seems to reflect the fact that humans update their actions according to
a rule that ignores relative payoffs. Interestingly, absence of network reciprocity has also been
observed in numerical simulations using best response dynamics (89), an update rule widely
used in economics that does not take into account the neighbors’s payoffs. This suggests that
the result that networks do not play any role in the repeated PD may be general for any dynam-
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ics that does not take neighbors’ payoffs into account. We want to stress that the same kind of
models thought of in a strict biological context are ruled by completely different mechanisms
which do take into account payoff (fitness) differences. Therefore, in such contexts lattice reci-
procity does play its role. In any case, our results call for further experiments that uncover what
rules are actually governing the behavior of players engaged in this and other social dilemmas.
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Chapter 6
Heterogeneous networks do not
promote cooperation when humans
play a Prisoner’s Dilemma.
It is not fully understood yet why we cooperate with strangers on a daily basis. In an in-
creasingly global world, where interaction networks and relationships between individuals are
becoming more complex, different hypotheses have been put forward to explain the founda-
tions of human cooperation on a large scale and to account for the true motivations that are
behind this phenomenon. In this context, population structure has been suggested to foster
cooperation in social dilemmas, but theoretical studies of this mechanism have yielded contra-
dictory results so far, and the issue lacks a proper experimental test in large enough systems.
We have performed the largest experiments to date with humans playing a spatial Prisoner’s
Dilemma on a lattice and on a scale-free network (1229 subjects). We observed that the level
of cooperation reached in both networks is the same, comparable to that of smaller networks
or unstructured populations. We have also found that subjects respond to the cooperation they
observe in a reciprocal manner, being more likely to cooperate if in the previous round many
of their neighbors and themselves did so. This implies that humans do not consider neighbors’
payoffs when making their decisions in this dilemma, but only their actions. Our results, that
are in agreement with recent theoretical predictions based on this behavioral rule, suggest that
population structure has little relevance as a cooperation-promoter or inhibitor among humans.
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6. HETEROGENEOUS NETWORKS DO NOT PROMOTE COOPERATION WHEN
HUMANS PLAY A PRISONER’S DILEMMA.
6.1 Introduction
The strong cooperative attitude of humans defies the paradigm of homo economicus and poses
an evolutionary conundrum (123; 124). This is so because many of our interactions can be
framed as Prisoner’s Dilemmas (93; 125; 126) or Public Goods Games (127), famous for
bringing about a “tragedy of the commons” (128). Several mechanisms have been suggested
as putative explanations of cooperative behavior (129), among which the existence of an un-
derlying network of contacts constraining who one can interact with has received very much
attention. This mechanism was first proposed by Nowak and May (19), whose simulations on
a square lattice with agents that imitate the behavior of their neighbor with the highest payoff
showed high levels of cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The ensuing two decades have
witnessed a wealth of theoretical studies that have concluded that this so-called “network reci-
procity” (129) is indeed possible under a variety of circumstances, but in many other contexts
networks do not promote−or even inhibit− cooperation (16; 88). The effect of regular and ho-
mogeneous networks on cooperation is very sensitive to the details of the model (e.g., dynam-
ics, clustering), while theoretical results and simulations indicate that heterogeneous networks
should be particularly efficient in fostering cooperation in social dilemmas (88; 108; 109). A
natural way to shed some light on these partially contradictory results would be to test exper-
imentally the predictions of the different models. Such tests are currently lacking (130), as
the few available experimental works only deal—with some exception (23)— with very small
networks (100; 131; 132). Interestingly, the only theoretical result (133) that takes into account
the behavioral information extracted from experiments predicts that neither homogeneous nor
heterogeneous networks would influence the cooperative behavior in the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
i.e., the observed cooperation level should be the same as if every player interacted with every
other one.
6.2 The experiments.
Here, we close the cycle by testing the above theoretical predictions (133) and contributing
to the current debate on the existence and effects of network reciprocity by performing ex-
periments on large samples of structured populations of individuals who interact through a
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game. Specifically, we have designed a setup in which 1229 human
subjects were placed either in a square lattice or in a scale-free network, and for more than
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Figure 6.1: Players in the experiment were sitting in different physical locations, but played
in two virtual networks. Panel A is a snapshot at round 10 of a graphic animation illustrating
the activity during the experiment. On a map of Arago´n the image displays small buildings repre-
senting the schools. Arrows (green for cooperate and red for defect) represent actual actions taken
by players. They travel towards the school where their randomly assigned neighbors were sitting.
Buildings are colored green and red, proportional to the respective number of cooperative and de-
fective actions taken by the subjects in that school. The height of the yellow column on top of each
building is proportional to the school’s accumulated payoffs. Panels B and C show snapshots of
the two networks at that same round, along with their degree distributions (in the case of the het-
erogeneous network, both the theoretical distribution and the actual realization corresponding to
the network of the experiment are represented). Colors indicate the corresponding player’s action
(green for cooperate, red for defect). The size of a node is proportional to its degree.
50 rounds they played a 2 × 2 multiplayer PD game with each of their k neighbors, taking
only one action, either to cooperate (C) or to defect (D)—the action being the same against all
opponents. The experiment was simultaneously carried out on two different virtual networks:
a 25×25 regular lattice with k = 4 and periodic boundary conditions (625 subjects), and a het-
erogeneous network with a fat-tailed degree distribution (604 subjects, the number of neighbors
varied between k = 2 and k = 16). Figure 6.1 depicts a snapshot of a visual representation of
the experiment as well as of the two networks. Subjects played a repeated (weak) Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD) with all their neighbors for an initially undetermined number of rounds. Pay-
offs of the PD were set to be 7 ECUs for mutual cooperation, 10 ECUs for a defector facing
a cooperator, and 0 ECUs for any player facing a defector (weak PD (19)). We note that this
choice of payoffs is as in Grujic´ et al.’s experiment on a smaller regular lattice (23) (see Figure
6.1) and such that cooperation should reach a high level according to the available simulations
(19; 88; 108; 109). The size of each network was large enough so that clusters of cooperators
could form (the underlying mechanism by which cooperators may thrive (115; 134)).
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On this general setup, we carried out two treatments, which we will refer to as experiment
and control. In the experiment, subjects remained at the same positions in the network with the
same neighbors throughout all the rounds played. In the control treatment we removed the ef-
fect of the network by shuffling the neighbors of each subject in every round. Therefore, in this
phase, the players were always connected to the same number of neighbors, but these neighbors
changed from round to round. On the screen, subjects saw the actions and normalized payoffs
of their neighbors from the previous round, who in the control treatment were different from
their current neighbors with high probability. All treatments of the experiment were carried out
in sequence with the same subjects. Players were also fully informed of the different setups
they were going to run through. The number of rounds in each treatment was randomly chosen
between 50 and 70 in order to avoid subjects knowing in advance when it was going to finish,
resulting in 51 and 59 rounds for the experimental and control treatments, respectively.
6.3 Results and Discussions.
Figures 6.2A and 6.2B show the fraction of cooperative actions, c, in each round for the two
networks and for both treatments. The first feature worth noticing in this figure is that, in
the experiment phase, the level of cooperation in either network quickly drops from initial
values around 60% to values around 40% and finally settles at a slower pace around 30%,
much lower than theoretical models predict (16; 19; 88). This is especially remarkable for
the heterogeneous network, on which no previous results are available, and is in stark contrast
with the predictions that this kind of networks should be particularly efficient in promoting
cooperation (88; 108; 109). In the control, the initial level of cooperation is already at these
low values. This behavior is consistent with previous findings in experiments with smaller
lattices (23; 100) as well as with unstructured populations (135; 136). Regarding the slow decay
undergone by these curves after the first quick drop in the level of cooperation, we believe that
this is associated to a process of learning (see below). However, the most remarkable result
that this figure provides is that, quite unexpectedly, the network does not have any influence in
the evolution of the level of cooperation. In fact, both curves are nearly identical—the slightly
lower values obtained for the lattice are likely to arise from the small difference in the initial
level of cooperation—despite the very different nature of the networks of contacts between the
players.
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The experimental result we have just reported is in very good agreement with the theoretical
prediction in (133). This prompts us to investigate in detail what is the players’ behavior, as
the reason why this prediction was different from earlier ones is the use of the update rule
observed in (23). The distributions of subjects by their individual cooperation levels (averaged
over the whole experiment) depicted in Figures 6.2C and 6.2D show quite some heterogeneity
of behavior: a few subjects have a high level of cooperation (above 70%), a sizable fraction
cooperated less than 20% of the rounds, whereas the bulk of subjects have intermediate levels of
cooperation. Importantly, the comparison of these distributions of actions, which turn out to be
statistically indistinguishable (see Kolmogorov-Smirnov test data on Table 6.1 of the appendix
6.5), provides additional evidence that the behavior observed in the two networks is the same.
This finding, along with the identical behavior of the cooperation level, suggests that subjects
use the same strategies in the lattice and in the heterogeneous network, regardless of the fact
that in the latter the number of neighbors of each individual is heterogeneously distributed.
After considering the aggregate distribution of actions, let us now look for deeper insights
on the individual behaviors. As in previous experiments on smaller lattices (23; 100) or un-
structured populations (135; 136), our results are compatible with a coexistence of at least three
basic strategies: cooperators (players who cooperate with a high probability regardless of the
context), defectors (players who defect with a high probability regardless of the context) and
“moody” conditional cooperators (23) (players whose action depends on their previous action
as well as the level of cooperation in their neighborhood). A search for moody conditional
cooperation shows the results depicted in Figure 6.3. Panels A and B show the fraction of
cooperative actions occurred after a cooperation/defection, as a function of the level of coop-
eration in the neighborhood. The plots are the fingerprint of moody conditional cooperation:
players are more prone to cooperate the more their neighbors cooperate if they cooperated than
if they defected. Furthermore, Figure 6.3 also supports the striking finding that the strategic be-
havior of subjects is remarkably similar whether they are playing on the lattice (Figure 6.3A) or
on the heterogeneous network (Figure 6.3B). On the other hand, panels C and D show that the
next action of a subject cannot be predicted knowing the largest payoff difference he/she sees
in the neighborhood, thus confirming that subjects did not use payoff differences as a guidance
to update their actions.
Figure 6.4 provides further evidence of the significance of the moody conditional coop-
eration by means of a nonparametric bootstrap check. The series of actions taken by every
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individual are randomly reassigned to other positions in the lattice or the network and the prob-
ability of cooperation is recomputed. This is done 106 times and the results show that the two
probabilities become independent of the context. Of course, such a reshuffling will not change
the dependence on the player’s own previous action, as the order of the actions is not altered,
and consequently there are still two distinct lines corresponding to the probability of cooper-
ation following cooperation or defection, but the dependence on the number of cooperators in
the previous round is fully removed.
The existence of (almost pure) cooperators and defectors aside from moody conditional
cooperators can be further supported through a comparison with the same histograms but for
the control condition (see Figure 6.6 of the appendix), since for the latter a larger number
of subjects are in the region that would correspond to defectors. This can be interpreted as an
indication that a fraction of—probably—moody conditional cooperators changed to a defective
strategy, given that retaliation is ineffective in the control condition. Furthermore, performing
running averages of the levels of cooperation during the experiment condition (see Figures
6.7 and 6.8 of the appendix) shows that the number of subjects whose level of cooperation is
below a given threshold increases with time—irrespective of the precise value of the threshold.
Not only this gives support to the existence of this kind of players, but it is consistent with a
continuous (albeit small) flow of players who change from moody conditional cooperation to
defection—a behavior that could be understood as a generalized form of a grim strategy. Notice
that this flow can account for the slow decay observed all along the run of the experiment and
control observed in Figures 6.2A and 6.2B.
Finally, another important point that our experiment allows to address to some extent is
the dependence of the actions on the connectivity of the participants for the heterogeneous
network. The results are displayed in Figure 6.5, where we represent the average cooperation
level c as a function of the connectivity of the players, k, for both treatments: experiment
and control. As can be seen from the plots, there might be some trend towards lower levels
of cooperation with increasing degree for small connectivities, particularly in the control (the
levels for the first three values of the degree in the experiment are not statistically different).
However, looking at the figure as a whole it becomes clear that there does not seem to be
any statistically significant trend. It has to be borne in mind that in this type of networks the
number of hubs or large-degree nodes is intrinsically small, and therefore the statistics for them
is not very accurate (notice the size of the error bars). Going beyond this results would require
much larger networks (which would still have the same problem for their higher degree nodes).
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Additionally, the bottom panels of Figure 6.5 show the frequency of cooperative actions of
nodes with degree k after playing as C or D with respect to the fraction of their neighbors
that cooperated in the previous round. The results are a clear evidence that moody conditional
cooperation is indeed the general behavior even if one disaggregates the data in terms of their
degree. As we have already stated above for the total level of cooperation, for higher degrees
the statistics is poorer and the analysis does not lead to such clear-cut results.
6.4 Conclusions
To sum up, we have performed a large-scale experimental test of the hypothesis of network
reciprocity, i.e., that the existence of a structure in the population may affect cooperation in so-
cial dilemmas. Our experiment shows that, when it comes to human behavior, the existence of
an underlying network of contacts does not seem to have any influence in the global outcome.
We want to stress that this conclusion applies only to human cooperation, and network reci-
procity may still be relevant in other contexts, e.g., in microbiology (137). Players seem to act
by responding to the level of cooperation in their neighborhood, and this renders the network
irrelevant. In addition, players behave in a ‘moody’ manner, being significantly less likely to
cooperate following a defection of their own. The levels of cooperation attained in a regular
lattice and in a highly heterogeneous network (hitherto thought to be a cooperation enhancer)
are indistinguishable, and the responsive behavior of subjects appears to be independent of the
number of neighbors they have or on the payoff differences they observe. The results are in
full agreement with the theoretical prediction in (133); the fact that the key hypothesis in that
model is that people behave in the way we have just described, provides further support to our
finding of moody conditional cooperation in networked Prisoner’s Dilemmas.
Our results have implications for policy making when cooperation is a desired behavior.
Although further experiments with other social dilemmas still need to assess the range of appli-
cability of our conclusions, the present study suggests that imposing a network structure might
be a sterile effort. It should be noted, however, that this caveat does not imply that networking
is useless to achieve cooperation—results would probably be very different if the network is
allowed to be formed by the subjects as part of the game. Recent experiments on groups of up
to 20 people (138; 139) strongly suggest this, but to the best of our knowledge no large-scale
experiments have been carried out to test this issue. On the other hand, the theoretical work
in (133) does not predict the slow decay of the cooperation level observed in the experiments,
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Figure 6.2: The level of cooperation declines and is independent of the network of contacts.
Fraction of cooperative actions (level of cooperation) per round during the experiment (panel A)
and the control (panel B) for both networks, and histograms of cooperative actions in the lattice
(panel C) and in the heterogeneous network (panel D). The histograms (panels C and D) show the
number of subjects ranked according to the fraction of cooperative actions they perform along the
experiment in the two networks. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test shows that the distributions are sta-
tistically indistinguishable (see appendix 6.5). They illustrate the high heterogeneity in subjects’
behavior, their levels of cooperation ranging from nearly zero to almost one in a practically contin-
uous distribution. The corresponding histograms for the control (Figureexp.figS4 of the appendix)
show that a sizable group of subjects lowered their levels of cooperation hence becoming mostly
defectors. Actually, the decline in the level of cooperation observed in the experiment (panels A
and B) can be explained as a constant flow of subjects to more defective strategies (for evidence
supporting this hypothesis see Figures 6.7 and 6.8 of the appendix).
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Figure 6.3: Players’ behaviour depends both on the level of cooperation in the neighborhood
and on their previous action. Frequency of cooperative actions after a cooperative/defective ac-
tion, conditioned to the context (fraction of cooperative actions in the neighborhood in the previous
round) observed in the lattice (A) and in the heterogeneous network (B). Details of the linear fits
and comparison with randomizations to prove statistical significance can be found in the appendix.
The plots demonstrate that there is a relevant dependence on the context for subjects that cooperated
in the previous round (i.e., were in a “cooperative mood”), the cooperation probability increasing
with the fraction of cooperative neighbors much as for the conditional cooperators found by Fis-
chbacher et al.(99). However, after having defected, this dependence is less clear, and if anything,
it suggest an exploiting behavior—subjects who defected are less prone to cooperate the more co-
operation they find around. Panels C and D show how subjects who cooperated or defected are
distributed according to the largest payoff-per-link difference in their neighborhoods between the
two actions. These plots reveal that a player’s decision to cooperate or defect was independent on
the payoffs-per-link they observed (an information that was explicitly provided during the experi-
ment).
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Figure 6.4: Null hypothesis statistical significance test. Probability of cooperating after playing
C or D, conditioned to the context (fraction of cooperative actions in the neighborhood in the
previous round), averaged over 106 random shuffling of players. Panel A) corresponds to the
experimental treatment in the lattice, panel B) to the same treatment but for the heterogeneous
network, panel C) to the control phase in the lattice and panel D) to the same control treatment for
the heterogeneous network. The results show that there is no dependence on the context and hence
that the results of panels A and B of Figure 3 are statistically relevant. The anomalous variance (or
even absence of data) observed at a fraction of C’s in the neighborhood close to 0.9 is not a relevant
feature of the experimental results but a consequence of the very low probability of having events
contributing to that bin of the histogram in the heterogeneous network. This anomaly can also be
noticed in Figure 3.
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Figure 6.5: Dependence of the strategies on the connectivity. The upper panels show the co-
operation level c as a function of the connectivity ki in the heterogeneous network, averaged over
all rounds of the experiment (upper left panel) and the control (upper right) of the experiment. In
the lower panels, we plot the frequency of cooperative actions of players with degree as indicated,
after they have cooperated or defected, as a function of the fraction of cooperative actions in their
neighborhood during the previous round, along the experiment treatment in the heterogeneous net-
work. Statistics is restricted to nodes of connectivity k = 2 (lower left panel), k = 3 (lower center)
and k = 4 (lower right).
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which we have conjectured that arises from moody conditional cooperators becoming defec-
tors in a generalized grim behavior. Such a change in the percentage of players using different
strategies is not included in the theoretical model, and therefore a next step would require to
account for such changes and, if possible, to justify them within an evolutionary framework.
Finally, given that in our setup players have to play the same action with all their neighbors,
it is clear that our results should be related to those of public goods experiments. In fact,
conditional cooperation was first observed in that context (99). Our findings suggest that the
“moody” version we have found can also arise in public goods games. If that is the case, it is
likely that network reciprocity does not apply to public goods games on networks. Hopefully
our experiment will encourage further research in all these directions.
6.5 Appendix 1: Additional material about the experimental re-
sults
Here we present further results aimed at supporting the findings shown in the previous sections.
As there, we will refer to the basic types of individuals found in the experiment as mostly
cooperators (players who cooperate with a high probability regardless of the context), mostly
defectors (players who defect with a high probability regardless of the context) and moody
conditional cooperators (players whose action depends on their previous action as well as the
level of cooperation in their neighbourhood, see Fig. 6.3 A and B).
Figure 6.6 shows the histograms of the number of players ranked according to the fraction
of cooperative actions they performed along the control phase, in the lattice (panel A) and in
the heterogeneous network (panel B). The same results but for the experimental phase can be
found in panels C and D of Figureexp.fig:2. The comparison between the plots shows a large
increase in the fraction of individuals that never or almost never cooperated in the control with
respect to the experiment. This is likely to be a consequence of the fact that in the experiment
there is an initial amount of cooperation well above 50%, which is not the case in the control.
At the other extreme of the plots, the (small) amount of highly cooperative players remains
approximately the same, indicating that their motivation has nothing to do with having or not a
fixed environment for their interactions. The general picture thus arising from the control part
is that there is not much cooperation, and the majority of players do not cooperate other than
occasionally.
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Figure 6.6: Distribution of cooperative actions in the control. We represent the number of
players that cooperated during the given number of rounds (normalized by the total number of
rounds played). The results correspond to the control phase. Similar results were presented Fig.6.2.
On the other hand, Figure 6.7 displays the time evolution of the distribution of cooperative
actions in the experimental part. The histograms show the players’ frequency as a function of
the fraction of cooperative actions along successive 10-round periods corresponding to the ex-
perimental phase in the lattice (left column) and in the heterogeneous network (right column).
The results show evidence of some degree of learning as the experiment progresses: Indeed, the
number of people who cooperate never or rarely increases with time. This would be consistent
with the decay of cooperation shown in Fig. 6.2 A; while the first, quick drop in cooperation
would be explicable within a computer model with a fixed proportion of defectors, cooperators
and moody conditional cooperators, the second part of the evolution, a much slower decay,
is inconsistent with such a model and must then come from changes in the proportion of the
different types of players.
The phenomenon we have just described can also be shown in a different manner, namely
by monitoring the evolution of mostly defectors both during the experimental and control parts
of the experiment. Figure 6.8 represents the fraction of agents whose probability to cooperate
is below a given threshold (indicated in the rightmost legend) at every round (time t). To
calculate this quantity, we have taken into account the actions of the players during the previous
10 rounds. The results obtained show an increasing trend (more evident for the experimental
phase, top panels) for both the square lattice and the heterogeneous network, which confirms
the tendency of the players to learn that they should defect as time goes on.
We also report on the statistical analysis we carried out about the experimental data. First,
in order to determine whether or not the likelihood to cooperate differs significantly in the two
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Figure 6.7: Time evolution of the distribution of cooperative actions. The different panels
show how frequently players cooperated in different time periods. The results correspond to the
first treatment (experiment). Rows represent periods 1-10(t0 = 0, top), 11-20(t0 = 10), 21-
30(t0 = 20), 31-40(t0 = 30) and 41-50(t0 = 40, bottom) as indicated.
studied networks, we use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test for the two data sets. We take
as a first sample the distribution of the probability to cooperate in the lattice, cumulated over
all rounds of the experimental phase. The second sample used as input for the KS test corre-
sponds to the same distribution but for the heterogeneous network. These are the distributions
represented on Figure 6.2. The maximum difference between the cumulative distributions for
the experimental phase is 0.1071 with a corresponding value for PKS = 0.995. The statis-
tics of both samples, together with the ones corresponding to the control phase Fig. 6.6 are
summarized in Table 6.1.
Finally, Table 6.2 summarizes the statistical fits (obtained from a weighted least squares
regression) of the conditional probability P to cooperate, conditioned on the player’s action in
the previous round (X=after C, after D) and on the density ρ of cooperators in the players’
neighborhoods during the previous round. Fits are defined by P (C|X, ρ) = a + bρ. The data
fitted correspond to the results shown in Figure 6.3 A,B.
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Figure 6.8: Evolution of the fraction of mostly defectors. Fraction of agents with a coop-
eration probability lower than a given threshold as a function of t(=round), according to their
cooperative actions through the previous 10 rounds, for different values of the threshold =
0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4. Columns represent results for the lattice (left) and the heterogeneous network
(right), while rows correspond to the two treatments: experiment (top) and control (bottom).
6.6 Appendix 2: Experimental setup.
6.6.1 Volunteer recruitment and treatment
The experiment was carried out with 1229 volunteers chosen among last year high-school stu-
dents (17-18 years old) of 42 different High Schools located throughout the geography of the
Autonomous Region of Arago´n, Spain, whose capital is Zaragoza, where the University of
Zaragoza is. 34 High Schools were in the province of Zaragoza, 5 in the province Huesca, and
3 in the province of Teruel. For the recruitment of the students, we contacted the coordina-
tors of a program (Ciencia Viva, ”Living Science”) of the local government that supports the
dissemination of Science among public high schools of Arago´n. Moreover, we also contacted
many of the private schools of Zaragoza City also offering them the possibility of taking part
in the experiment. In all cases, the experiment was referred to as ”a social experiment” and no-
body (including the high-school teachers in charge of the coordination) knew in advance what
the experiment was about (see below).
Following the call for participation, we selected 1300 volunteers. In order to satisfy ethical
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experiment control
lattice heterogeneous lattice heterogeneous
mean 0.03703 0.03703 0.03226 0.03226
95% confidence (0.02434,0.04974) (0.02335,0.05072) (0.02549,0.04858) (0.02607,0.04800)
standard deviation 0.03210 0.03459 0.02918 0.02772
high 0.0976 0.104 0.106 0.0878
low 0 0 0 0
third quartile 0.06560 0.06126 0.05440 0.05795
first quartile 0.006400 0.006623 0.006400 0.01159
median 0.04000 0.03146 0.0448 0.03808
Median absolute deviation 0.02844 0.02937 0.02495 0.02275
Table 6.1: Statistics of the distribution of the probability to cooperate cumulated over all rounds of the experimental and
control phases in both networks. See the text for further details.
lattice heterogeneous
a b a b
after C 0.457± 0.015 0.122± 0.034 0.475± 0.016 0.126± 0.039
after D 0.350± 0.021 −0.149± 0.050 0.309± 0.069 −0.0269± 0.035
Table 6.2: Values of the fitting parameters for the results shown in Figure 6.3 A,B. Fits are defined by P (C|X, ρ) =
a+ bρ, being X=after C, or after D. See the text for more details.
procedures, all personal data about the participants were anonymized and treated as confiden-
tial. Moreover, the Ethical Committee of the University of Zaragoza approved all procedures.
On the day of the experiment, the aforementioned 1229 volunteers showed up, with 541 males
and 688 females representing the 44.02% and 55.98% of the total number of players, respec-
tively. Out of the 1229 students, 625 played the game on a square lattice (274 males and
351 females keeping the male to female ratio) and 604 on an heterogeneous network. In the
first topology, every player had k = 4 neighbors while in the second, the connectivity varied
between 2 and 16 following a distribution N(k)N = P (k) = Ak
−2.7
, with A = (
∑
k P (k))
−1
.
All the students played via a web interface specifically created for the experiment (see
below) that was accessible through the computers available in the computer rooms of their
respective schools. At least one teacher supervised the experiment in each computer room
(which at most had a maximum capacity of 20 students), preventing any interaction among the
students. To further guarantee that potential interactions among students seating next to each
other in the class do not influence the results of the experiment, the assignment of players to
the different topologies was completely random. Hence, the odds of having two participants
geographically close (i.e., of the same school and seating next to each other) who were also
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neighbors in the virtual topology was quite small. In addition, as described below, the col-
ors used to code the two available actions of the game were also selected randomly, further
decreasing the likelihood that neighboring participants could influence each other.
We describe in the following section the steps followed by each participant during the
experiments. In short, all participants went through a tutorial on the screen, including questions
to check their understanding of the game. When everybody had gone through the tutorial, the
experiment began, lasting for approximately an hour. At the end of the experiments volunteers
were presented a small questionnaire to fill in. Immediately after, all participants received their
earnings and their show-up fee. Total earnings in the experiment ranged from 2.49 to 40.48
euros.
6.6.2 Experimental platform and interface
The experiment was run using a fairly sophisticated web application specifically developed to
this purpose. The application was made entirely using free software. It was developed in Ruby
On Rails, a technology used by other popular websites like Twitter, and has a MySQL database
that stores all data needed to carry out the experiment and the subsequent analysis. MySQL is a
freely available open source relational database management system based on Structured Query
Language (SQL), the most popular language for adding, accessing and managing content in a
database.
The application was designed to be used by three different user profiles. First of all, we
have the players, who were shown at the beginning a detailed tutorial for a better understanding
of the interface and basis of the experiment. Secondly, there are teachers who were responsi-
ble for supervising students through their dedicated web monitors, facilitating the work of the
central administrator work and contributing to the success of the experiment. Finally, the ad-
ministrators were responsible for controlling the game and everything that was happening in
real time. The application, which was designed using technologies compatible with all plat-
forms, was managed from a standard web browser. There was a last participant, a daemon or
process running in the background whose function was to update the results and play instead
of players who do not play within the specified time frame for each action.
Considering that the experiment required that around 1300 students could play online si-
multaneously, we used a server with enough power, and many optimizations were performed in
terms of connections to the server, access to database, client-server data exchange, lightness of
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the interface, control logic, etc. The experiment started on December 20, 2011 at 10:00 CET.
The steps followed during the development of the experiment were:
1. Administrators opened the registration process.
2. Players (students) gradually registered.
3. Once all students had registered, teachers informed the administrators via their screen.
4. As soon as the required number of participants have registered (this took around 20
minutes), administrators blocked further registrations and initiated the reading of the
tutorial.
5. Students and teachers read the tutorial.
6. Teachers informed (also via their screens) administrators that the reading was completed.
7. The experiment treatment began, which lasted 51 rounds.
8. Students played according to some predefined times (a maximum of 20 seconds per
round to choose an action). During these steps, teachers controlled for any potential
problem using a chat channel that connected them to the administrators. As mentioned
above, if one student did not play within the 20 seconds given for each action, the daemon
played automatically (see below). The administrators were able to identify who was not
playing and to contact the teachers if the situation persisted. However, the experiment
went smoothly and no feedback to the professors for misbehavior was needed.
9. The experiment treatment finished and a brief tutorial on the second one (control) was
shown.
10. Once teachers and students had read the tutorial, the former notified the administrators.
11. Administrators started the control treatment, which lasted 59 rounds.
12. Students played as in the previous treatment.
13. Once the control treatment finished, volunteers were presented a short questionnaire to
fill in.
14. All participants checked their earnings and were given their show-up fee.
120
6.6 Appendix 2: Experimental setup.
6.6.3 Synchronous play and automatic actions
The experiment assumes synchronous play, thus we had to make sure that every round ended in
a certain amount of time. This playing time was set to 20 seconds, which was checked during
the testing phase of the programs to be enough to make a decision, while at the same time not
too long to make the experiment boring to fast players. If a player did not choose an action
within these 20 seconds, the computer made the decision instead. This automatic decision was
randomly chosen to be the player’s previous action 90% of the times and the opposite action
10% of the times. We chose this protocol following previous testings performed by the authors
of a similar experiment (see (23)). Volunteers were informed that the computer would play
for them if their decision took more than the prescribed time-out. However, they were not
informed of the precise strategy used by the computer in order to avoid any bias in their own
choices of strategy. In any case, for the reliability of the experiment it is important that a huge
majority of actions were actually played by humans, not by the computer. This quantity, when
averaged over all rounds, yields that the 90% of the actions were chosen by humans, regardless
of the underlying network of contacts.
6.6.4 Questionnaires
At the end of the experiments volunteers were presented a small questionnaire to fill in. The
list of questions (translated into English) was the following:
1. Describe briefly how you made your decisions in part I (Experiment).
2. Describe briefly how you made your decisions in part II (Control).
3. Did you take into account your neighbors’ actions?
4. Is something in the experiment familiar to you? (yes/no).
5. If so, please point out what it reminds you of.
6. If you want to make any comment, please do so below.
The first three questions have a clear motivation, namely to see whether (possibly some) players
did have a strategy to decide on their actions. Question 3 was intended to check whether players
decided on their own or did look at their environment, because only in this last case imitative
or conditionally cooperative strategies make any sense. Questions 4 and 5 focused on the
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possibility that some of the players recognized the game as a Prisoner’s Dilemma because they
had a prior knowledge of the basics of game theory. The final question just allowed them to
enter any additional comment they would like to make. We did not carry out a more detailed
questionnaire to avoid the risk of many players’ leaving it blank (the whole experiment was
already very long).
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Presentation of Part II.
In this part of the thesis, we address the second research theme: the tolerance under the
framework of social dynamics. The concepts of tolerance and intolerance have been ap-
proached from many perspectives including biology, sociology and philosophy (74). For the
purposes of this thesis, we consider tolerance as “a permissive and indulgent attitude in relation
to those subjects whose characters, opinions or behaviors differ from one’s own” and, comple-
mentarily, intolerance or bigotry as “the refusal to accept subjects with different characters,
opinions or behaviors from ones own”.
Despite antecedents in classical greek (as well as from the hellenistic, and roman period)
philosophers (e.g. Socrates, Epictetus, Marc Aurellius), toleration does not become a serious
subject of philosophical and political concern in Europe until the 16th and 17th Centuries. Mo-
tivated by the Religion’s Wars which followed Reformation and Counter-Reformation, thinkers
as Milton, Bayle, Spinoza and Locke defended religious tolerance. Among the Enlightenment’s
philosophers, perhaps Voltaire was the one that most vividly expressed his views in defense of
religious tolerance, and surely Kant was the most rigorous one.
At the end of the 18th Century one can see tolerant ideas embodied in practice in the USA
Constitution’s Bill of Rights. In the 19th Century at the formulation of political liberalism, J.S.
Mill argues that the only proper limit of liberty is harm (to others), and that political power
should have no authority to regulate those activities and interests of individuals that are purely
private and have no secondary effects on others.
Already in the 20th Century, toleration became an important component of what is known
as liberal theory. It has been defended by liberal philosophers and political theorists such as
Dewey, Berlin, Popper, Dworkin and Rawls, but also criticized by Marcuse and other modern
marxist thinkers who worry that toleration and its ideal of state neutrality is merely another
hegemonic Western ideology, a useful ”superstructural mask”. After all, some politically neo-
liberal practices in Europe politics are indeed quite far from being tolerant in any ample sense
of the term. Nowadays, a concern for racial equality, gender neutrality, an end of prejudice,
respect for cultural and ethnic difference, and a general commitment to multiculturalism has
fueled ongoing debates about the nature of toleration in our age of globalization and homo-
geneization.
To a 21st Century social sciences theorist that might worry about these issues, a basic
methodological question is wether or not social tolerance can be measured, or at least semi-
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quantitatively inferred from observations. What about consider it as a parameter in an ABM
investigation? The accepted meaning of the ”tolerance” parameter of the Schelling model is but
a possible operational use of the concept of toleration. So we see there is already a half-century
old tradition of using tolerance as a social parameter in social modeling of some phenomena.
Moreover, given that intolerance is the main cause of conflicts at all levels, from two-person
disputes to multipart struggle and wars, and considering that, unfortunately, social rejection
and self-exclusion based on real or perceived characteristics is inherent in the human condition
and has always been present in every culture and time period (74; 75), the cultural diffusion
enhanced by development of mass media and new technologies leads to an increasing need to
address tolerance under the perspectives of social and cultural dynamics.
Tolerance and intolerance are issues that can be properly addressed through ABMs, as
shown, for example, the fact that one of the first social ABM was the residential segregation
model developed by Thomas C. Schelling in 1971 (52; 53). The Schelling’s model shows how
a preference to have similar neighbors can lead to segregation for relatively small values of
intolerance (see Introduction 1.3.1). Nevertheless, ABM have not paid much attention to the
study of tolerance, in contrast to other related topics such as homophily (59), opinion formation
(153) or rumor spreading (155).
In the Axelrod model (see Introduction 1.3.1 for a basic presentation) the social influ-
ence on the ”cultural” individual characteristics defining the cultural state, appears itself as
homophile satisfaction, the driving force of cultural change (or cultural evolution). One might
say that the ”incentive” to modify a cultural trait (e.g. conversion to a new, non-inborn faith,
changing of musical taste, or going into bio-organic food consumption) is the aspiration to a
greater share of cultural features with nearby agents. Simple and of general appealing, ho-
mophile satisfaction is the ”benefit function” in an economic framework formulation of the
model. Economic language is well-fitted to permeate Political Sciences modeling, and hu-
man social behavior, though not always, can sometimes be understood in terms of economy of
”moral feelings” and/or other categories.
Importantly, the Axelrod’s dynamics assumption, namely ”the more similar two cultural
agents are, the more similar they’ll likely become in the future”, seems also be rooted on a sen-
sible theorist’s inference from social experiences and observations. Note that this assumption
leads naturally, for a dimer of cultural automata, to a self-sustained increase of cultural similar-
ity. Though this may suggest that the dynamics is just a trivial accelerated tendency to cultural
consensus, when passing from the cultural dimer analysis to the neighborhood’s state analysis
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of a focal agent, one realizes that the (ensemble averaged) mean similarity of the focal isn’t
forcefully an increasing function of time dynamics: it could decrease in time, so dynamics is
not that trivial. Despite that, the tension between the two extreme macroscopic states, global-
ization and multiculturalism, is regulated by the (initial) degree q of cultural diversity, as in the
dimer analysis: Provided q is so large as to render negligible the probability of sharing some
cultural feature, no option other that multiculturalism prevails for the dimer, as well as for the
whole macroscopic population, where frozen multicultural patterns dominate the asymptotic
states for large initial cultural diversity.
Another basic feature of this modeling framework of cultural dynamics is its highly non-
biased setting respect to trait values: There is no advantage of particular traits regarding ”socio-
cultural ineffectiveness” power. A physicists’ term for this basic feature is trait symmetry. The
complete invariance under interchangeability of traits imposes that the homogeneously cul-
tural macroscopic state contains qF microscopic states, that are equally likely provided traits
are uniformly distributed in the initial conditions. Along any particular stochastic trajectory, the
macroscopic consensus reaches fixation (thus irreversibly breaking trait’s symmetry) through
an unbiased random walk, as it occurs in Evolutionary Genetics where neutral characters are
fixed in some populations. The same occurs regarding traits frequencies in multicultural macro-
scopic states.
Our daily experience would easily sanction as too simplistic both (homophily and exact
symmetry) basic features of this cultural dynamics: to put it crudely, during the early eighties
of last century, when I became more a reggae than heavy metal rocker tasted young Spaniard,
is a different socio-economic situation from the coetaneous conversion of a young Mexican
”catholic”-born to the ”Jehovah’s witnesses ” faith, that are treated as indistinguishable pro-
cesses inside this framework. The model, however, is not aimed to address individuals’ cultural
issues. Also, for a field anthropologist interested, say, in the cultural decline of Patagonia pop-
ulations, such a bareness of details in the description of cultural dynamics could seem useless,
likely a mere kidding exercise. However, no particular cases of important cultural processes
(as culture extinction) motivate this model.
Our kind of theorists’ social modeling is (no more and no less than) an educated (scien-
tific) attempt to gain insight into basic fundamental mechanisms that operate, in some sense
universally, in the emergence of collective social behaviors. We know that the Ising model is
invaluably useful, far away its strict applicability to e.g. magnetic materials experiments. This
important message is well-understood inside our physicists’ culture, and, hopefully, will be
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increasingly so across other scientific cultures. It is amply heard, at least in some branches of
social and economical sciences research, in connection to the Schelling model, where residen-
tial segregation based on ethnic (racial, unchangeable agent features) differentiation of individ-
uals, is modeled through a very simple homophile satisfaction driven mobility dynamics (see
Introduction for a basic presentation).
Although intolerance and homophily are close ideas, the relation between both concepts
is not trivial: while homophily refers to the preference to not interact with dissimilar people,
this preference does not implies social rejection. Nevertheless, the Axelrod and the Schelling
model share the same social force, the homophile satisfaction. In the first one it fuels the
cultural change (under conditions given by a cultural diversity parameter), while in the second
it determines moving decisions (conditioned by a tolerance parameter) in a ”geography” of
residential neighborhoods. Each model addresses a different specific social issue, and inside
own domain, each one is a basic archetype model ultimately based on homophile satisfaction
as a social force.
Our goal in this part of the thesis is to incorporate intolerance into the cultural dynamics
through different mechanisms. Starting from the Axelrod’s model, in chapter 7 we introduce
intolerance allowing agents to move from a culturally dissimilar environment to other available
places according to a intolerance threshold T . This is possible thanks to the introduction of
a density of empty sites h in the lattice of the original model. We show that, when the den-
sity h of empty sites is low enough and the agents percolates the lattice, mobility enhances
the convergence to monocultural state. Moreover, the transition value qc depends linearly with
the system size. On the other hand, for large enough values of h, when 1 − h is below the
site percolation threshold, a new multicultural fragmented phase appears at low values of the
initial cultural diversity q; however, the monocultural phase of the original Axelrod’s model is
recovered for intermediate values of q, triggered by mobility, as well as the disordered (multi-
cultural) phase for large values of q. In chapter 8, we extend the previously described model
by considering intolerance T as an individual cultural feature susceptible of imitation through
the cultural dynamics. This asymmetry introduced in the traits of Axelrod dynamics allows to
study the preference of tolerant traits to be present or not in dominant cultures. We consider
two options in order to introduce individual intolerance: social rejection (i.e., the agents move
according to their neighbors’ intolerance) and self-exclusion (agents move incited by its own
intolerance to their neighbors). In both cases we show that tolerant traits are more likely to be
present in dominant cultures. Moreover, the advantage of tolerance increases with the density
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h of empty sites, being higher in the social rejection scheme. In order to obtain a more realistic
model, given that social networks are heterogeneous, in Chapter 9 we introduce tolerance into
cultural dynamics through network plasticity, allowing agents to remove links to its dissimilar
neighbors and reconnecting them to other individuals chosen at random. This method allows
to consider heterogeneous and dynamic networks, with a network dynamics driven by the cul-
tural dynamics. Starting from the dynamics designed by Vazquez et al. (166), we introduced
tolerance through a parameter Z that modulates the intensity of rewiring mechanism. We show
that rewiring mechanism induces opposite effects. As expected, for large values of tolerance Z,
rewiring promotes the convergence to globalization. Nevertheless, for intermediate values of
Z, the rewiring mechanism enhances the formation of disconnected cultural clusters for values
of the initial cultural diversity q which present globalization in non-evolving networks. Fur-
ther, for low values of Z, although clusters are present in transitory states, rewiring promotes
cultural spreading between clusters for large enough values of q, and monocultural phase is
recovered.
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Chapter 7
Residential segregation and cultural
dissemination: An Axelrod-Schelling
model.
In the Axelrod’s model of cultural dissemination, we consider mobility of cultural agents
through the introduction of a density of empty sites and the possibility that agents in a dis-
similar neighborhood can move to them if their mean cultural similarity with the neighborhood
is below some threshold. While for low values of the density of empty sites the mobility en-
hances the convergence to a global culture, for high enough values of it the dynamics can lead
to the coexistence of disconnected domains of different cultures. In this regime, the increase
of initial cultural diversity paradoxically increases the convergence to a dominant culture. Fur-
ther increase of diversity leads to fragmentation of the dominant culture into domains, forever
changing in shape and number, as an effect of the never ending eroding activity of cultural
minorities.
7.1 Introduction
The use of agent-based models (ABM) (156) in the study of social phenomena provides useful
insights about the fundamental causal mechanisms at work in social systems. The large-scale
(macroscopic) effects of simple forms of (microscopic) social interaction are very often surpris-
ing and generally hard to anticipate, as vividly demonstrated by one of the earliest examples
of ABM, the Schelling (52; 53) model of urban segregation, that shows how residential seg-
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regation can emerge from individual choices, even if people have fairly tolerant preferences
regarding the share of like persons in a residential neighborhood.
To gain insights on the question of why cultural differences between individuals and groups
persist despite tendencies to become more alike as a consequence of social interactions, Ax-
elrod (59) proposed an ABM for the dissemination of culture, that has subsequently played
a prominent role in the investigation of cultural dynamics. Questions concerning the estab-
lishment, spread and sustainability of cultures, as well as on the ”pros and cons” of cultural
globalization versus the preservation and coexistence of cultural diversity, are of central impor-
tance both from a fundamental and practical point of view in today’s world.
The Axelrod model implements the idea that social influence is ”homophilic”, i.e. the
likelihood that a cultural feature will spread from an individual to another depends on how
many other features they may have already in common (59). The resulting dynamics converges
to a global monocultural macroscopic state when the initial cultural diversity is below a critical
value, while above it homophilic social influence is unable to inforce cultural homogeneity,
and multicultural patterns persist asymptotically. This change of macroscopic behavior has
been characterized (141; 142; 143; 144) as a non-equilibrium phase transition. Subsequent
studies have analyzed the effects on this transition of different lattice or network structures
(145; 146), the presence of different types of noise (”cultural drift”) (147; 148), as well as
the consideration of external fields (influential media, or information feedback) (149; 150) and
global or local non-uniform couplings (151). Along with other models of social dynamics (as
e.g., models of opinion formation (153; 154), rumor spreading (155), etc) cultural dynamics are
of interest in the field of non-equilibrium phase transitions in lattice models, as other stochastic
spatial models motivated by population dynamics or evolutionary biology (80). Up to now, no
investigation of the effects of agent mobility on cultural transmission has been carried out, with
the exception of (157), where individuals move following the gradient of a ”sugar” landscape
(that they consume) and interact culturally with agents in their neighborhood, i.e., mobility is
not culturally driven.
In this chapter we incorporate into the Axelrod dynamics of cultural transmission the pos-
sibility that agents living in a culturally dissimilar environment can move to other available
places, much in the spirit of the Schelling model of residential segregation. This requires the
introduction of a density of empty sites h in the discrete space (lattice) where agents live. As
anticipated by (157) the expectations are that the agents mobility should enhance the conver-
gence to cultural globalization, in the extent that it acts as a sort of global coupling between
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agents. It turns out that these expectations are clearly confirmed when the density h of empty
sites is low enough so that the set of occupied sites percolates the lattice: The transition value
depends linearly with the number of agents, so that in an infinite system (thermodynamical
limit) only global cultural states are possible. However, for large enough values of h, new phe-
nomena appear associated to this mixed Axelrod-Schelling social dynamics, including a new
multicultural fragmented phase at very low values of the initial cultural diversity, a (seemingly
first order) transition to cultural globalization that is triggered by mobility, and the fragmenta-
tion of the dominant culture into separated domains that change continuously as the result of
erosive processes caused by the mobility of cultural minorities.
7.2 The model
In the Axelrod model of cultural dissemination, a culture is modelled as a vector of F inte-
ger variables {σf} (f = 1, ..., F ), called cultural features, that can assume q values, σf =
0, 1, ...q − 1, the possible traits allowed per feature. At each elementary dynamical step, the
culture {σf (i)} of an individual i randomly chosen is allowed to change (social influence) by
imitation of an uncommon feature’s trait of a randomly chosen neighbor j, with a probabil-
ity proportional to the cultural overlap ωij between both agents, defined as the proportion of
shared cultural features,
ωij =
1
F
F∑
f=1
δσf (i),σf (j), (7.1)
where δx,y stands for the Kronecker’s delta which is 1 if x = y and 0 otherwise. Note that in
the Axelrod dynamics the mean cultural overlap ω¯i of an agent i with its ki neighbors, defined
as
ω¯i =
1
ki
ki∑
j=1
ωij , (7.2)
not always increases after an interaction takes place with a neighboring agent: indeed, it will
decrease if the feature whose trait has been changed was previously shared with at least two
other neighbors.
To incorporate the mobility of cultural agents into the Axelrod model, two new parameters
are introduced, say the density of empty sites h, and a threshold T (0 ≤ T ≤ 1), that can
be called intolerance. After each elementary step of the Axelrod dynamics, we perform the
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following action: If imitation has not occurred and ωij 6= 1, we compute the mean overlap
(7.2) and if ω¯i < T , then the agent i moves to an empty site that is randomly chosen. Finally,
in the event that the agent i randomly chosen is isolated (only empty sites in its neighborhood),
then it moves directly to an empty site. Note, additionally, that in the presence of a density of
empty sites, the sum in equation (7.2) runs over neighboring agents, and not on neighboring
sites, so that ki can take on the values 0, 1, . . . 4 for a square lattice geometry.
We define the mobility mi of an agent i as the probability that it moves in one elementary
dynamical step (provided it has been chosen):
mi = (1− ω¯i) Θ(T − ω¯i) , (7.3)
where Θ(x) is the Heaviside step function, that takes the value 1 if x > 0, and 0 if x ≤ 0. For
an isolated agent, that moves with certainty, one may convene that its mean cultural overlap is
zero, so that expression (7.3) applies as well. The average mobility m of a configuration is the
average of the mobility of the agents:
m =
1
N
N∑
i=1
mi , (7.4)
where N is the total number of cultural agents. We will consider below two-dimensional
square lattices of linear size L, so that N = (1− h)L2, periodic boundary conditions, and von
Neumann neighborhoods, so that the number ki of neighbors of an agent i is 0 ≤ ki ≤ 4. We
fix the number of cultural features to F = 10, and vary the parameters q, h and T , as well as the
linear size L of the lattice. As it happens also for the genuine (i.e., without mobility) Axelrod
model, no qualitative differences appear for different values of F ≥ 3, the only difference
being that larger values of F make it easier the convergence to cultural globalization. One can
easily realize that the probability that the overlap between two randomly chosen cultures, say i
and j, is positive P (ωij > 0) = 1 − ((q − 1)/q)F , is an increasing function of the parameter
F .
Note that for F = 1, no matter how large q ≥ 2 is, the overlap ωij is either 0 or 1 so
that there is no chance for cultural interaction (imitation). In this limit case each agent keeps
forever its own initial culture, and the size of each culture is fixed by the initial conditions
(no cultural evolution). In this case the model effectively reduces to a version (one among the
many possible variants) of the Schelling model of urban segregation. Specifically, it becomes
a Schelling model with myopic long range move. Some recent papers in the physics literature
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Figure 7.1: Order parameter 〈Smax〉/N versus scaled initial cultural diversity q/N for a very
small density of empty sites h = 0.05 and different values of the intolerance T = 0.3, 0.7, and of
the lattice linear size L = 20, 30, 40, as indicated in the inset.
on the Schelling model are (158; 159; 160; 161). See also (162) for some critical comments on
the physical perspective of the Schelling model.
7.3 Results and Discussion
For the initial conditions for the cultural dynamics, N cultural agents are randomly distributed
in the L × L sites of the square lattice, and randomly assigned a culture. The simulation is
stopped when the number na of active links (i.e., links such that 0 < ωij < 1) vanishes. The
results shown below are obtained by averaging over a large number (typically 5 · 102 − 104)
of different initial conditions.
The usual order parameter for the Axelrod model is 〈Smax〉/N , where 〈Smax〉 is the average
number of agents of the dominant (most abundant) culture. Large values (close to unity) of
the order parameter are the signature of cultural globalization. In Fig. 7.1, we plot the order
parameter versus the initial cultural diversity scaled to the population size, q/N , for a small
value of the density of empty sites h = 0.05, and different values of the intolerance T and
of the linear size L. We observe the collapse in a single curve of the graphs corresponding
to different lattice sizes and, moreover, that the results are rather insensitive to the intolerance
values. Figure 7.2 represents the cultural distribution in both states: ordered phase for low
values of q/N , and disordered phase for high values of q/N .
For a fixed value of the initial cultural diversity q, the larger the size N of the population
is, the more likely an agent can share a cultural feature with someone else in the population.
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Figure 7.2: Cultural distribution when the density of empty sites is below their percolation thresh-
old: The system is characterized by two phases as in the original Axelrod Model: A monocultural
phase for low values of initial cultural diversity q/N (left chart, q/N=0.1) and a multicultural phase
for high values of q/N (right chart, q/N=5). The center chart (q/N=1) represents an anomalous state
that is present only in some realizations. Each color represents the cultural group that owns the
node. Empty cells are represented in black. Here has been taken L=30, h=0.05 and T=0.8.
Hence, as mobility allows contacts with virtually anybody, the increase of the population size
enhances the tendency towards cultural globalization, and the monocultural (ordered) phase
extends up to higher values of the parameter q. The critical value qc of the transition between
consensus and a disordered multicultural phase diverges with the system size qc ∼ N , so that
in the thermodynamical limit only global cultural states are possible for a small density h of
empty sites.
We will focuss hereafter on larger values of the density h of empty sites, a regime where
the cultural dynamics shows strikingly different features. At very low values of the initial
cultural diversity q (so that cultural convergence is strongly favored), the asymptotic states are
characterized by low values of the order parameter 〈Smax〉/N . The reason for the absence of
cultural globalization in this regime is the existence of disconnected monocultural domains,
a fact that requires values of the density 1 − h of cultural agents at least close to (or below)
the site percolation threshold value for the square lattice (0.593). In Fig. 7.4 we plot the order
parameter versus the density h of empty sites, for three different values of q/N , intolerance
T = 0.7, and linear lattice size L = 30. For the largest value of q/N = 4.0 corresponding
to the culturally disordered regime, the order parameter is rather insensitive to the h values.
This is also the case for q/N = 1.1, a value representative of the cultural globalization regime.
However, for the lowest value of q/N = 0.5, we observe the decrease of the order parameter
when 1− h takes on values close to the site percolation threshold, signaling the appearance of
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Figure 7.3: Order parameter 〈Smax〉/N versus scaled initial cultural diversity q/N for an inter-
mediate value of the density of empty sites h = 0.5. Panel (a) corresponds to a high value of the
intolerance T = 0.7, and different lattice linear sizes L = 20, 30, 40, 50, while in panel (b)
L = 40, and different values of the intolerance T = 0.2, 0.4, 0.7, 0.9 are used. See the text for
further details.
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Figure 7.4: Order parameter 〈Smax〉/N versus density h of empty sites, for three different values
of the scaled initial cultural diversity q/N = 0.5, 1.1, 4.0, T = 0.7, and linear lattice size L = 30.
the fragmented multicultural regime. This new kind of macroscopic multicultural state is thus
of a very different nature from the ”genuine” multicultural phase of the original Axelrod model
(h = 0). Though cultural convergence is locally achieved inside each geometrical cluster, the
absence of contacts between clusters makes impossible the existence of globalization. The
values of the order parameter in this fragmented phase, represented in Fig. 7.3a as a function
of q/N with h = 0.5 and T = 0.7 and for several values of L, decrease with increasing lattice
size, and the expectation is that the order parameter vanishes in the thermodynamical limit,
because the largest cluster size below percolation should be independent of the lattice size.
Left chart of figure 7.5 shows the cultural distribution of this new multicultural fragmented
phase, next to the phases of original Axelrod Model.
The increase in q from the very small values that correspond to the fragmented multicultural
phase has the seemingly paradoxical effect of increasing the order parameter 〈Smax〉/N values,
i.e., the increase of the initial cultural disorder promotes cultural globalization. To understand
this peculiar behavior, one must consider the effect of the increase of q in the initial mobility
of the agents. One expects that the higher the value of q is, the lower the initial values of
the cultural overlap ωij among agents are, and then the higher the initial mobility of agents
should be. Under conditions of high mobility, the processes of local cultural convergence are
slower than the typical time scales for mobility, so that the agents can easily move before full
local consensus can be achieved, propagating their common features, and enhancing the social
influence among different clusters. In other words, the attainment of different local consensus
in disconnected domains is much less likely to occur, and one should expect the coarsening of
a dominant culture domain that reaches a higher size.
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Figure 7.5: Cultural distribution for a empty sites density above their percolation threshold. A
new multicultural fragmented phase appears for very low values of the initial cultural diversity
(left chart, q/N=0.1), in adition to the two phases of original Axelrod Model (the ordered phase
of center chart for q/N=1 and the disordered phase of right chart for q/N=5). Here has been taken
L=30, h=0.45 and T=0.8. Colors represent the cultural groups and black sites the empty cells.
A straightforward prediction of this argument is that one should observe higher values
of 〈Smax〉/N for higher values of the intolerance T , because agents mobility is an increasing
function of this parameter (see eq. (7.3)). The numerical results shown in Fig. 7.3b for different
values of T and h = 0.5 nicely confirm this prediction, in support of the consistency of the
previous argument. Interestingly, for very low values of T when mobility is not enhanced,
multiculturalism prevails for the whole range of q values. On the contrary, for high values of
the intolerance T , an almost full degree of cultural globalization is reached, as indicated by
the values 〈Smax〉/N ≃ 1 of the order parameter. In those final states almost all agents belong
to a single connected monocultural cluster. One should also note that, for fixed values of the
intolerance T and the density h of empty sites, the previous argument indicates that the relevant
variable for this transition is the initial cultural diversity q, and not q/N , so that the interval of
values of q/N that corresponds to the multicultural fragmented phase shrinks for increasing N
values.
To characterize the passage from the multicultural fragmented phase to global consensus
with increasing initial cultural diversity, we have computed the histograms of the values of
Smax/N at values of q where the order parameter increases, see Fig. 7.6. The histograms
display the bimodal characteristics of a first-order transition. In a fraction of realizations, the
transient mobility is able to spread social influence among the clusters so that global consensus
is finally reached. This fraction increases with q, to the expense of the fraction of realizations
where fragmented multiculturality is reached. Note that no significant change of shape and
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Figure 7.6: Histograms of the values of Smax/N , nearby the transition from the fragmented mul-
ticultural phase to globalization, for 9. × 103 realizations at (from left to right and top to bottom)
q = 100, 150, 250, 400, for L = 30, h = 0.5, and T = 0.7. The histograms display the
characteristic behavior of a discontinuous (first order) phase transition.
position of the corresponding part of the histogram is noticeable, apart from its progressive
reduction to lower volumes, when q increases.
Further increase of the initial cultural diversity q enhances the likelihood of agents sharing
no cultural feature with anybody else in the finite population. The presence of these culturally
”alien” agents decreases the value of the order parameter and the increase of their number
with q is concomitant with the transition to multiculturality in the original Axelrod model (as
well as here, for finite populations). We see in Fig. 7.3b that the increase of the intolerance
parameter T shifts this transition to higher values of q/N , in agreement with the enhancement
of the convergence to globalization that T produces via mobility, as discussed above. Each
alien agent has, at all times, a mobility mi = 1, and the average mobility cannot decrease
in time to zero value when they appear. In other words, the asymptotic states of the cultural
dynamics are no longer characterized by m = 0. The time evolution of the average mobility m
for particular realizations at h = 0.5, T = 0.7, L = 30 and different values of q/N is shown
in Fig 7.7. The value of q/N beyond which the stationary average mobility is larger than zero
signals the appearance of these alien cultural agents.
In addition, the restless character of the alien agents has an important effect on the geometry
of the dominant culture, namely its erosion. As an illustrative example, let us consider the
situation represented in the inset of Fig. 7.8, in which an agent i of the dominant culture is
placed at the frontier of a cluster, having a single neighbor of his kind, and assume that an alien
agent j has moved recently to one of the empty neighboring sites of i. When agent i is chosen
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Figure 7.7: Average mobility m versus time t for h = 0.5, L = 30, T = 0.7 and different values
of the scaled initial culture diversity q/N as indicated. Unlike the other figures, in this case each
curve represents the results of a single realization. See the text for further details.
for an elementary dynamical step, there is a probability 1/2 of choosing agent j for an imitation
trial. As ωij = 0, and then ω¯i = 1/2, the agent i will move from there to a randomly chosen
empty site whenever the intolerance parameter is T > 1/2. We see that, for this particular
situation, the erosion of the dominant culture cluster will occur with probability one half.
Note that the erosion of the dominant culture cluster does not change the size Smax of the
dominant culture. It simply breaks it up into separate domains, some of them consisting of
single (isolated) individuals. These isolated members of the dominant culture will eventually
adhere to domains, to be at a later time again exposed to erosion, and so on. Therefore the
shape and number of domains of the dominant culture (as well as that of the other ones),
fluctuate forever. The number nD0 of isolated dominant culture agents reaches a stationary
value that results from the balance between erosive and adhesive processes. To quantify the
strength of the eroding activity of cultural minorities we show in Fig. 7.8 the stationary value
of the averaged fraction 〈 nD0Smax 〉 of isolated individuals of the dominant culture versus the scaled
initial cultural diversity, for h = 0.5, T = 0.7, and L = 30. Soon after the transition from the
fragmented multicultural phase to globalization occurs, erosion increases dramatically, largely
contributing to the large values of the stationary mobility m that characterize the multicultural
states in the model here introduced.
Figure 7.9 shows the order parameter Smax/N versus intolerance T, for a scaled diversity
initial q/N = 1.1 and different densities of empty sites h. This value of q/N is high enough
to avoid cultural globalization in the Axelrod limit, but low enough to allow the overlap. There
exists a threshold of intolerance Tc, below which the order parameter is Smax/N ≈ 0. If
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Figure 7.8: Cultural minorities continuously erode the dominant culture domain, that breaks into
separate domains and isolated individuals. As a quantitative measure of this erosion phenomenon
we plot here the stationary value of the averaged fraction nD0 /Smax of isolated individuals of the
dominant culture versus q/N , for h = 0.5, T = 0.7, and L = 30. The inset shows an illustrative
configuration where erosion can take place.
T < Tc the mobility is low and can not promote cultural convergence. Although empty sites
enhance mobility, paradoxically it is found that Tc increases with h. The explanation for this
phenomenon is that the influence of h on the mobility is small, but the increase of h implies
a decrease of N, therefore also a decrease of q if q/N had been fixed. This in turn implies
a increase of mean overlap ωi, a decrease of mobility mi and finally the incerase of Tc as
observed. For low values of h, if T > Tc the order parameter is found Smax/N ≈ 1, that is,
above a critical value of mobility the system reaches monocultural state. By contrast, when h
is high enough to allow the formation of site clusters, it can be seen a discontinuous behavior:
Now a node can have m = 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4 neighbors, and Smax(T ) presents steps for T=n/m.
7.4 Theorical analysis
Let i be a node of dominant culture D, and κ its number of links to his cultural domain. If i has
an allien neighbor of culture O, every time step the probability Psu for i to stay unchanged, ie,
to preserve his features and rest in D-group is:
Psu =
k + (1− ωDO)H(k+ωDOk+1 − T )
k + 1
, (7.5)
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Figure 7.9: Order parameter Smax/N versus intolerance T, for differents values of h, q/N=1.1 and
L=30. The shape corresponds to discrete and continuous aspects of the algorithm. Results have
been averaged for 103 different initial conditions. See the text for further details.
where H represents the Heaviside function. The probability Psc for i to change, that is, to leave
the group D is:
Psc =
ωDO
k + 1
, (7.6)
and the probability Psu for i to move is:
Pm =
1− ωDO
k + 1
H(T − k − ωDO
k + 1
) , (7.7)
From now on, we deal with stationary state, and therefore we take ωDO = 0.
In order to calculate an estimate of nD0 , we consider:
nu: number of D-agents exposed to real erosion, ie, having an allien-neighbour they belong
to a D-cluster with at least three elements. nu is the sum of nodes like that, with κ links to
D-agents:
nu =
∑3
κ=1 n
u(κ).
nu2 : D-agents exposed to erosion that belong to a 2-agents domain.
nE : number of empty sites adjacent to a D-domain.
HD0 : number of empty sites adjacent to isolated D-agents.
We take into account the useful time step, ie, we only consider a step when a event occurs.
That only implies a time translation and does not affect fixed points. We study the most likely
events of erosion and adhesion:
• a1: Simple adhesion event: nD0 → nD0 − 1 , ∆Nu ≥ 0 ,
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• e1: Simple erosion event: nD0 → nD0 + 1 , ∆Nu = −1 ,
• a2: Double adhesion event: nD0 → nD0 − 2 ,
• e2: Double erosion event: nD0 → nD0 + 2 ,
and, their respectives probabilities are:
P (a1) =
nD0 n
E
hL2(n0 + nD0 + n
u)
,
P (e1) =
(
1− n
E
hL2
) 1
n0 + nD0 + n
u
3∑
κ=1
nU (κ)
1
κ+ 1
H
(
T − κ
κ+ 1
)
,
P (a2) ≃ n
D
0
n0 + nD0 + n
u
HD0
hL2
,
P (e1) =
(
1− n
E
hL2
)nU2 12H(T − 12)
n0 + nD0 + n
u
.
(7.8)
A necessary condition for equilibrium is:
P (a1) + 2P (a2) = P (e1) + 2P (e2)
(7.9)
Therefore, under this assumptions (we are not taking into account all possible events), we
can replace 7.8 in 7.9 to estimate nD0 :
T < 1/2 : nD0 = 0 ,
1/2 < 2/3 : nD0 =
(hL2 − ne −HD0 )(nu(1) + nu2)
2(nE +HD0 )
,
2/3 < 3/4 : nD0 =
(hL2 − ne −HD0 )(12nu(1) + 13nu(2) + 12nu2
nE +HD0
,
T ≥ 3/4 : nD0 =
(hL2 − ne −HD0 )(12nu(1) + 13nu(2) + 14nu(3) + 12nu2
nE +HD0
(7.10)
Figure 7.10 shows the comparison between theorical estimate for the isolated dominant
culture agents nD0 and experimental results. As one can see, although theory underestimates
the value of isolated agents, adjustment is quite good. The explanation for this deviation is
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Figure 7.10: Isolated dominant culture agents nD0 versus the scaled initial cultural diversity q/N ,
for T=0.8, h=0.3 and L=30. Circles represent simulation results for 104 realizations, and lines
theorical estimation.
that we have ignored some kinds of events. However, nD0 estimate is rooted not only in system
parameters, but also in other observables related to the spatial distribution (perimeter, location
of aliens), so that rather than a prediction is a check of the analytical method.
7.5 Conclusions
We have introduced a model of cultural dynamics in which agents can move driven by cultural
dissimilarities with their environments, at the style of the Schelling model of urban segregation.
The introduction of agents mobility through this segregation mechanism into the Axelrod cul-
tural dynamics leads to an enhancement of the convergence to cultural globalization for small
densities of empty sites, so that the behavior of the order parameter (i.e., the relative size of
the dominant culture) scales with the number N of cultural agents. That is, the transition to
multiculturalism only occurs for finite populations.
Furthermore, for larger densities of empty sites, when cultural agents cannot percolate the
lattice, a new type of multicultural fragmented phase appears at low values of the initial cultural
diversity q. Though the initial cultural overlap is enough to trigger the local cultural conver-
gence inside each geometrical cluster of agents, cultural globalization is no longer possible
due to the lack of cultural transmission between monocultural isolated domains. Provided the
values of the intolerance T are high enough, this regime is followed by a new transition to
globalization for increasing values of q, that is triggered by the increase in the initial mobility.
Moreover, in the genuine Axelrod transition from global consensus to polarization, the shape
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and number of cultural domains are here dynamically fluctuating by the competitive balance of
erosive and adhesive processes associated to the agents mobility.
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Chapter 8
Selective advantage of tolerant
cultural traits in the Axelrod-Schelling
model.
In the previous chapter 7 we introduced the Axelrod-Schelling model, that incorporates into the
original Axelrod’s model of cultural dissemination the possibility that cultural agents placed
in culturally dissimilar environments move to other places, the strength of this mobility being
controlled by an intolerance parameter. By allowing heterogeneity in the intolerance of cultural
agents, and considering it as a cultural feature, i.e., susceptible of cultural transmission (thus
breaking the original symmetry of Axelrod-Schelling dynamics), we address here the question
of whether tolerant or intolerant traits are more likely to become dominant in the long term
cultural dynamics. Our results show that tolerant traits possess a clear selective advantage in
the framework of the Axelrod-Schelling model. We show that the reason for this selective
advantage is the development, as time evolves, of a positive correlation between the number of
neighbors that an agent has in its environment and its tolerant character.
8.1 Introduction
In the Axelrod-Schelling model introduced in chapter 7, we focused on mobility, considering
the driving force of mobility is the agents’ cultural dissimilarity with their environment, i.e.,
homophile (dis)satisfaction, the same that drives cultural transmission. Starting from the Ax-
elrod model for culture dissemination and the residential segregation model of Schelling, two
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new parameters where introduced, namely the density h of empty lattice sites (places that are
available to moving agents), and an intolerance parameter T that controls the strength of the
mobility: If an attempt to cultural interaction (imitation) fails, then the agent i moves to a ran-
domly chosen empty lattice site if its mean cultural similarity ω¯i < T . T here is a threshold
for tolerance, in such a way that high values of T characterize intolerant societies.
In this chapter, we extend the Axelrod-Schelling model by considering intolerance T as
a cultural feature, and then it is no longer a parameter (a property of the whole population)
but an individual property of agents subjected to cultural transmission. Due to its influence on
the dynamics through the rule of mobility, the question of whether or not certain traits of this
feature are more likely to be present in the dominant culture makes sense, contrary to what
occurs with the rest of cultural features, whose particular traits do not influence the dynamics,
and are thus selectively neutral.
We have performed extensive numerical simulations that implement different rules for the
mobility of agents, whose results show unambiguously that tolerant traits possess a selective
advantage over intolerant ones, i.e., they are better adapted for survival in the long term dy-
namics. Furthermore, by a stochastic analysis we present arguments showing that the reason
of this cultural evolutionary success of tolerant traits is the establishment in the population of
a negative correlation between the number ki of neighboring agents, and the value Ti of the
agent intolerance. This is presented in section 8.3. Before, in section 8.2, we reconsider the
transition between fragmented multiculturalism and globalization, first analyzed in chapter 7,
by using an alternative scheme for mobility with homogeneous intolerance. This new scheme
corresponds to the homogeneous version of one of the rules of mobility used in section 8.3
(mobility by social rejection), so that this helps in the interpretation of some of these results,
and at the same time, it throws a new light on the understanding of the mechanisms triggering
this transition. Finally, we summarize our results in the concluding chapter 10.
8.2 The transition from fragmented multiculturalism to globaliza-
tion revisited
One of the new phenomena that appear associated to the mixed Axelrod-Schelling social dy-
namics is the existence, for values of the density (1−h) of agents below the lattice percolation
threshold, of a multicultural macroscopic phase at very low values of the initial cultural diver-
sity q. In this regime, the processes of local cultural convergence are faster that the typical time
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scales at which mobility is able to induce global convergence to a monocultural state. In this
multicultural state agents are aggregated into disconnected (monocultural) clusters where dif-
ferent cultural consensus have been achieved. Hence the name fragmented for this multicultural
phase.
If the value of q is increased (see figure 1a), the behavior for the order parameter 〈Smax〉/N ,
becomes rather sensitive to the value of the intolerance parameter T : For very low values of
T multiculturalism persists, while for very high values, a first order transition to complete
globalization is observed. At intermediate values of T , the order parameter increases versus
q but complete globalization is not reached. The observation that the increase of the initial
cultural diversity promotes cultural globalization may seem paradoxical at a first sight, but it
is not difficult to rationalize it by noting that an increase in q has also the effect of enhancing
mobility, which is in turn an important driving force towards globalization. Moreover, insofar
as higher values of T enhance agents’ mobility, the different behaviors that are observed for
different values of the intolerance are consistent with this interpretation.
To deepen further our current understanding of the complex competing effects of different
parameter variations that lead to the transition fragmented multiculturalism-globalization, we
study here this transition in a different scheme for the mobility of cultural agents. We remind
here that in the original scheme of chapter 7, after an elementary step of the Axelrod dynamics,
if imitation has not occurred and ωij 6= 1, the agent i moves to a randomly chosen empty site
whenever ω¯i < T . If the agent i turns out to be isolated, then it moves with certainty. We refer
hereafter to this scheme as A. The mobility mi of an agent i is defined as the probability that it
moves in one elementary dynamical step (provided it has been chosen). Thus in the scheme A:
mAi = (1− ω¯i) Θ(T − ω¯i) , (8.1)
where Θ(x) is the Heaviside step function, that takes the value 1 if x > 0, and 0 if x ≤ 0.
In the new scheme, hereafter referred to as B, after an elementary step of the Axelrod
dynamics, if imitation has not occurred and ωij 6= 1, the agent i moves to a randomly chosen
empty site with probability (1 − ω¯i) T . In the case that agent i is isolated, then it moves with
certainty, as in the previous scheme. The mobility of agent i in the scheme B is thus given by
mBi = (1− ω¯i)2 T . (8.2)
As shown in the figure 8.2, in both schemes the mobility is a decreasing function of ω¯.
However in the scheme A the mobility vanishes in the interval ω¯ > T (being independent on
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Figure 8.1: Order parameter 〈Smax〉/N versus scaled initial cultural diversity q/N for a density
of empty sites h = 0.5 and lattice linear size L = 40. Panel (a) corresponds to scheme A for
different values of the intolerance parameter. Panel (b) corresponds to scheme B. See the text for
further details.
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Figure 8.2: Mobility mi for a node i as a function of his mean overlap ω¯i in schemes A and B. In
the scheme A the mobility vanishes for ω¯ > T . Otherwise, whenever ω¯ 6= 1 and T > 0, it does not
vanish in the scheme B.
T for ω¯ < T ), while it does not vanish in the scheme B, provided ω¯ 6= 1 (and T > 0), though
it takes lower values than in the scheme A for ω¯ < T where it depends linearly on T .
In figure 8.1(b) we plot the order parameter versus the scaled initial cultural diversity q/N
for h = 0.5 and different values of the intolerance T , for the scheme B and a two-dimensional
square lattice geometry. In contrast with the results for the scheme A (shown in figure 8.1(a)),
the behavior of the order parameter turns out to be rather insensitive to the values of the in-
tolerance T , and the transition from the fragmented multicultural phase to globalization takes
place for all the values of T that we have used. How to fit these observations into the interpre-
tation framework given in chapter 7 (succintly reproduced above in a previous paragraph) for
the transition?
To have a better picture of the speed at which the processes of cultural convergence take
place and what parameters are more influential on them, we have inspected the time evolution
of the histograms of ω¯, namely P (ω¯, t), at values of the initial cultural diversity close (below
and above) to the transition. In all cases and for both schemes, this probability density evolves
always from being sharply concentrated near ω¯ = 0 at t = 0, to become later widespread,
the centroid shifting to progressively higher values of ω¯ as time goes by, until it concentrates
near ω¯ = 1, finally becoming a Dirac delta function δ(ω¯ − 1). The time scale at which this
evolution occurs seems not to be influenced by the scheme (A or B) adopted and the influence
of the value of T is also minor. The important parameter that mainly determines the time scale
of local cultural convergence is the initial cultural diversity q: The lower its value the faster
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this process takes place. Then, what makes a truly meaningful difference between, on one side,
both scheme A at high T values and scheme B at all T values and, on the other side, scheme
A at low T values (where the transition to globalization is absent), is that agents with high
cultural overlap do not move in the latter.
These results throw a new light over the mechanisms that trigger the transition from the
fragmented multicultural phase to cultural globalization. The increase of the initial cultural
diversity slows down the local cultural convergence, giving then a chance to mobility to induce
global cultural consensus. But it is the mobility of agents with a significant high local cultural
overlap (however small its mobility could be, as it is the case for the scheme B at low T values),
and not just the amount of overall mobility, what allows the effective cultural transmission
among the disconnected clusters of the fragmented states so making possible the coalescence
of the giant monocultural cluster characteristic of the globalization state. If mobility is strictly
limited to culturally marginal agents, its power of cultural transmission is unable to overcome
the fragmentation into disconnected cultural clusters.
8.3 Heterogeneous intolerance.
As we have already mentioned in the introductory section, the mobility of cultural agents in the
Axelrod-Schelling model is driven by the same utility (or social driving force) that underlies
the cultural dynamics of the Axelrod model (as well as the dynamics of the Schelling model),
namely ”homophile satisfaction”. In the model, those agents that are placed inside fully ho-
mogeneous cultural environments don’t move. Cultural dissimilarities are the only source of
mobility, and the parameter T , that controls the strength of mobility, quantifies the degree
of (in)tolerance to cultural dissimilarities. Being a model parameter, tolerance is a quantity
characteristic of the whole (artificial) society. In other words, in this context one can speak
of tolerant (low value of T ) or intolerant societies. However, it seems to us rather natural
to consider (artificial) societies where different agents have different degrees of tolerance to
cultural dissimilarities. This certainly opens the possibility of new interesting questions to be
investigated inside the model.
In what follows, we consider that each cultural agent i has assigned a real number 0 ≤
Ti ≤ 1, called intolerance. Moreover, we are going to consider the intolerance of agents as
a quantity associated to a cultural feature, i.e. a component of the cultural vector, and then
subjected to temporal changes as a result of cultural interactions. Without loss of generality,
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one can associate the agents’ intolerance to the first component σ1 of the cultural vector {σf}.
As this variable takes on integer (0, 1, ..., q − 1) values, one has to choose some function f(x)
that takes values in the interval [0, 1], and define the intolerance Ti of agent i to be
Ti = f(σ1(i)) . (8.3)
Next we have to specify the particular way in which the agents’ intolerances enter into the
dynamical rules. Many alternatives can indeed be considered for it, and our first choice will be
the following: After an elementary step of the Axelrod dynamics, if imitation has not occurred
and ωij 6= 1, the agent i moves to a randomly chosen empty site with probability
1
ki
ki∑
j=1
(1− ωij)Tj , (8.4)
where the sum extends to the ki neighbors of i, and if the agent i is isolated (ki = 0) it moves
with certainty. In this choice, the intolerance thetaj of a cultural agent j is seen as its degree of
hostility towards a culturally dissimilar neighbor i, and is weighted by the cultural dissimilarity
(1 − ωij). The mobility of an agent i is here the result of the social rejection of its neighbors,
due to cultural dissimilarities.
The Axelrod-Schelling model with homogeneous tolerance, as the original Axelrod’s model
does, assumes an unbiased scenario in the sense that the traits of a cultural feature are com-
pletely interchangeable: Nothing in the dynamical rules distinguishes among different traits,
and then the likelihood that each particular trait is present in the dominant culture of a realiza-
tion is the same for all of them, provided they are uniformly distributed in the initial conditions
for the dynamics. The particular traits that survive in the dominant culture of a given realization
reach fixation by neutral selection, so that averaging over many independent realizations, one
obtains a uniform distribution of traits in a large enough sample of dominant cultures.
However this symmetry of the model is broken in our current case of heterogeneous intoler-
ance regarding the cultural feature σ1, for its particular values do influence the local dynamics
through the dynamical rule of mobility. Then, the question of how likely are different traits to
prevail and be present in the dominant culture makes now sense in this new symmetry-breaking
scenario. Do tolerant traits possess a cultural selective advantage? or, on the contrary, are intol-
erant traits better adapted to survive? Moreover, by which dynamical mechanisms the ”natural”
selection of particular T values is built up in the time evolution of the populations of cultural
agents?
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Note that if one takes for f(x) in equation (8.3) a constant function, so that Ti = T inde-
pendent of i, one recovers the scheme B introduced in the previous section 8.2. In the extent
that the behavior of the order parameter 〈Smax〉/N (for a density of empty sites h = 0.5) in
scheme B was seen to be rather insensitive to the value of T , one should expect in the present
case of heterogeneous intolerance, that the order parameter for a density of empty sites h = 0.5
will be as shown in figure 8.1(b). Thus the choice made above in equation (8.4) is technically
convenient for the purpose of investigating the question on the selective advantage of tolerant
traits, just because it is expected that it leads to states of cultural globalization in some ranges
of the initial cultural diversity, when the very term ”dominant culture” is most meaningful.
We consider two-dimensional square lattices of linear size L, with periodic boundary con-
ditions. The number F of cultural features is fixed to F = 10, and we have used two values
of the density of empty sites, namely h = 0.05, representative of the situation in which agents
percolate the lattice, and h = 0.5 as representative of the opposite case. For f(x) we will
consider a simple linear function:
Ti = q
−1σ1(i) . (8.5)
For the initial conditions, N = (1− h)L2 agents are randomly distributed on the L×L lattice
sites and randomly assigned a culture. The simulation of the cultural dynamics is stopped when
the number of links for which 0 < ωij < 1, commonly called active links, vanishes. Besides
the order parameter, we compute the intolerance TD of the dominant culture, the average intol-
erance 〈T 〉, and sometimes, the histogram of intolerance values of the final state. The results
that we show below are obtained by averaging over a large number (typically 103 − 104) of
different initial conditions.
In the two panels of Figure 8.3 we show our numerical results for h = 0.05 (panel a) and
h = 0.5 (panel b). First, we confirm the expectations on the behavior of the order parameter
discussed above: Given the insensitive character of the order parameter in the scheme B to the
value of the intolerance parameter T for both values of h, no effect on 〈Smax〉/N due to the
heterogeneity of agents’ intolerance is observed.
The numerical results for the intolerance values TD of the dominant culture for both values
of the density of empty sites clearly show that very tolerant traits are better adapted to survive
and become a part of the dominant culture. This occurs in the whole range of values of the
initial cultural diversity that leads to values of the order parameter much larger than N−1 (so
as the term dominant possess a meaning). By comparing the graphs of TD shown in Figs. 8.3a
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Figure 8.3: Order parameter 〈Smax〉/N (stars), intolerance TD of the dominant culture (circles),
and average intolerance 〈T 〉 (squares) versus scaled initial cultural diversity q/N for a lattice linear
size L = 40, for the scheme of mobility corresponding to equation (8.4). Panel (a) corresponds
to a density of empty sites h = 0.05. Panel (b) corresponds to h = 0.5. See the text for further
details.
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Figure 8.4: Comparison of TD and 〈T 〉 for L = 40 and L = 100, h = 0.5 and the same mobility
rule used in Fig 8.3.
and 8.3b, we observe that the TD values are significantly lower for h = 0.5 than for h = 0.05,
so that the strength of the selective advantage of tolerant traits increases when the density h
of empty sites is higher. The fact that the average intolerance 〈T 〉 of the final configurations
is higher than TD, provided the order parameter N−1 ≪ 〈Smax〉/N < 1, indicates that the
non-dominant surviving values of the intolerance are typically larger than the dominant one.
We further show in Fig. 8.4 that the results regarding the behavior of TD and 〈T 〉 for L = 40,
are essentially unchanged for lattice of size 100× 100.
In Fig. 8.5 we show the histogram of TD values, obtained from 2 × 103 realizations, at
fixed value of q/N = 1.1, for a density of empty sites h = 0.05. One should note that though
the mean value of the dominant intolerance is at TD = 0.07, the probability density is sharply
peaked at TD = 0 and quickly decays to negligible values as TD increases. In other words,
the lower the value of TD, the more probable, so that the mean value is only indicative of the
dispersion scale of the density.
In order to explain why tolerant traits are better adapted to prevail in the long term of the
dynamics, let us consider the subset A(T, t) of those cultural agents i for which, at time t,
Ti ≤ T , where T is an arbitrarily chosen value of the intolerance (e.g., T = 0.3 or more, or
less). Let us denote by n(T, t) the cardinal of A(T, t), and call L(T, t) the set of lattice links
(i, j), such that the agent i belongs to A(T, t) and the agent j is not in this set (so Tj > T ). If
time is measured in elementary step units, the difference
∆n(T, t) = n(T, t+ 1)− n(T, t) (8.6)
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Figure 8.5: Histogram of the values of the intolerance TD of the dominant culture for 2 × 103
realizations, at scaled initial cultural diversity q/N = 1.1, and a density h = 0.05 of empty sites.
See the text for further details.
can only take on the values 0,±1. To compute the probability P+ that ∆n(T, t) takes on the
value +1, one has to sum over all links (i, j) ∈ L(T, t) the product of the following factors:
a) the probability (N−1) of choosing agent j for a cultural imitation trial,
b) the probability (k−1j ) that its neighbor i is chosen,
c) the probability (ωij) that agent j imitates an uncommon feature’s trait of i, and
d) the probability
(
1
(1−ωij)F
)
that the chosen uncommon feature is σ1.
Note that for a link (i, j) in the set L(T, t), the strict inequality ωij < 1 holds. Then we
obtain
P+ =
1
NF
∑
(i,j)∈L(T,t)
1
kj
ωij
(1− ωij) . (8.7)
In a similar way, the probability P− that ∆n(T, t) takes on the value −1 is
P− =
1
NF
∑
(i,j)∈L(T,t)
1
ki
ωij
(1− ωij) . (8.8)
We see that the number of agents in the set A(T, t) performs a complicated random walk
with left- and right-step probabilities changing in time as dictated by the model dynamics. The
expected value of ∆n(T, t) is given by the difference (P+ − P−), then
E[∆n(T, t)] =
1
NF
∑
(i,j)∈L(T,t)
(ki − kj)
kikj
ωij
(1− ωij) . (8.9)
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This equation is the basis for an understanding of the selective advantage of tolerant traits.
Indeed, following equation (8.4), agents with high Ti values promote the mobility of their
neighbors (leaving empty sites in their neighborhoods) more than tolerant agents do, so that one
should expect that a negative correlation between values of ki and Ti may be easily developed in
the population, and tolerant agents may likely have larger values of ki than those of intolerant
agents. If this is the case, then equation (8.9) indicates that the random walk performed by
n(T, t) will be biased to the right, and the number of tolerant agents will likely increase as time
evolves. The cultural selective advantage of tolerant traits has its origin on the bias produced by
the negative correlation degree-intolerance (ki, Ti) that is directly induced by the dynamical
rule of social rejection.
The equation (8.9) allows also to rationalize the observation that the selective advantage of
tolerant traits is strengthened by higher values of the density h of empty sites, because higher
h values easily allow for higher values of the degree differences (ki − kj) for (i, j) ∈ L(T, t),
and so the bias favoring the increase of n(T, t) can be stronger.
We have also considered a second way in which agents’ intolerance enter into the mobility
rule of the dynamics: After an elementary step of the Axelrod dynamics, if imitation has not
occurred and ωij 6= 1, the agent i moves to a randomly chosen empty site provided
ω¯i < Ti . (8.10)
Note that if one takes for f(x) in equation (8.3) a constant function, so that Ti = T indepen-
dent of i, one recovers the scheme A for homogeneous intolerance, that was used in chapter
7: Intolerance value is a threshold for the cultural overlap. But there is also here an impor-
tant difference with respect to equation (8.4) regarding the interpretation, or meaning, of the
intolerance. In (8.10) what determines whether an agent i moves or not, is its own intolerance
value Ti, instead of that of its neighbors, as in the previous case. Though both dynamical rules
are based on homophile dissatisfaction, they in fact implement different plausible mechanisms
for mobility. Whether the average social rejection (hostility) of my neighbors is more impor-
tant than my own degree of tolerance with a dissimilar environment or not, in the decision of
moving, may be a question with widely different (as well as context-dependent) individual an-
swers, and it is certainly not inside the scope of this work to enter into such a discussion. We
regard here both as alternative plausible mechanisms for mobility, which may lead to differ-
ences regarding the selective advantage of tolerant traits in the Axelrod-Schelling model with
heterogeneous intolerance.
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Figure 8.6: Order parameter 〈Smax〉/N (stars), intolerance TD of the dominant culture (circles),
and average intolerance 〈T 〉 (squares) versus scaled initial cultural diversity q/N for a lattice linear
size L = 40, for the scheme of mobility corresponding to equation (8.10). Panel (a) corresponds
to a density of empty sites h = 0.05. Panel (b) corresponds to h = 0.5. See the text for further
details.
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Figure 8.7: Time evolution of the average number of neighbors per agent 〈k〉 and average intoler-
ance 〈T 〉, for q/N = 1, L = 40 and h = 0.5 as obtained from 200 realizations in the scheme of
equation (8.10).
Figure 8.8: Time evolution of the tolerance distribution when the density of empty sites is below
their percolation threshold in a representative realization. Each cell represents a node. The color
code is a quasi-continuum, from blue for tolerant nodes to red for intolerant ones. Left chart
represents the initial conditions, center charts the intermediate states and the right one the stationary
state. Here has been taken L=30, h=0.05.
Figure 8.9: Time evolution of the tolerance distribution when the density of empty sites is above
their percolation threshold in a representative realization. Codes are the same that in figure 8.8.
L=30, h=0.5.
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We show in figure 8.6 the results obtained for the dynamical rule associated to equation
(8.10). Though the values of TD are in this scheme higher than those characteristic of the
scheme analyzed before, certain degree of selective advantage of tolerant traits is unambigu-
ously observed. Also, the selective advantage is stronger for high density h of empty sites,
as before. Now, however, agents move depending on their own intolerance values, and then
it is not (at least) as clear as before that a negative correlation degree-intolerance could be
established, which would in turn explain the selective advantage of tolerant traits.
A possibility for this comes from the fact that intolerant agents move to empty sites more
easily than tolerant agents do, so that a negative (ki, Ti) correlation could appear provided
the lattice sites occupied by agents are more likely to have agents in their neighborhood than
empty sites are. To check for this, we have computed the time evolution of the average number
of neighbors 〈k〉 of agents. Figure 8.7 shows that, after some (long) transient, the average
degree of agents increases above its initial value (that is 〈k〉 = 4(1−h), for a square lattice and
von Neumann neighborhood). This increase of 〈k〉 corresponds to the coalescence of clusters
that will become monocultural in due (short) time. Interestingly, we also see in figure 8.6
the decrease of the average intolerance 〈T 〉 as soon as the average degree increases, so giving
further support to the argument.
Consequently, also in the case that the agents’ mobility is the result of their own intolerance
to cultural dissimilarity, the tolerant traits possess selective advantage due to the establishment
of a negative (ki, Ti) correlation which in this case has its origin in the agents’ aggregation
processes concomitant to the increase of local cultural overlaps. The observed fact that the
selective advantage of tolerant traits is now weaker than in the case when mobility is induced by
social rejection, may likely be the effect of two confluent factors; on one hand, the development
of a negative degree-intolerance correlation is not now a direct consequence of the dynamical
rule, and on the other, as analyzed in previous section 8.2, agents’ aggregation processes are
much less effective when intolerance enter as a threshold for mobility.
8.4 Summary and concluding remarks.
In the Axelrod-Schelling model for cultural dissemination among mobile agents, we have
considered the intolerance, that was originally (chapter 7) a model parameter controlling the
strength of agents’ mobility, as a variable associated to a cultural feature, and thus subjected to
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cultural transmission. We have performed extensive numerical simulations for two different dy-
namical rules for mobility, whose respective homogeneous versions are analyzed with respect
to the transition from topologically fragmented local consensus to global cultural consensus
that occurs at very low values of the initial cultural diversity. In the first of these dynami-
cal rules (mobility by social rejection) agents move due to the intolerance of their neighbors,
weighted by their cultural dissimilarity, while in the second one the mobility depends on the
agent’s own intolerance to the cultural dissimilarity with its environment. In both cases our
results indicate that tolerant traits are selectively advantageous, so that the intolerance values
present in the dominant culture are preferentially low. One then sees how the breaking of the
original symmetry (indifference of the dynamics respect to particular feature’s trait values, that
leads to purely neutral selection of dominant characters in cultural evolution) effectively allows
for the appearance of natural selection of advantageous traits.
The selective advantage of tolerant traits increases with the density h of empty lattice sites,
and is also higher for the first scheme, where mobility is the result of the social rejection from
the neighborhood. A stochastic analysis allows the rationalization of all these numerical obser-
vations, and points to the dynamical development of a negative correlation between the number
of neighbors of an agent and its intolerance value as the origin of the selective advantage of
tolerant traits. We should emphasize here that regarding the rule of cultural imitation, nothing
privileges tolerant traits over intolerant ones, i.e., Axelrod’s cultural interactions are completely
unbiased, so the bias towards tolerant traits can only come from the influence of the tolerance
cultural feature on the mobility of agents, that shapes the instantaneous network of interac-
tions among cultural agents. One should expect analogous findings for other network updating
dynamics as the one considered (in the symmetric context) by (166; 167), also showing topo-
logically fragmented phases, provided the trait symmetry is broken at the network updating
rule level.
In this regard, the term tolerance -in the context of the Axelrod-Schelling model- has a very
precise and narrow meaning, much more limited than its usual meaning in social science and
political philosophy, where it certainly means much more than just a conditioning factor of the
mobility of individuals and groups. However, inside the limitations of a simple agent based
model like this one, our findings on the ”adaptive to survival” character of tolerant traits in cul-
tural dynamics, point to basic mechanisms that can be highly influential in cultural evolution.
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Chapter 9
Co-evolutionnary network approach
to cultural dynamics controlled by
intolerance.
Starting from Axelrod’s model of cultural dissemination, we introduce a rewiring probability,
enabling agents to cut the links with their unfriendly neighbors if their cultural similarity is
below a tolerance parameter. For low values of tolerance, rewiring promotes the convergence
to a frozen monocultural state. However, intermediate tolerance values prevent rewiring once
the network is fragmented, resulting in a multicultural society even for values of initial cultural
diversity in which the original Axelrod model reaches globalization.
9.1 Introduction
The growing interest in the interdisciplinary physics of complex systems, has focussed physi-
cists’ attention on agent-based modeling (32; 156) of social dynamics, as a very attractive
methodological framework for social sciences where concepts and tools from statistical physics
turn out to be very appropriate (142) for the analysis of the collective behaviors emerging from
the social interactions of the agents. The dynamical social phenomena of interest include res-
idential segregation (52; 53), cultural globalization (59; 141), opinion formation (153; 168),
rumor spreading (155; 169) and others.
The question that motivates the formulation of Axelrod’s model for cultural dissemination
(59) is how cultural diversity among groups and individuals could survive despite the tenden-
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cies to become more and more alike as a result of social interactions. The model assumes a
highly non-biased scenario, where the culture of an agent is defined as a set of equally impor-
tant cultural features, whose particular values (traits) can be transmitted (by imitation) among
interacting agents. It also assumes that the driving force of cultural dynamics is the ”homophile
satisfaction”, the agents’ commitment to become more similar to their neighbors. Moreover,
the more cultural features an agent shares with a neighbor, the more likely the agent will imi-
tate an uncommon feature’s trait of the neighbor agent. In other words, the higher the cultural
similarity, the higher the social influence.
The simulations of the model dynamics show that for low initial cultural diversity, mea-
sured by the number q of different traits for each cultural feature (see below), the system
converges to a global cultural state, while for q above a critical value qc the system freezes
in an absorbing state where different cultures persist. The (non-equilibrium) phase transition
(110) between globalization and multiculturalism was first studied for a square planar geom-
etry (141; 143; 144), but soon other network structures of social links (145; 146; 152) were
considered, as well as the effects of different types of noise (”cultural drift”) (147; 148), exter-
nal fields (modeling e.g. influential media, or information feedback) (149; 150; 163; 164), and
global or local non-uniform couplings (151; 165).
In all those extensions of Axelrod’s model mentioned in the above paragraph, the cultural
dynamics occurs on a network of social contacts that is fixed from the outset. However, very
often social networks are dynamical structures that continuously reshape. A simple mechanism
of network reshaping is agents’ mobility, and a scenario (named the Axelrod-Schelling model)
where cultural agents placed in culturally dissimilar environments are allowed to move has
been analyzed in chapters 7 and 8. In this model, new interesting features of cultural evolution
appear depending on the values of a parameter, the (in-)tolerance, that controls the strength of
agents’ mobility.
A different mechanism of network reshaping has been considered in (166; 167), where a
cultural agent breaks its link to a completely dissimilar neighbor, redirecting it to a randomly
chosen agent. At variance with the mobility scenario of the Axelrod-Schelling model, that lim-
its the scope of network structures to clusters’ configurations on the starting structure (square
planar lattice, or others), the rewiring mechanism allows for a wider set of network structures
to emerge in the co-evolution of culture and social ties (170).
In this chapter we introduce in the scenario of network rewiring a tolerance parameter Z
controlling the likelihood of links rewiring, in such a way that the limit Z = 1− recovers
164
9.2 The model
the case analyzed in (166; 167), where only links with an associated null cultural overlap are
broken. Lower values of Z correspond to less tolerant attitudes where social links with progres-
sively higher values of the cultural overlap may be broken with some probability that depends
on these values. The results show a counterintuitive dependence of the tolerance Z on the
critical value qc. On one hand, as expected from (166; 167), rewiring promotes globalization
for high values of the tolerance, but on the other hand, very low values of Z (which enhance
the rewiring probability) show the higher values of qc. Indeed, a non monotonous behavior is
observed in qc(Z): Our results unambiguously show that for some intermediate values of the
tolerance Z, cultural globalization is disfavored with respect to the original Axelrod’s model
where no rewiring of links is allowed. In other words, rewiring does not always promote glob-
alization. On the other hand, the resulting network topology depends on q, changing from a
Poisson connectivity distribution P (k) to a fat tailed distribution for q ∼ qc.
9.2 The model
As in Axelrod’s model, the culture of an agent i is a vector of F integer variables {σf (i)}
(f = 1, ..., F ), called cultural features, that can take on q values, σf (i) = 0, 1, ..., q − 1,
the cultural traits that the feature f can assume. The N cultural agents occupy the nodes
of a network of average degree 〈k〉 whose links define the social contacts among them. The
dynamics is defined, at each time step, as follows:
• Each agent i imitates an uncommon feature’s trait of a randomly chosen neighbor j with
a probability equal to their cultural overlap ωij , defined as the proportion of common
cultural features,
ωij =
1
F
F∑
f=1
δσf (i),σf (j), (9.1)
where δx,y denotes the Kronecker’s delta which is 1 if x = y and 0 otherwise. The whole
set of N agents perform this step in parallel.
• Each agent i disconnects its link with a randomly chosen neighbor agent j with prob-
ability equal to its dissimilarity 1 − ωij , provided the dissimilarity 1 − ωij exceeds a
threshold (tolerance) Z,
1− ωij > Z , (9.2)
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and rewires it randomly to other non-neighbor agent. The tolerance 0 ≤ Z ≤ 1 is a
model parameter.
First we note that the initial total number of links in the network is preserved in the rewiring
process, so the average degree 〈k〉 remains constant. However, the rewiring process allows
for substantial modifications of the network topological features, e.g. connectedness, degree
distribution, etc. In that respect, except for the limiting situation of very low initial cultural
diversity q and a very high tolerance Z (where the likelihood of rewiring could be very low),
one should expect that the choices for the initial network of social ties have no influence in the
asymptotic behavior of the dynamics.
When the threshold tolerance Z satisfies F−1F ≤ Z < 1, only those links among agents
with zero cultural overlap are rewired, so the model becomes the one studied in (166; 167). On
the other hand, when the tolerance takes the value Z = 1, there is not rewiring likelihood and
the original Axelrod’s model is recovered. When Z = 0 rewiring is always possible provided
the cultural similarity is not complete, i.e., ωij 6= 1, so that it corresponds to the highest
intolerance.
The usual order parameter for Axelrod’s model is 〈Smax〉/N , where 〈Smax〉 is the average
(over a large number of different random initial conditions) of the number of agents sharing
the most abundant (dominant) culture, and N is the number of agents in the population. Large
values of the order parameter characterize the globalization (cultural consensus) regime. We
also compute the normalized size 〈Stop〉/N of the largest network component (i.e., the largest
connected subgraph of the network).
9.3 Results and discussion
We have studied networks of sizes N = 900, 1600; averaging over 50 - 2000 replicas. Checks
for robustness of main results with larger size of N = 2500 were also made. The considered
cultural vectors have F = 10 cultural features, each one with a variability q = 5 - 10000.
We studied different values of the tolerance threshold Z ∈ (0, 1) and different values of the
average connectivity 〈k〉 = 4, 10, 20, 40. Each simulation is performed for N , F , 〈k〉, Z, and
q fixed. For the sake of comparison with previous results (166; 167), we will present results for
〈k〉 = 4.
The behavior of the order parameter for different values of Z is seen in Fig. 9.1. Like in
(166), three different macroscopic phases are observed with increasing values of q, namely a
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Figure 9.1: Order parameter as a function of the variability q for different values of the tolerance
threshold Z. N = 900, 〈k〉 = 4, average over 1000 replicas.
monocultural phase, with a giant cultural cluster, a multicultural one with disconnected mono-
cultural domains, and finally a multicultural phase with continuous rewiring. The nature of the
latter phase has been successfully explained in (166): At very large values of the initial cultural
diversity q, the expected number of pairs of agents sharing at least one cultural trait becomes
smaller than the total number of links in the network, so that rewiring cannot stop. Here we
will focus attention on the first two phases and the transition between them.
In figure 9.2 we show the size distribution of the dominant culture over different realiza-
tions, measured for different values of q, at a particular fixed value of the tolerance Z = 0.5.
In the region of q values near the transition from globalization to multiculturalism, the distri-
bution is double peaked, indicating that the transition is first order, as in the original Axelrod’s
model. The transition value, qc, may be roughly estimated as the q value where the areas below
the peaks of the size distribution are equal. The estimates of the transition points for different
values of the tolerance Z are shown in Fig. 9.3. The non monotonous character of the graph
qc(Z) seen in this figure reveals a highly non trivial influence of the tolerance parameter on the
co-evolution of cultural dynamics and the network of social ties.
Let us first consider the (most tolerant) case Z = 0.9 that, except for the system size
N , coincides exactly with the situation considered in (167), i.e., only links with zero cultural
overlap are rewired. As discussed in (167), for q values larger than the critical value for a fixed
network ( qc(Z = 1) ≃ 60), rewiring allows redirecting links with zero overlap to agents with
some common cultural trait (compatible agents), so reinforcing the power of social influence
to reach cultural globalization. Once all links connect compatible agents, rewiring stops (note:
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Figure 9.2: Histograms of Smax/N for different values of q, and for a fixed tolerance Z = 0.5,
N = 900, 〈k〉 = 4. From this figure one gets qc ∼ 20.
the decrease to zero of a positive cultural overlap cannot be strictly excluded, though it may be
considered as a non typical event). From there on, the network structure will remain fixed, and
globalization will be reached with the proviso that the network has so far remained connected.
This is the case for most realizations (for N = 900) up to values of q ∼ 240. Increasing
further the cultural diversity q, increases the frequency of rewiring events and slows down the
finding of compatible agents, favoring the topological fragmentation into network components
before rewiring stops. Under these conditions, the asymptotic state will consist of disconnected
monocultural components.
On one hand, network plasticity allows to connect compatible agents, so promoting global-
ization; but on the other hand it may produce network fragmentation, so favoring multicultur-
alism. What we have seen in the previous paragraph is that for Z = 0.9 the first effect prevails
over the second one up to qc(Z = 0.9) ≃ 240. Going from there to less tolerant situations
(decreasing Z), increases the likelihood of rewiring, making easier that network fragmentation
occurs before rewiring stops. This has the effect of decreasing the critical value qc. In fact,
from Fig. 9.3 we see that for Z = 0.7, 0.6, and 0.5 multiculturalism prevails for cultural diver-
sities where the original Axelrod’s model shows cultural globalization. In these cases network
plasticity promotes multiculturalism in a very efficient way: Agents segregate from neighbors
with low cultural similarity and form disconnected social groups where full local cultural con-
sensus is easily achieved, for q values low enough to allow a global culture in fixed connected
networks.
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Figure 9.3: Critical value of the diversity qc versus the tolerance threshold Z, obtained from the
distribution of sizes of the dominant culture. N = 900, 〈k〉 = 4. See the text for further details.
For very low values of the tolerance parameter, though network fragmentation occurs eas-
ily during the evolution, Fig. 9.3 shows that globalization persists up to very high values of
the initial cultural diversity q. To explain this seemingly paradoxical observation, one must
realize that network fragmentation is not an irreversible process, provided links connecting
agents with high cultural overlap have a positive rewiring probability. Under these circum-
stances, transient connections among different components occur so frequently so as to make
it possible a progressive cultural homogenization between components that otherwise would
have separately reached different local consensuses. Fig. 9.4 illustrates the time evolution for
q = 100 and different values of Z. Panel (a) shows an example of cultural evolution where net-
work fragmentation reverts to a connected monocultural network for Z = 0.2. Panel (b), that
corresponds to Z = 0.6, shows that social fragmentation persists during the whole evolution,
while in panel (c), which corresponds to the most tolerant situation ( Z = 0.9), the network
remains connected all the time.
The degree distribution of the network is Poissonian centered about 〈k〉 for all q values,
except for q & qc where it becomes fat tailed, with several lowly connected (and disconnected)
sites. For very high q values, in the dynamical phase, the network rewiring is esentially random,
so Pq(k) is again Poisson like, centered around 〈k〉.
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9.4 Summary
In this chapter we have generalized the scenario for co-evolution of Axelrod’s cultural dynam-
ics and network of social ties that was considered in (166; 167), by introducing a tolerance
parameter Z that controls the strength of network plasticity. Specifically, Z fixes the fraction
of uncommon cultural features above which an agent breaks its tie with a neighbor (with prob-
ability equal to the cultural dissimilarity), so that, the lower the Z value, the higher the social
network plasticity.
Our results show that the network plasticity, when controlled by the tolerance parameter,
has competing effects on the formation of a global culture. When tolerance is highest, network
plasticity promotes cultural globalization for values of the initial cultural diversity where multi-
culturalism would have been the outcome for fixed networks. On the contrary, for intermediate
values of the tolerance, the network plasticity produces the fragmentation of the (artificial) so-
ciety into disconnected cultural groups for values of the initial cultural diversity where global
cultural consensus would have occurred in fixed networks. For very low values of the toler-
ance, social fragmentation occurs during the system evolution, but the network plasticity is so
high that it allows the final cultural homogenization of the transient groups for very high values
of the cultural diversity. Intermediate tolerances promote multiculturalism, while both extreme
intolerance and extreme tolerance favor the formation of a global culture, being the former
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more efficient than the latter.
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Chapter 10
Conclusions.
Starting from the idea of many interacting entities, we have addressed different social and eco-
nomic issues using procedures and theoretical tools from complex systems physics, in addition
to other fields, such as complex networks and game theory. Although social sciences obvi-
ously have their own methods to deal with such kind of problems, this methodology yields new
approaches, especially in problems that involve stochastic and/or nonlinear dynamics aspects,
and enhances the study of emergent properties arising from aggregating approaches.
In the first part of the thesis, we address a issue related to different sciences such as biology,
economics or sociology: the evolution of cooperation in hostile environments, that is, when in
the first instance the selfish behavior is more advantageous for the individual that cooperative
action. This problem has been dealt with in a variety of ways. In this context, the Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD) has become a paradigm for studying the emergence of cooperative behavior.
Besides, the thermodynamical perspective on evolutionary game dynamics studies (used, e.g.,
in chapter 2) is not a new issue, as can be found in research literature on game theory (16;
121), and allows us to interpret the social indicators as physical observables and later to infer
analytical results.
In chapter 2 we investigate in detail the dynamics of PD in an artificial network (Dipole
Model) that models the influence on a population of two antagonist hubs connected to the
whole population, but with no direct connection between them. Based on previous studies (109;
112; 113) that have shown that the asymptotic states of evolutionary PD in complex networks
are characterized by three kinds of agents (pure cooperators, pure defectors and fluctuating
agents), we designed the model so that the hubs remain as pure strategist; more specifically,
we constrained the initial conditions in order to cancel the probability of strategy change for
173
10. CONCLUSIONS.
the hubs. The analytical formulation enables a thermodynamic approach of the system, which
provides a description with a range of validity limited by the effects of network topology. The
results, besides providing mathematical meaning to the concept of social temperature, help to
understand the behavior of a population under the influence of two opposite influential elements
(e.g., mass media).
In chapter 3, we study the reversibility of the evolutionary dynamics of PD in different
complex networks under adiabatic variations of the temptation to defect. The results show that,
for the topologies analyzed, the process is reversible provided it is kept away from absorb-
ing states, but when the cooperation reaches a tipping point the system becomes irreversible
showing a hysteresis cycle which is a function of the considered network. The causes of irre-
versibility vary from one topology to another: the centralization of cooperator clusters around
cooperator hubs in scale-free (SF) networks prevents the onset of irreversibility in most SF
networks. However, the multiple clusterization of cooperators in Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER) networks
determines that, once the tipping-point is reached, irreversible transitions always occur, and
irreversibility is more evident around the absorbing states.
In chapter 4 we take into consideration a topic that has been deeply studied in the last years:
multiplex networks. Usually, real populations (regardless of their nature) are not isolated, but
interlinked by interactions between different layers (174; 175). In addition, the interactions
that take place within a given layer may be governed by different rules that the interactions
between elements of different layers (176; 177; 178). In this context, we study the influence
of interdependency between different layers on the degree of cooperation in stratified systems.
In particular, we focus on the case in which relations within layers are governed by an evolu-
tionary PD, while elements of different layers interact through the Snowdrift (SD) game. This
scheme models a situation in which defection is punished in interactions with outsider defec-
tors. Our model consists of two populations, provided with an internal structure of contacts,
that interact through interpopulation links. When the populations are well-mixed, we carry
out analytical calculations that populations that show, in a region of the parameter space, a
polarized state consisting of a full-cooperation community connected to a full-defection pop-
ulation. Other regions of the parameter space show quasi-polarized states, characterized by a
population where every agent defects linked to another where most agents cooperate. In order
to deal with networked populations, we solved the system numerically and found that previous
states appear when population structure is a complex network of contacts, where network reci-
procity promote cooperation. The results show that, while for small values of the temptation to
174
defect parameter polarization opposes network reciprocity, for higher temptation values both
mechanisms have the same sign promoting cooperation in a layer. As an application, we find
that the cooperation level in a target population can be controlled through a coupled defective
population.
However all the above, the statement that underlying network structure enhances coop-
eration in human interactions is based on some assumptions, namely that personal strategies
depends on neighbor’s pay-offs. Althoug network reciprocity mechanism in humans has been
deeply studied in the last twenty years (see, e.g., (16; 18; 94; 95; 96; 97; 109)), the conclusions
are in general contradictory, because the strategies are usually a hypothesis of the models with-
out experimental support (79). In chapter 5, instead of assuming that people choose following
one of the usal strategies, we analyzed the problem taken as starting point the results of re-
cent experiments (23; 100) on the behavior of small human populations in iterated PD games.
These works shown that people do not take into account the neighbors’ payoffs, but, instead,
they consider the cooperation level in their neighborhood. We have studied mathematically the
implications of such strategies in heterogeneously-connected large populations. Specifically,
we solved analytically the mean-field case and compared the theoretical results with data ob-
tained from numerical simulations made in three network topologies: regular lattice, ER and
SF. This comparison show that cooperation level is exactly the same, regardless of the net-
work structure. The consequences of this prediction are very important, because, if eventually
confirmed by experiments, they will allow to discard the network reciprocity mechanism in
human prisoner’s dilemma-like situations. Experimental confirmation implies experiments in
heterogeneous networks, and therefore, large scale experiments.
In chapter 6 we show the results of the large-scale experimental test we have performed
to test the conclusions above mentioned. Our experiment shows that, regarding human be-
havior, the underlying topology does not have influence in the observed cooperation level. In
particular, the cooperation levels observed in a regular lattice and in a heterogeneous network
are indistinguishable, moreover, the behavior of subjects appears to be independent of their
connectivity. This conclusion applies only to human cooperation in static networks, there-
fore network reciprocity may still be relevant in other contexts (e.g., in microbiology (137) or
evolving social networks (179)). Our experiment confirm that most people follow the strategy
shown in previous works (23), consisting of the imitation of neighbor’s actions with a probabil-
ity that depends on their frequency. Accordingly, the results confirm the theoretical prediction
made in chapter 5. These results may be applied to promoting cooperation in real systems, the
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study suggests that improving network structure might be an innefective policy but invites to
incentive individual behavior.
In the second part of the thesis, we study some aspects of social dynamics, focusing our
attention in particular on a issue that has been approached from biological, sociological and
philosophical perspectives: the intolerance (74). Intolerance, defined as “the refusal to accept
subjects with different characters, opinions or behaviors from ones own”, is amenable to be
dealt with agent based models (ABM), in fact, one of the first ABM designed to explore a
social issue was the segregation model of Schelling (52). Despite this, ABM have not paid
much attention to the intolerance in itself, while related issues of social dynamics -such as
homophily (59) , opinion formation (153) or rumor spreading (155)- have been deeply and
widely studied.
In chapter 7, we have introduced a model of cultural dynamics allowing agents to move
according to their degree of cultural disagreement with their neighborhood. For small density
of empty sites, the introduction of mobility into the Axelrod cultural dynamics promotes the
convergence to cultural globalization, with the consequence that the order parameter scales
with the system size. Therefore, the transition to multicultural population only occurs for finite
populations (i.e., in the thermodynamic limit there exists only monocultural phase). Further-
more, for larger densities of empty sites (i.e., when population density is below the percolation
threshold), a new phase (that we call multicultural fragmented phase) appears at low values of
the initial cultural diversity q. The causes of this new phase can be founded in the early stages
of the dynamics: for low values of q, the initial cultural overlap is enough to promote local
cultural convergence enhancing the formation of isolated clusters of agents, wich isolation pre-
vents cultural diffusion between different domains. For high enough values of the intolerance
threshold T , the increase of q has the effect of increasing the initial mobility, and the monocul-
tural phase of the original Axelrod model is recovered, followed by the multicultural phase for
high enough values of q and finite populations. Moreover, in the last transition from order to
disordered phase, the dynamics show erosion-adhesion processes associated to the agents mo-
bility; in fact, the increase in q enhances the probability of agents without a common cultural
feature with anyone else (aliens).
In chapter 8, we refined the Axelrod-Schelling model by considering the intolerance T as
a variable associated to a cultural feature, and thus subjected to cultural transmission. There
are (at least) two natural ways of relating mobility and individual intolerance: agents can move
due to the intolerance of their neighbors (social rejection) or agents can move motivated by its
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own intolerance to the cultural dissimilarity with its environment (self-exclusion). In both cases
our results indicate that tolerant traits are more likely to spread, so that the dominant culture
tends to have low values of intolerance. In addition, the selective advantage of tolerant traits
increases with the density h of empty sites, and is also higher for the social rejection scheme.
While in chapters 7 and 8 we introduced tolerance into the original Axelrod’s model
through mobility, in Chapter 9 we consider network plasticity, allowing agents to remove links
to its dissimilar neighbors. Rewiring mechanism into Axelrod dynamics was considered by
Vazquez, Gonza´lez-Avella, Eguı´luz and San Miguel (166); in their model, an agent was able
to break its link to an antithetical neighbor (i.e., they do not share any trait), redirecting it to
another agent at random. In our research, we have generalized the model proposed in Refs.
(166; 167), by introducing a tolerance parameter Z which modulates the intensity of plastic-
ity. We show that rewiring mechanism can produce opposite effects, depending on the toler-
ance value Z: while for large values of Z, rewiring enhances monoculturalism compared to
non-evolving networks, for intermediate values of the Z, rewiring mechanism promotes clus-
terization into disconnected cultural groups for values of the initial cultural diversity q which
would show monoculturalism in fixed networks. Finally, for low values of Z, transient states
show clusterization phenomena, but rewiring (encouraged by low tolerance) enhances cultural
transmision between groups for very high values of q, yielding monocultural states. In conclu-
sion, intermediate tolerance values enhance diversity, high values of tolerance greatly promote
globalization while low values of tolerance weakly promote it. Note that, unlike the Axelrod-
Schelling described in chapters 7-8, the networks used are heterogeneous and dynamic, with a
network dynamics given by the cultural dynamics.
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